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CRASHWORTHY CODE
Bryan H. Choi*
Abstract: Code crashes. Yet for decades, software failures have escaped scrutiny for tort
liability. Those halcyon days are numbered: self-driving cars, delivery drones, networked
medical devices, and other cyber-physical systems have rekindled interest in understanding
how tort law will apply when software errors lead to loss of life or limb.
Even after all this time, however, no consensus has emerged. Many feel strongly that
victims should not bear financial responsibility for decisions that are entirely automated, while
others fear that cyber-physical manufacturers must be shielded from crushing legal costs if we
want such companies to exist at all. Some insist the existing liability regime needs no modernist
cure, and that the answer for all new technologies is patience.
This Article observes that no consensus is imminent as long as liability is pegged to a
standard of “crashproof” code. The added prospect of cyber-physical injury has not changed
the underlying complexities of software development. Imposing damages based on failure to
prevent code crashes will not improve software quality, but will impede the rollout of
cyber-physical systems.
This Article offers two lessons from the “crashworthy” doctrine, a novel tort theory
pioneered in the late 1960s in response to a rising epidemic of automobile accidents, which
held automakers accountable for unsafe designs that injured occupants during car crashes. The
first is that tort liability can be metered on the basis of mitigation, not just prevention. When
code crashes are statistically inevitable, cyber-physical manufacturers may be held to have a
duty to provide for safer code crashes, rather than no code crashes at all. Second, the
crashworthy framework teaches courts to segment their evaluation of code, and make narrower
findings of liability based solely on whether cyber-physical manufacturers have incorporated
adequate software fault tolerance into their designs.
Requiring all code to be perfect is impossible, but expecting code to be crashworthy is
reasonable.
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IN CODE WE TRUST
In October 2004, Paramjit Singh entered the operating room for a
routine heart bypass surgery.1 A catheter was inserted into his heart, and
a heart monitor device was used to ensure the catheter would not overheat.
During the operation, the software controlling the heart monitor crashed,
causing the catheter to burn and destroy Singh’s heart. The hospital placed
Singh into an artificial coma for eleven weeks, during which he suffered
anoxic brain damage. Singh then received a heart transplant, but the antirejection drugs caused him to develop blood cancer, which required
subsequent treatment by chemotherapy. Total medical bills were
estimated at $2.7 million.
At trial, the evidence showed that the manufacturer of the heart monitor
was aware of and had developed a fix for the software bug as early as
1998, but made a calculated business decision not to issue a recall or
warning to any customers. Instead, monitors were patched on a rolling

1. For a fuller factual account, see Singh v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 151 Wash. App. 137, 210
P.3d 337 (2009).
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basis only when sent in for repair, and so the one used during Singh’s
operation had not yet been patched. The jury awarded Singh
$31.75 million in compensatory damages plus an additional $8.35 million
in punitive damages. The verdict was upheld on appeal.2
Singh’s case was extraordinary on many dimensions, not least of which
was the extremity of his injuries. The fact that Singh was helplessly under
anesthesia at the time likely contributed additional opprobrium.3 But by
the same token, the accident was exceedingly rare: in more than six years
of operation, the software had never before crashed mid-operation while
a catheter was inserted in a patient’s body.4 Even so, the deliberate
concealment of a simple bug fix may have made the manufacturer’s costbenefit decision seem especially callous.5
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the case, however, is how unusual
it is for a plaintiff like Singh to recover any legal damages at all. Tort
liability for software failures is a rarity.6 When Microsoft Word crashes
and loses one’s work, the only remedy is to restart, not to hire a lawyer.7
If lucky, the software in question might provide some form of “crash

2. Id.
3. Cf. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (lending generous inferences where plaintiff
was harmed while rendered unconscious for surgical treatment).
4. Singh, 151 Wash. App. at 141–42, 210 P.3d at 339–40 (noting only one other incident in Japan
in October 2002). But cf. S. Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 950 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) (“We think that negligence simply means creating a risk that a reasonably prudent person
would avoid and is not related to a statistical table of frequency of harm.”); Huggins v. Stryker Corp.,
932 F. Supp. 2d 972, 988 (D. Minn. 2013) (“The test is not whether the precise nature and manner of
the plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable, but whether the possibility of an accident was clear to the person
of ordinary prudence.” (quoting Domogala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 2011)).
5. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 293, 330–32 (2018) (describing concealment of the Cobalt ignition switch problem);
Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991); W. Kip
Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000); see also Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054, 1060–61, 1064 (Ala. 1992) (approving $7.5 million award for
punitive damages (reduced from $15 million) where automaker knew of engine stalling problems
caused by defective computer chips, developed a solution, but concealed it from the public and did
not issue a notice or recall).
6. See Jane Chong, Bad Code: Exploring Liability in Software Development, in CYBER
INSECURITY: NAVIGATING THE PERILS OF THE INFORMATION AGE 69 (Richard M. Harrison & Trey
Herr eds., 2016) [hereinafter CYBER INSECURITY]; Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort
of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1567, 1579 n.139 (2005);
Michael Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD.
L. REV. 425, 430, 469 (2008) (“To date, there are no reported decisions in the United States holding
a software vendor liable under a strict [products] liability theory.”).
7. See Emily Kuwahara, Note, Torts v. Contracts: Can Microsoft Be Held Liable to Home
Consumers for Its Security Flaws?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 998 (2007).
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recovery” that preserves one’s documents and data, but the absence of
such failsafe features triggers no legal penalty. Courts uniformly dismiss
claims of software defect, often because there is no physical injury at
stake,8 but also for a broad range of other disqualifying reasons.9 And even
when the plaintiff alleges an eligible injury, it remains exceedingly
difficult to prove whether the software caused the injury, and whether that
cause was due to some defect intrinsic to the software.10 The very fact that
the manufacturer elected not to settle Singh’s case suggests it believed it
had a plausible chance of winning—even in the face of such troubling
facts.11
8. See, e.g., Taxes of P.R., Inc. v. Tax Works, Inc., No. 14-00279, 2014 WL 6604056 (W.D. Mo.
June 16, 2014); Cotton Patch Café, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., No. 09-3242, 2012 WL 5986773 (D.
Md. Nov. 27, 2012); Hodell-Natco Indus., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-02755, 2010 WL
6765522 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2010); Shema Kolainu—Hear Our Voices v. ProviderSoft, LLC, 832 F.
Supp. 2d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re All Am. Semiconductor, Inc., 490 B.R. 418 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla.
2013). But see In re Facebook Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 428, 460–62
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss negligent design claims involving stock exchange
software); Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 866 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (negligence claims
for data breach); Clark Street Wine & Spirits v. Emporos Sys. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 474, 480–82
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (gross negligence claims for data breach); Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F.
Supp. 2d 1219, 1235–36 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (negligence claims for damages caused by spyware). These
latter cases denying motions to dismiss are very much the exception, not the rule.
9. See, e.g., Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2011) (government contractor immunity);
Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008) (no jurisdiction where injuries
occurred in Panama); Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Myriad France SAS, 850 F. Supp. 2d 878 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (contractual limitation of liability); Pirozzi v. Apple Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 840, 851–52 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (no “special relationship” between manufacturer and customer); Rock Creek Lumber Co.
v. Valley Mach. Works, Ltd., No. 3:08-cv-0967, 2010 WL 2891535 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2010) (lack
of expert testimony); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation,
and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1839, 1841–42 (2014) (collecting cases involving factory
workers injured by industrial robots, as well as cases involving robotic surgery devices, and finding
these claims generally unsuccessful); Chong, supra note 6; Scott, supra note 6. But see In re Fort
Totten Metrorail Cases Arising Out of Events of June 22, 2009, 895 F. Supp. 2d 48, 73–76, 84 (D.D.C.
2012) (rejecting government contractor and derivative sovereign immunity defenses).
10. See, e.g., Winters v. Fru-Con Inc., 498 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2007); Scott v. White Trucks, 699
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1983); West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D.N.H. 2013);
Wendorf v. JLG Indus., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Graves v. CAS Med. Sys., Inc.,
735 S.E.2d 650 (S.C. 2012); Bailey v. Disney Worldwide Shared Servs., No. 113072/08 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 10, 2012); see also Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property
in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (describing use of trade secret privilege
to withhold software source code from discovery process).
11. Settlement is a well-worn tactic used to smooth liability risks for new technologies. See Nora
Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff
& John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American
Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); Nancy Leveson, Medical Devices: The Therac-25, in
SAFEWARE:
SYSTEM
SAFETY
AND
COMPUTERS
515
(1995),
https://www.bowdoin.edu/~allen/courses/cs260/readings/theraclong.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UD9-
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As the software industry ventures from purely cyber systems toward
cyber-physical systems such as self-driving cars, delivery drones, and
networked medical devices,12 anticipation has been building that the rules
for cyber-physical liability will be different.13 Traditional software does
not kill, at least not without opportunity for human intervention.14 But
when code controls physical systems directly, code crashes will cause
physical crashes.15 “Common sense” suggests courts would “revolt” at the
idea of “killer bots.”16
Yet precisely how liability should work for cyber-physical systems has
remained in limbo. Part I identifies the three major moves proposed in the
3GDJ]; Jaclyn Trop & Ben Protess, Toyota in Talks on Final Settlements over Car Recalls, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2014, at B2, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/business/toyota-in-talks-on-finalsettlements-over-car-recalls.html [https://perma.cc/54TL-92UE] (reporting settlements in hundreds
of sudden-acceleration cases after Toyota won three trials and then lost one); Bernie Woodall, Uber
Avoids Legal Battle with Family of Autonomous Family Victim, REUTERS, Mar. 28, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-uber-settlement/uber-avoids-legal-battle-withfamily-of-autonomous-vehicle-victim-idUSKBN1H5092 [https://perma.cc/YCT8-E7RH].
12. Cyber-physical systems involve a tight coupling between embedded systems and their physical
environment. See generally Ayan Banerjee et al., Ensuring Safety, Security, and Sustainability of
Mission-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, 100 PROC. IEEE 283, 283 (2012) (“Systems that use the
information from the physical environment, and in turn can affect the physical environment during
their operation, are called cyber-physical systems (CPSs)”); Edward A. Lee, Cyber-Physical
Systems—Are Computing Foundations Adequate? (Position Paper for NSF Workshop on CyberPhysical Systems: Research Motivation, Techniques and Roadmap, Oct. 2006).
13. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019); Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile
Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611 (2017); Donald G. Gifford,
Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident
Compensation, 11 J. TORT LAW 71 (2018); Andrzej Rapaczynski, Driverless Cars and the Much
Delayed Tort Law Revolution (Colum. Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 540, 2016). For a broader
discussion of the historical salience of physical injury to tort law, see Thomas C. Grey, Accidental
Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001).
14. See Rebecca Crootof, A Meaningful Floor for “Meaningful Human Control”, 30 TEMP. INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 53 (2016); M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot
Interaction (Data & Soc’y Research Inst., Working Paper No. 1 V2, 2016).
15. Compare West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D.N.H. 2013), and
Wendorf v. JLG Indus. Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Mich. 2010), with Getz v. Boeing Co., 654
F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2011), and Bailey v. Disney Worldwide Shared Servs., No. 113072/08 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 10, 2012).
16. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Laws that Choke Creativity, TED (Mar. 2007),
https://www.ted.com/talks/larry_lessig_says_the_law_is_strangling_creativity/transcript
[https://perma.cc/J5EE-6CQ9] (“Common sense—a rare idea in the law, but here it was, common
sense—revolts at the idea” (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)); see also
BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS AND GERMS, HACKERS
AND DRONES (Lara Heimert ed., 2015); Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and
Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (2015).
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literature thus far: consumer protectionism, technology protectionism, and
doctrinal conventionalism. The first two sound a call-to-arms and
gravitate toward an all-or-nothing stance: either all the liability should fall
on cyber-physical manufacturers, or none of it should. The appeal of both
approaches is their obvious simplicity—yet this simplicity masks brittle
assumptions, such as the expected rate of injury or the amount of available
funds. A more sustainable approach demands a middle path—a mediating
principle capable of distinguishing those cyber-physical injuries that merit
remedy from those that do not. Here, the third camp counsels patience,
maintaining that the current tort regime for product safety already offers
robust balancing principles and that no drastic corrections are needed to
accommodate cyber-physical technologies.17
Contrary to such reassurances, Part II builds the case that the
conventional approaches to software safety will continue to stall even in
the cyber-physical context. A fundamental attribute of software—
computational complexity—confounds the usual tort calculus refined for
ordinary manufactured goods. Unlike mechanical errors, software errors
occur in an arbitrary manner that cannot be reasonably prevented via ex
ante design or ex post testing.18 In the commercial-grade software systems
being built today, it is impossible to guarantee complete correctness of
code. Yet once discovered, many software errors can be painted as
careless or obvious.19 Given this perplexing antinomy—simultaneous
impossibility and triviality—it is no accident that courts have struggled to
articulate an appropriate tort liability framework for buggy software. The
transition to cyber-physical systems does not solve that basic riddle.
This Article argues that as long as software errors remain inevitable,
the software liability paradigm must shift from prevention to mitigation.20

17. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 124 (1986) (defining “conventionalism” as the idea that
“the law of a community includes everything within the implicit extension of [legal] conventions”
like legislation and precedent).
18. See infra Section III.C.
19. See infra note 196; Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1854 (“Applying the ‘reasonable alternative
design’ test to software will also present problems because a programming error in the software will
constitute a defect that, having been discovered, might be easily fixed by a reprogrammed version of
the software.”). These easy fixes distinguish software from “unavoidably unsafe” products such as
pharmaceutical drugs. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k (1965); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Design Liability: Farewell to Comment k, 67 BAYLOR L.
REV. 521, 543 (2015) (“However, in the last several decades, the notion that courts have no role to
play in reviewing drug designs has fallen into disrepute.”).
20. See Jane Chong, We Need Strict Laws If We Want More Secure Software, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct.
30, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115402/sad-state-software-liability-law-bad-code-part-4
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To that end, Part III proposes adapting the doctrine of “crashworthiness”
from the automotive context to the software context. The crashworthy
doctrine holds that a vehicle manufacturer owes a duty to “use reasonable
care in the design and manufacture of a product to minimize injuries to its
users and not to subject its users to an unreasonable risk of injury in the
event of a collision or impact.”21 It originally grew out of the physics
concept—popularized by Ralph Nader—of the “second collision.”22 The
first collision is the one between the car and another external object such
as a tree; the second collision occurs when the momentum of the car stops
abruptly but the passengers do not.23 Those who documented crash sites
from the 1920s to the 1960s recorded with numbing frequency victims’
eyes impaled on jutting dashboard knobs, necks broken by rigid steering
columns, jagged “glass collars” where heads had burst through
windshields, severed arms from rollovers, and on and on without legal
solutions in sight.24
So long as the problem of car crashes was defined solely in terms of
prevention, courts remained trapped in a zero-sum tradeoff between safety
and usability. If bad drivers were the primary cause of crashes,25 then there
was very little courts could require automakers to do to prevent crashes—
short of selling “square” cars that “nobody” wanted.26 What Nader and his
allies accomplished was to redefine the problem by partitioning off the
[https://perma.cc/8Q9P-ZZER] (arguing that courts should “conceive[] of software as a product that
could be designed to minimize, though not eliminate, security vulnerabilities”).
21. Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504 (8th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
22. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 81–146 (1965).
23. See MICHAEL R. LEMOV, CAR SAFETY WARS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF TECHNOLOGY,
POLITICS, AND DEATH 50 (2015) (explaining that the “basic physics” of the second collision theory
were described by Hippocrates in the fourth century BCE and again by Sir Isaac Newton in 1687).
24. LEMOV, supra note 23, at 13–16, 54–55 (describing early publications documenting the
“sickening details” of car wrecks); NADER, supra note 22, at 93–133; see also JOEL W. EASTMAN,
STYLING VS. SAFETY: THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY, 1900–1966, at 115–17, 177–89 (1984); JEFFREY O’CONNELL & ARTHUR
MYERS, SAFETY LAST: AN INDICTMENT OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 101–42, 168–90 (1966).
25. See infra notes 35, 253.
26. Compare O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 5 (“Back in 1956 William Mitchell, GM’s
director of styling, . . . [told] a Fortune reporter that completely safe cars would appeal only to
‘squares—and there ain’t any squares no more.’”), with id. at 111 (declaring the argument that “a safe
car would be too expensive or so ugly no one would buy it . . . loses its intensity the farther away you
get from Detroit”). See also JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 104 (1990) (describing a doomed government program that produced Experimental Safety
Vehicles that “met or exceeded all existing and proposed safety standards issued through mid-1970,”
but turned out to be so clunky and expensive that it had “virtually no impact on standard setting”);
EASTMAN, supra note 24, at 184–88, 192–93, 198.
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first collision, and inventing a new tort claim focused only on the second
collision.27 By showing statistically that each and every car manufactured
is highly likely to crash at some point in its lifetime, car safety advocates
persuaded courts to set aside the thorny question of why crashes happen,
and ask instead how to minimize harm when the inevitable hits.28 This
reframing helped courts regain their footing, and the crashworthy doctrine
soon won uniform consensus across the country.29
Today, software code faces the same crossroad. Bugs and
vulnerabilities are so rampant across the industry that the question of
cybercrashes and cyberattacks is not “whether” but “when.”30 Meanwhile,
courts have deferred the issue for decades, leaving consumers to suffer
unilaterally the full externalized costs of technical debt.31 As in the
automotive context, rejecting the false idol of “crashproof” code and
adopting a new mandate of “crashworthy” code would embolden courts
and regulators to weigh in on software safety. Consumers would obtain a
coveted cause of action against cyber-physical injuries. At the same time,
cyber-physical manufacturers and engineers would also benefit by
obtaining clearer guidance on uncertain questions of tort liability.
To be clear, a judicial approach need not exclude other methods of
safety governance such as agency regulation, legislative rulemaking, or
27. A significant portion of Nader’s argument was that cars like the Chevrolet Corsair and
Volkswagen Beetle were inherently unstable by design and were likely to fishtail, roll over, and crash
at the slightest provocation. NADER, supra note 22, at ch.1; CTR. FOR AUTO SAFETY, SMALL-ON
SAFETY: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE VOLKSWAGEN ch.2 (Lowell Dodge et al. eds., 1972).
28. See Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (“Collisions with or without
fault of the user are . . . statistically inevitable.”).
29. See infra note 243.
30. See Jane Chong, Bad Code: Should Software Makers Pay? (Part 1), NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 3,
2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/114973/bad-code-should-software-makers-pay-part-1
[https://perma.cc/2TKK-B89E]; cf. Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal.
2015). For purposes of this Article, a code “crash” should be understood as any deviation from a
software program’s expected performance, including but not limited to disruption of service. See
LAURA L. PULLUM, SOFTWARE FAULT TOLERANCE: TECHNIQUES AND IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2001).
A cyberattack is the subset of code crashes involving deliberate intent.
31. Jane Chong, Why Is Our Cybersecurity So Insecure?, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/us-cybersecurity-why-software-so-insecure
[https://perma.cc/E345-Y8TV] (citing Ward Cunningham’s concept of “‘technical debt’ to describe
the long-term costs of cutting corners when developing code”); see also Jane Chong, What You Don’t
Know About Internet Security Will Definitely Hurt You, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 22, 2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/115281/what-you-dont-know-about-internet-security-willdefinitely-hurt-you [https://perma.cc/D6V9-THDN] (detailing the market failures of cybersecurity);
Chong, supra note 6, at 78 (“The idea of levying a Pigovian tax on software, which attempts to correct
the cost of insecure code to the market, is not so counterintuitive if we accept that all software contains
vulnerabilities and generates negative externalities.”).
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private self-governance. In fact, the crashworthy code framework can be
readily adapted for the regulatory setting. As the history of automotive
safety teaches, regulators have often followed the judicial lead in learning
how to set safety standards.32
Part III concludes with guidance on how to design a cyber-physical
system so that its code could be deemed “crashworthy” as a matter of law.
The computer science literature has long distinguished “fault prevention”
from “fault tolerance,” which corresponds neatly to the dichotomy
between prevention and mitigation.33 Accordingly, a doctrine of
crashworthy code could assess liability against a cyber-physical
manufacturer based on whether it adequately incorporates state-of-the-art
techniques in software fault tolerance. By definition, because the
crashworthy code doctrine does not aim to prevent all injuries, it does not
demand incorporation of techniques that lie beyond the state of the art.
This approach offers three advantages. First, from an engineering
standpoint, it reduces the complexity of the problem space by reserving
heightened scrutiny for only a small subset of code, while allowing the
vast majority of code development practices to continue as is. This
strategy also comports with best practices for safety-critical systems, such
as including multiple redundancies and anticipating ad hoc failures.
Second, from a legal standpoint, judges and juries are better equipped to
evaluate the narrower question whether a system’s design had reasonable
crashworthy measures, rather than whether the entire code base as a whole
was reasonably safe. More importantly, severing the pre-crash issues from
the post-crash issues offers courts more fine-grained control to resolve
these difficult cases. Third, from the consumer standpoint, requiring code
to be crashworthy should result in safer system designs, and match
consumer expectations for how a cyber-physical system should respond
when its code crashes.
I.

THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF SOFTWARE LIABILITY

Sudden and astounding progress in self-driving car technologies has
sparked renewed fervor that cyber-physical software can solve car

32. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to
Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG.
167 (2017).
33. See infra note 298.

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

48

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:39

accidents simply by removing humans from the loop.34 This confidence
that eliminating “human factors” is the key to elevating society can be
traced in part to longstanding beliefs that driver error is the dominant
cause of car accidents.35 It also reflects exuberance about the superior
capabilities of computer technologies,36 as well as a bias among computer
engineers that human input is the major obstacle to perfect system
design.37
34. See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1 (2017); see also JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 12–16 (2016); David C. Vladeck, Machines Without
Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 146 (2014) (“[D]riverless vehicles are likely to be far less hazardous or risky than the products they replace.”); Kevin
Funkhouser, Note, Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles, Products Liability, and the Need
for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 437, 451 & n.106 (“If early estimates about autonomous
vehicles prove to be even close to accurate, their widespread implementation could lead to one of the
greatest safety advances in decades.”). A more reliable prediction is that computer errors will be
different in kind, rather than that they will be more or less frequent. See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened
Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1241, 1260 (2012) (positing that early accident cases involving novel devices tend to exhibit
a “blam[e] the user” dynamic).
35. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 29 (“And since the horse was gone, the driver was
the only serious candidate for blame. This was simple common sense—so common that virtually
every utterance on motor vehicle safety in the critical early years of its social conceptualization
focused on the driver as the problem.”); cf. M.C. Elish & Tim Hwang, Praise the Machine! Punish
the Human!: The Contradictory History of Accountability in Automated Aviation (Data & Soc’y
Research Inst., Working Paper No. 1 V2, 2015). Most commentary cites unquestioningly to traffic
statistics attributing more than 90% of accidents to driver error, but there is disagreement as to how
much reliance to place on such statistics. Compare ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 141 (“Human
error causes the vast majority of accidents today.”), with NADER, supra note 22, at 239 (“Investigation
stops with the driver in the vast majority of cases because our statutes ascribe all responsibilities to
the driver . . . . Accident reporting and statistics also reflect the law’s emphasis.”).
36. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, The Most Important Self-Driving Car Announcement Yet,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/the-mostimportant-self-driving-car-announcement-yet/556712/ [https://perma.cc/J5P3-UQPJ] (“The first
million miles took roughly six years. The next million took about a year. The third million took less
than eight months. The fourth million took six months. And the fifth million took just under three
months. Today, that suggests a rate on the order of 10,000 miles per day. If Waymo hits their marks,
they’ll be driving at a rate that’s three orders of magnitude faster in 2020. We’re talking about
covering each million miles in hours.”). But see Vijay Kumar, Irrational Exuberance and the ‘FATE’
of Technology, COMM. ACM, Nov. 2018, at 8; Matthew Hutson, AI Researchers Allege that Machine
Learning Is Alchemy, SCIENCE (May 3, 2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/05/airesearchers-allege-machine-learning-alchemy [https://perma.cc/MGM9-MKLP].
37. See Alex Davies, The Very Human Problem Blocking the Path to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED
(Jan. 1, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/human-problem-blocking-path-selfdriving-cars/ [https://perma.cc/C97F-7JKJ]; John Markoff, Google’s Next Phase in Driverless Cars:
No
Brakes
or
Steering
Wheel,
N.Y. TIMES,
May
28,
2014,
at
B1,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/technology/googles-next-phase-in-driverless-cars-no-brakesor-steering-wheel.html [https://perma.cc/U2QL-4PLV]; Kathleen L. Mosier & Linda J. Skitka,
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Yet this buoyant optimism is matched by equally heavy pessimism. Just
a few high-profile fiascos could “trigger a crisis of confidence.”38
Regulators might shut down projects because of resistance from legacy
automakers,39 and because of public fears—fanned by armchair conceits
such as the “trolley problem”40—that autonomous software is a recipe for
premeditated murder.41 The reason for pause is not the tragedy of death

Human Decision Makers and Automated Decision Aids: Made for Each Other?, in AUTOMATION
AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 201 (Raja Parasuraman & Mustapha
Mouloua eds., 1996).
38. Joshua Corman & Beau Woods, Safer at Any Speed: The Roads Ahead for Automotive Cyber
Safety Policy, in CYBER INSECURITY, supra note 6, at 47; see also Daisuke Wakabayashi, Arizona
Orders Uber to Remove Self-Driving Cars from Its Roads, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2018, at B4,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/technology/arizona-uber-cars.html [https://perma.cc/9ZZBZXAH].
39. See Vikas Bajaj, The Distraction of Automated Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2018, at SR8,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/opinion/distraction-self-driving-cars.html
[https://perma.cc/X8Y5-9TG8]; John Lippert et al., Toyota’s Vision of Autonomous Cars Is Not
Exactly Driverless, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2018, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-09-19/toyota-s-vision-of-autonomous-cars-is-notexactly-driverless (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
40. See Bryant Walker Smith, Slow Down that Runaway Ethical Trolley, CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y (Jan. 12, 2015, 3:42 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/01/slow-down-runawayethical-trolley [https://perma.cc/GGW8-P5W3] (“Unfortunately, the reality that automated vehicles
will eventually kill people has morphed into the illusion that a paramount challenge for or to these
vehicles is deciding who precisely to kill in any given crash . . . . Late last year, I was asked the ‘who
to kill’ question more than any other—by journalists, regulators, and academics.”); see also Ryan
Calo, Is the Law Ready for Driverless Cars?, COMM. ACM, May 2018, at 34, 35 (“The New Trolley
Problem strikes me as a quirky puzzle in search of a dinner party.”); Noah Goodall, Away from Trolley
Problems and Toward Risk Management, 30 J. APPLIED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 810 (2016);
Rodney Brooks, Unexpected Consequences of Self Driving Cars, RODNEY BROOKS: ROBOTS, AI, &
OTHER STUFF (Jan. 12, 2017), https://rodneybrooks.com/unexpected-consequences-of-self-drivingcars [https://perma.cc/F7YQ-9REC] (denigrating the trolley problem as “pure mental masturbation
dressed up as moral philosophy”); Julian De Freitas et al., Doubting Driverless Dilemmas, PSYARXIV
(forthcoming 2019), https://psyarxiv.com/a36e5/ [https://perma.cc/EHU7-UJ5R] (“Instead of stoking
these flames with distracting thought experiments, we should empower safety engineers to continue
improving at the main goal of minimizing harm.”).
41. See, e.g., Jean-François Bonnefon et al., The Social Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles, 352
SCIENCE 1573 (2016) (reporting so-called “experimental ethics” results from MIT Media Lab’s
“Moral Machine” project); Bryant Walker Smith, The Trolley and the Pinto: Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Automated Driving and Other Cyber-Physical Systems, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 197, 198–99 (2017)
(collecting media hype). Note that the real technology-in-use relies on continuously updating
calculations of collision risk, not split-second judgments of moral preference. See, e.g., Consideration
of risks in active sensing for an autonomous vehicle, U.S. Patent No. 8,781,669 (filed May 14, 2012);
Controlling vehicle lateral lane positioning, U.S. Patent No. 8,781,670 (filed May 28, 2013).
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itself (tens of thousands of Americans die by car every year) but because
death by software-car is perceived as “different.”42
The legal literature thus far has offered only rudimentary guidance on
liability for autonomous vehicles.43 It can be organized broadly into three
camps. One perspective is consumer protectionism, which seizes on the
central fact that end users are no longer in charge when autonomous
software takes over control. If human “drivers” are no longer driving, how
could it be fair to hold them responsible for car accidents? Surely the fault
must fall elsewhere. A counter-response, technology protectionism, raises
fears that out-of-control liability costs will drive manufacturers out of
business. Transformative technologies are considerably more difficult to
build than the ordinary consumer could fathom, and liability must be
capped if such ventures are to be risked at all; technology companies
cannot be used as societal insurers. In its strongest form, the argument is
for absolute immunity from tort liability; weaker versions seek merely to
cap damages in more limited fashion. The third stance, doctrinal
conventionalism, cautions against adopting either of the two extremes.
Instead, this view holds that existing regimes such as negligence and
products liability are flexible and capacious enough to address cyberphysical harms on a case-by-case basis.
A.

Consumer Protectionism: A Heavy Hand

The first approach, consumer protectionism, draws on one of the richest
traditions of twentieth century American legal theory.44 It takes the
general view that the burdens caused by new technologies should not be
forced upon hapless victims, but should be borne instead by those best
situated to account for those risks.45 An important battle within this
tradition has been over how to apportion costs when the plaintiff shares
42. Azim Shariff et al., Psychological Roadblocks to the Adoption of Self-Driving Vehicles,
NATURE HUM. BEHAV., Sept. 2017, at 694; HILLARY ABRAHAM ET AL., MIT AGELAB, AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLES, TRUST AND DRIVING ALTERNATIVES: A SURVEY OF CONSUMER PREFERENCES (2016).
43. See, e.g., DOROTHY GLANCY ET AL., TRANSP. RES. BD., A LOOK AT THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
FOR DRIVERLESS VEHICLES 79 (2016) (concluding that “forecasts regarding the ‘likely’ or optimal
legal policy responses to driverless vehicles should be made only tentatively”).
44. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 921
(2010) (discussing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881)); John C.P. Goldberg,
Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 523–24 (2003) (describing modernity’s influence
on American tort theory).
45. See generally Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91
GEO. L.J. 585 (2003); Mario J. Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict
Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980).
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some percentage of fault, e.g., for reckless driving. But when autonomous
software takes full control of the wheel, the argument that liability should
be shared is significantly weakened.46 Intuitively, many commentators
start from the gut sense that victims of driverless accidents are blameless
and should not have to pay for their injuries.47
Strict liability has long been the first resort of those seeking to shift the
costs of accidents away from victims to other responsible parties.48 There
are two flavors of strict liability: the older vintage is for “ultrahazardous”
or “abnormally dangerous” activities such as blasting rocks, keeping
vicious animals, or storing toxic chemicals.49 Some have asked whether
lack of human controllability could qualify as abnormally dangerous.50
However, technological novelty should not be conflated with abnormality.
That post-industrial distinction helps explain why this doctrine’s scope
has become vanishingly thin, and why extending it to consumer-oriented
goods and services would be a poor conceptual fit where the intended use
is normal, not abnormal.51 A more helpful heuristic here is whether a given
46. See Rapaczynski, supra note 13. Questions of victim fault do not disappear entirely, however:
residual claims might include failure to maintain software updates, intentional tampering by end users,
and the child who runs out in front of a moving car.
47. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Carmakers Be Liable When a Self-Driving Car Crashes?,
FORBES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2016/09/22/shouldcarmakers-be-liable-when-a-self-driving-car-crashes/ [https://perma.cc/7PAT-QKBW].
48. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681,
703–04 (1980); George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2301, 2307 (1989) (“The simple desire of the founders was to ease consumer recovery in cases in
which consumers had suffered personal injury from products which obviously had been
mismanufactured.”).
49. Charles E. Cantú, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities
from Strict Products Liability Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel
Lines of Reasoning that Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. REV. 31 (2002). This version of strict
liability represents the only remnants that survived the dramatic shift to negligence theory at the end
of the nineteenth century. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 44, at 921–22; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 520 (1977).
50. See Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car
Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 459 & n.40 (2013) (citing an early case from 1921
finding an out-of-control car to be a “dangerous instrumentality”); Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1862–
63 & n.291 (collecting discussion). But cf. M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 610
(2011) (“Despite the inevitability of some injury and damage, there is little reason to assume that
personal robots will regularly harm people or property.”).
51. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability:
Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1355, 1376 & n.81 (2009)
(observing that “very few activities have been found to be abnormally dangerous,” not even gas lines,
power lines, underground storage of gasoline, or transportation of dangerous chemicals) (citing
Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 623–24 (1999)).
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cyber-physical system is inappropriate or unfit for the location in which it
is deployed.52 For example, autonomous weapons systems for military use
or nanobot swarms for industrial use could be considered abnormally
dangerous if deployed in a residential neighborhood.53 But autonomous
taxi fleets intended for urban use almost certainly would not, because that
activity is categorically appropriate for the zone.54
The more modern version of strict liability, pioneered in the mid-1960s,
is for consumer products in “defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user.”55 After an intense bloom in the 1960s and 1970s, the strict
products liability movement has likewise faced stiff cutback in
courtrooms and mainstream tort scholarship following the liability
insurance crisis of the 1970s and 1980s56 and the subsequent tort reform
movement of the 1990s and 2000s.57
Nevertheless, strict products liability has been enjoying a popular
revival within the software and robotics literature. The conceptual moves
52. See Cantú, supra note 49, at 35–40; Mark A. Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the
Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 653–55 (1998);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM ch.4 (AM. LAW INST.
2009); David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence,
89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 146 (2014) (asserting that driverless vehicles cannot be ultrahazardous “for
the simple reason that driver-less vehicles are likely to be far less hazardous or risky than the products
they replace”).
53. See WITTES & BLUM, supra note 16, at 35–37 (describing research efforts on nanotechnology
and nanobots); Henry Fountain & Michael S. Schmidt, ‘Bomb Robot’ Takes Down Gunman, but
Raises Enforcement Questions, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2016, at A15.
54. Even if autonomous cars are not “abnormal,” one might well believe they should be held to a
supernatural standard of care. This intuition is better explained by the concept of “compliance error”
than of “ultrahazardous activity.” See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 887, 903, 910 (1994) (observing the “paradox” that “accidents in areas with the most
safety equipment are the strongest res ipsa cases” because there are more possibilities for compliance
error, which he defines as “an inadvertent failure to use a precaution”). Many thanks to Martha
Chamallas for this pointer.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
56. See Anita Johnson, Products Liability “Reform”: A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L. REV. 677
(1978); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988).
57. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law:
A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (2010); Goldberg, supra
note 44, at 540 (observing that the strict liability movement “has lost a good deal of its momentum”);
James A. Henderson, Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 390–97 (2002)
(arguing that broad-based strict liability is “not viable” because it is not insurable, due to problems
such as adverse selection and moral hazard); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the
Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 1, 88–93 (2002); Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061 (2009).
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are well-established: cyber-physical manufacturers should bear unilateral
responsibility because they are the “least cost avoiders” as well as the
“best risk spreaders.”58 To the first point, software manufacturers typically
maintain tight control over their code and fiercely guard its secrecy.59 No
one else is likely to have better knowledge or ability to certify code quality
or to improve code safety than those holding the pen.60 To the second
point, ordinary consumers are less likely to have the financial resources
to pursue litigation, whereas well-endowed corporations are betterpositioned to “spread the losses” across greater pools of revenue.61
And yet there is reason for pessimism: none of those arguments are
new, and they have long failed to move any court to extend products
liability law to software.62 Even more damning is the fact that the strict

58. See, e.g., Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things: Should
Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 913,
916 (2017) (“[H]olding manufacturers liable for downstream harms caused by their insecure
devices . . . encourage[es] manufacturers (as a least-cost-avoider) to invest in security measures.”);
Jeffrey K. Gurney, Note, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving
Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. & TECH. POL’Y 247, 272 (the manufacturer “writes and
controls the algorithm for the autonomous technology,” so therefore “the easiest method for courts to
ensure autonomous vehicle safety would be to hold the manufacturer liable for accidents caused in
autonomous mode”); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1526–
29 (2017) (“[P]lacing the risk of cyber-incidents on parties that are better able to mitigate them will
likely lead to an overall improvement in the systems that make up the cybersecurity ecosystem,
reducing the overall risk for everyone.”). See generally Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort
Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 262 (1976).
59. See Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1052 (2011); Harry
Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (2016); Wexler, supra note 10.
60. See Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777, 1779, 1794 (2014)
(arguing that manufacturer duties should expand with greater proximity to “knowledge about, access
to, and control over their products, the people who use them, and the ways in which they are used”);
cf. NADER, supra note 22 (arguing that it is easier to change manufacturer behavior than to change
consumer behavior). But see Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a
Legitimate, Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV.
753 (2016) (arguing that a free-market system for bug hunting would be an efficient solution).
61. Orly Ravid, Comment, Don’t Sue Me, I Was Just Lawfully Texting & Drunk When My
Autonomous Car Crashed Into You, 44 SW. L. REV. 175, 201 (2014) (“[M]anufacturers should be per
se liable for any injury resulting from complete and proper autonomous use.”); Jacob D. Walpert,
Note, Carpooling Liability?: Applying Tort Law Principles to the Joint Emergence of Self-Driving
Automobiles and Transportation Network Companies, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1863, 1894–95 (2017).
Volvo, followed by a few other automakers, proclaimed willingness to accept full liability. Geistfeld,
supra note 13, at 1629–30 & n.52.
62. See infra note 142.
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products liability movement has eroded to the point where it is hardly
“strict” at all anymore.63
No-fault insurance is the new hope for those who acknowledge the
shortcomings of strict liability as a doctrinal matter but want to find
alternative ways to make it work.64 Advocates hawk no-fault schemes as
a win-win-win: manufacturers can smooth their losses, victims can
receive guaranteed payouts, and courts can outsource tricky liability
questions to insurers who have expertise at pricing risk.65 Fringe benefits
include that the insurance system is more cost-effective than the tort
system,66 and that the insurance industry will “nudge” manufacturers to
improve on a battery of safety metrics.67
Other scholars sound a note of caution against invoking insurance as
deus ex machina, citing problems with prior no-fault schemes.68 First,
63. Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1823–26 (noting that only manufacturing defects and distributor
liability are truly strict); Twerski & Henderson, supra note 57. But cf. Douglas A. Kysar, The
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003) (drawing on behavioral psychology
literature to argue that there may be a role remaining for the stricter “consumer expectations” test).
64. See Abraham & Rabin, supra note 13 (propounding a “Manufacturer Enterprise Responsibility
(MER)” scheme that would be a “manufacturer-financed, strict responsibility bodily-injury
compensation system, administered by a Fund created through assessments levied on HAV [highly
automated vehicle] manufacturers”); Daniel A. Crane et al., A Survey of Legal Issues Arising from
the Deployment of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191,
258 (2017) (“In the long run, however, the new products liability risks associated with the shift to
ACVs seem entirely insurable, given the size of reinsurance markets and given their ability to handle
substantially larger risks.”). But see Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Summer 1991, at 11, 26–28 (observing that “liability insurance attempts to provide
perfect compensation, while accident insurance covers only risks that victims believe it worthwhile
to insure against”).
65. Calo, supra note 50, at 609–11; Ravid, supra note 61, at 203 (“In wanting to avoid the problem
of needless complicated and expensive litigation, an insurance solution ought to do the trick.”);
Vladeck, supra note 34, at 147–49; see also Hurwitz, supra note 58, at 1540–42; Kuwahara, supra
note 7, at 1010–12.
66. Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1694.
67. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012); see also MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 209–
13 (discussing Motor Vehicle Mfgrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), and
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). But see NADER, supra note
22, at 248–57 (summarizing the insurance industry’s position as one of calculated indifference:
“[t]hey don’t want us telling them how to build autos and we don’t want them telling us how to sell
insurance”); Crane et al., supra note 64, at 256–57 (“Of course, over time, as auto products liability
insurance premiums increase, those costs will be shifted back to auto makers, who will (again) shift
most of those costs back to auto consumers through higher auto prices.”).
68. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise”, 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2012) (attributing the failure of the no-fault movement to evidence that nofault is associated with increased fatality rates, resistance by the plaintiffs’ bar, as well as the rise of
auto insurers as primary payers); Efthimios Parasidis, Recalibrating Vaccination Laws, 97 B.U. L.
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financial constraints call into question the assumption that insurers will
always be able and willing to pay.69 No-fault schemes may be more
feasible where claims are rarely needed (as in nuclear energy insurance
pools), or where there is a special relationship that reduces moral hazard
(as in workers’ compensation and victim compensation funds).70 By
contrast, auto injury victims are among the most likely to seek
compensation.71 When claims exceed profit models, insurers reduce
payouts, deny claim coverage, or exit the market entirely.72 Second,
political resistance can thwart the enactment of no-fault compensation
schemes, or upset the delicate balancing needed to make such systems
work as designed.73 Third, liability insurance is useful for pooling factual
risks, but not for resolving uncertainties about the liability standard

REV. 2153 (2017); JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 1 (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/
2010/RAND_MG860.pdf [https://perma.cc/54S8-DK48]; GLANCY ET AL., supra note 43, at 47–61.
69. See, e.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26 (describing insurance crisis of the 1980s);
Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987);
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987);
Heather Long, Where Harvey Is Hitting Hardest, 80 Percent Lack Flood Insurance, WASH. POST
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/29/where-harvey-ishitting-hardest-four-out-of-five-homeowners-lack-flood-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/MYJ5-QSXZ]
(“Private insurers largely avoid offering flood insurance because it’s hard to price the risk and they
lose money. The federal program is struggling financially.”); Mary Williams Walsh, Wildfires Move
California Closer to Insurance Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2018, at B1.
70. See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, supra note 13 (leaning heavily on the assumption that autonomous
vehicles will be substantially safer than conventional vehicles); Gifford, supra note 13, at 127 (noting
that “many employers promoted the adoption of workers’ compensation because of their fear that the
fellow-servant rule . . . was about to collapse”). But see Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
in Workers’ Compensation: The Recent California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983 (1993).
71. See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 299 (citing DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1991)); cf. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New
Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 501 (2001) (finding
that tort claims are often shaped to match the available insurance coverage).
72. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Tort Luck and Liability Insurance, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 33
(2017) (“The crisis of the mid-1980s was a shot across the bow of courts and legislatures. These
institutions saw for the first time that where tort law went, liability insurance was not always sure to
follow. And with that recognition, the expansion of long-tail liability halted.”); Nora Freeman
Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 U. PENN. L. REV.
1631, 1655–58 (2015); Paul Heaton et al., Victim Compensation Funds and Tort Litigation Following
Incidents of Mass Violence, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1263 (2015).
73. See Engstrom, supra note 5, at 312–13 (collecting commentary); Henderson, supra note 57, at
383 & nn.36–37 (detailing several failed efforts to expand no-fault insurance, and noting that “‘the
no-fault movement ground to a halt in 1975’” and that “[n]o state has enacted a no-fault statute since
1975, and several no-fault statutes have been repealed” (citations omitted)); Hubbard, supra note 9,
at 1859–60.
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itself.74 Professor Mark Geistfeld warns that “when there is a fundamental
disagreement about the underlying liability rules, the uncertainty is
systemic and cannot be eliminated by the pooling of individual risks
within an insurance scheme.”75 Professor Patrick Hubbard also reflects
this caution, pointing out that
[A]ny proposal to impose no-fault liability for accidents caused
by fully autonomous cars needs to provide a test for determining
which accident costs will be imposed on sellers . . . . Simply
referring to the manufacturer’s ability to spread the cost ignores
these tasks as well as the reasons for abandoning cost-spreading
as a basis for products liability.76
To date, “cyber insurance” policies remain conspicuously limited in their
coverage.77
Another variation on the theme of consumer protectionism is to bypass
the manufacturer and pin liability directly on the autonomous entity

74. See Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 478, 483–84 (Peter
W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds. 1991) [hereinafter LIABILITY MAZE] (“As one prominent Lloyd’s
aviation underwriter put it: ‘We are quite prepared to insure the risks of aviation, but not the risks of
the American legal system.’”). Compare Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 11 (detailing automobile
accident insurance claims from 1920s to 1960s), with infra notes 188–90 (denial of Y2K insurance
claims). See generally MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 216–17 (describing dysfunctions in
value-of-life calculations, finding a range of imputed values “from $93,000 to $989,000,000 per life
saved” reflecting a “spectacular variance” of a factor of 1,000); Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and
Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 697 n.5 (1978) (observing that auto
liability insurers historically have defended harsher rules for tort recovery).
75. Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1618; see also John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 755 (1983) (“How does one
spread the potential loss of an unknowable hazard? How can insurance premiums be figured for this
purpose? Indeed, will insurance be available at all? . . . Providing compensation should not be the
sole basis for imposing tort liability, and this seems more emphatically so in the situation where the
defendant is no more able to insure against unknown risks than is the plaintiff.”); cf. Kenneth S.
Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 653 (2013) (cataloging the many
interpretive difficulties and market failures that arise within insurance law).
76. Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1868–69 (emphasis added).
77. Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Techno-Neutrality Solution to Navigating
Insurance Coverage for Cyber Losses, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 645 (2018); see also GLANCY ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 57 (noting that “insurers are beginning to add cyber exclusions to the policies to
avoid any ambiguity with respect to the issue”); Hurwitz, supra note 58, at 1536–38 (collecting
skeptical commentary and observing that the “cyber-insurance market has, in fact, proceeded along
these lines”); Robert Morgus, Cyber Insurance: A Market-Based Approach to Information Assurance,
in CYBER INSECURITY, supra note 6, 155, 161–62 (observing that “[m]any cyber insurance policies
exclude physical damage,” and that “only 50 percent cover the loss associated with restoring systems
due to physical damage caused by an incident”).

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

CRASHWORTHY CODE

57

itself.78 Lured by dreams of sentient robots, these thought experiments
often draw analogies to torts committed by animals or children.79 More
pragmatic economic drivers are at work here, too; Professor David
Vladeck offers the best example of how these two ideas interrelate.80 He
candidly confesses he favors a strict liability regime for consumer welfare
purposes, yet feels uncomfortable “making the manufacturer shoulder the
costs alone.”81 Vladeck’s compromise is to transfer liability to the robots,
in personam, for any injury-producing decisions that cannot be reasonably
assigned to their manufacturers.82 The robot—like the insurer—serves as
a pass-through vessel that dissociates the desire of victim compensation
from the pain of manufacturer payment. But this invention is an illusion:
robots will have owners, so robot liability is respondeat superior by
another name.83
78. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION OF 16 FEBRUARY 2017 WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
COMMISSION ON CIVIL LAW RULES ON ROBOTICS § 59(f) (2017) (proposing—
unsuccessfully—that “the most sophisticated autonomous robots” should have the status of
“electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause”); SAMIR CHOPRA &
LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 143–44 (Melody
Herr ed., 2011); Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability,
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018); Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision
Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1326, 1328–
29 (2012) (“With a fully autonomous vehicle, however, the responsibility for avoiding an accident
shifts entirely to the vehicle.”); K.C. Webb, Comment, Products Liability and Autonomous Vehicles:
Who’s Driving Whom?, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2017); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies
for Robots (Stanford Law and Economics Olin, Working Paper No. 523, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223621 [https://perma.cc/M28S-XLE8]; Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1630
(“Lest there be any doubt about the matter, NHTSA has ruled that Google’s self-driving car is the
equivalent of a human driver for federal regulatory purposes.”).
79. See F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83
TEMPLE L. REV. 405 (2011); CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 78, at 11–13; Duffy & Hopkins, supra
note 50, at 467 (arguing injuries involving autonomous cars should be treated like dog attacks, rather
than “dangerous instrumentalities,” because “both dogs and autonomous cars think and act
independently from their human owners”); Marchant & Lindor, supra note 78; cf. Christina Mulligan,
Revenge Against Robots, 69 S.C. L. REV. 579 (2018) (endorsing the psychological “satisfaction” of
punishing robots by drawing analogies to animals). But see Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of
Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 528–29 & n.108, 539 & n.166 (2015) (“There are analytic and
technical reasons to believe robots will never think like people.”).
80. Vladeck, supra note 34.
81. Id. at 146–48.
82. Id. at 124 & n.27; id. at 150 (“Conferring ‘personhood’ on these machines would resolve the
agency question; the machines become principals in their own right, and along with the new legal
status would come new legal burdens, including the burden of self-insurance.”). See generally
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1243–48
(1992).
83. Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217,
1223–25 (2017) (“I have coined a phrase—the homunculus fallacy—to describe . . . the belief that
TO THE

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

58

B.

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:39

Technology Protectionism: A Light Touch

The second approach, technology protectionism, starts from the
opposite premise that it is cyber-physical manufacturers who need
safeguarding.84 Alarmed that exposure to mass tort liability might choke
innovation, these commentators argue that difficult questions of software
liability should continue to be deferred for the greater societal good, citing
many prospective benefits such as lives saved, time and money conserved,
and toxic emissions reduced.85
Professor Ryan Calo has been a prominent proponent of robot
exceptionalism. Writing in 2011, Calo proposed a limited form of
immunity in which manufacturers would be shielded from tort liability for
third-party tinkering, akin to protections for firearms manufacturers and
website operators.86 More recently, he has extended the argument further
to encompass “emergent” robot behavior—decisions that are self-learned
and self-executed without any direct input from human programmers.87
While Calo is sensitive to the safety risks that such unsupervised

there is a little person inside the program who is making it work—who has good intentions or bad
intentions, and who makes the program do good or bad things. But, in fact, there is no little person
inside the algorithm . . . . The effects of robotics are always about the relationships of power between
human beings or groups of human beings.”); see also WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL
MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG (Martha Ramsey ed., 2009) (autonomous
machines are operational rather than functional agents); Calo, supra note 79, at 542–43 & nn.184–
86; Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1862–65 (collecting commentary); cf. James Grimmelmann, There’s
No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work—And It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
403 (2016); Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship, Disrupted: AI Authors in Copyright and First
Amendment Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589 (2017). But see Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors,
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 231 (2016) (“Finding a developer, operator, or other person to blame for
every action of a robot could be problematic in several ways.”).
84. See NIDHI KALRA ET AL., RAND, LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGIES 46–47 (2009), http://www.dot.ca.gov/newtech/researchreports/reports/2009/prr2009-28_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle_final_report_2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28GZ-DFV5];
Adam Thierer, When the Trial Lawyers Come for the Robot Cars, SLATE (June 10, 2016, 7:09 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/06/if_a_driverless_car_crashes_who_is
_liable.html [https://perma.cc/ECP2-BUEL].
85. See, e.g., Crane et al., supra note 64, at 298–301 (enumerating crash avoidance, increased
productivity, decreased congestion, fuel savings, car sharing, increased mobility, and network
effects); id. at 315 (suggesting possible subsidies for innovation including liability caps, tax credits,
and more); Bryant Walker Smith, supra note 41; see also Calo, supra note 50, at 575 (“[T]he potential
for crippling legal liability . . . may lead entrepreneurs and investors to abandon open robots in favor
of robots with more limited functionality.”).
86. Calo, supra note 50.
87. Calo, supra note 79, at 538–40, 554–55; cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF.
L. REV. CIRCUIT 45 (2015) (response to Ryan Calo).
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autonomy poses,88 his calculus is that the risks are outweighed by the
future societal benefits that robots—and those tinkering with robots—are
likely to deliver.89
Given the physical risks, Calo and others have suggested that immunity
could be paired with a federal agency review model patterned after the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)—the gold standard among technology oversight
bodies.90 Ideally, the upfront regulatory cost of this safety review and
compliance process would be offset by federal preemption of state tort
law on the back end, thereby maximizing consumer safety while
minimizing litigation risk.91 Skeptics of this preclearance model warn, on
one side, that a safety review does not guarantee careful review, and on
the other side, that a governmental review process can be too onerous and

88. Calo, supra note 50, at 603 (“The problem with blanket immunity in the context of robotics is
that it would remove not only the legal disincentive to the production of open robots but also an
incentive to make them safe.”); Calo, supra note 79; see also Christopher Wing, Note, Better Keep
Your Hands on the Wheel in That Autonomous Car: Examining Society’s Need to Navigate the
Cybersecurity Roadblocks for Intelligent Vehicles, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 729–31 (2016).
89. Calo, supra note 50, at 605. Bryant Walker Smith uses the phrase “newly possible” to express
a similar optimism. Smith, supra note 41, at 208 n.60. But see Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1869
(expressing skepticism about the claimed benefits, and criticizing such proposals as “simply
ignor[ing] the need to balance innovation with injury costs in a way that incentivizes safety
improvements”).
90. See RYAN CALO, BROOKINGS INST., THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS COMMISSION (2014);
Calo, supra note 79, at 555–58; Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has
Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672 (2016); Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial
Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353
(2016); Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: Legal
Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 190–97 (2014); Marchant &
Lindor, supra note 78, at 1321, 1337–39; cf. Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74
MD. L. REV. 785 (2015) (embracing the FTC enforcement paradigm for data privacy); Crane et al.,
supra note 64, at 224–27, 240–45 (considering potential regulatory oversight by agencies such as
NHTSA, FCC, and FTC, and noting that “calls for the creation of a Federal Robotics Commission”
have “yet to gain traction”).
91. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization
of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:
An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 368–71 (1984); Marchant & Lindor, supra note
78, at 1337–39.
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cause undesirable delay.92 Moreover, preemption doctrine is notoriously
incoherent and has been a patchy source of manufacturer immunity.93
Professor Mark Geistfeld offers a similar vision in which
manufacturers could win immunity by disclosing aggregate performance
indicators that satisfy a predetermined safety benchmark.94 This proposal
echoes the premarket approval process for pharmaceuticals,95 but does not
depend on the involvement of a federal agency.96 By tying the liability
standard to external test data rather than to internal properties of the code
itself, Geistfeld hopes manufacturers will be able to obtain more certainty
regarding their liability-risk exposure.
Although calls for manufacturer immunity have been more muted
within academic circles, many state legislatures have begun studying the
ramifications of enacting such immunities at the behest of
manufacturers.97
C.

Doctrinal Conventionalism: An Invisible Hand

A third approach to the question of liability for autonomous vehicles is
doctrinal conventionalism, which takes the view that the modern tort
regime is sufficiently robust to accommodate any new technology,
92. Compare Efthimios Parasidis, Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a Sensible Legal
Framework, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 183 (2018) (worrying about insufficient oversight), with
Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the FDA Review Process, 51 FOOD
& DRUG. L.J. 651 (1996) (complaining of regulatory bloat) and Lars Noah, The Little Agency That
Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901
(2008) (criticizing agency overreach).
93. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: Regulatory Substitutes
or Complements?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1724–33 (2016) (mapping significant rifts within preemption
doctrine); Engstrom, supra note 72; Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1859–60, 1866–67, 1871–72.
94. Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1651 (arguing that a fully autonomous vehicle will “necessarily
drive in a reasonably safe manner if prior driving experience shows that [it] at least halves the
incidence of crashes relative to conventional vehicles”).
95. See Richard Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J.
TORT L. [ii] (2006) (proposing that FDA preemption should be tied to adequate information
disclosures by pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers).
96. Geistfeld adds, however, that federal standards could reinforce this approach via the regulatory
compliance defense. Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1685–88.
97. See, e.g., S.B. 220, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2018) (enacting affirmative defense
for data breach lawsuits); S.B. 998, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (exempting mechanics from
liability for repairs to automated motor vehicles); S.B. 663, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013)
(limitations on manufacturer liability for third-party modifications made to automated motor
vehicles). See generally Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomousvehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/VC44-ZLP5].
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without special provisions such as strict liability or immunity.98 Typically,
the doctrinal analysis focuses on two dominant theories of tort law:
negligence and strict products liability.99 Both are defined in terms of
“reasonableness,” though the target differs: negligence measures the
reasonable care of one’s conduct, while products liability measures the
reasonable safety of one’s product.100 While there are some differences at
the margins, there exists broad agreement among tort scholars that the two
theories have largely converged in recent decades, especially with respect
to product design where conduct and product merge.101
Professor Patrick Hubbard offers one of the earliest, and strongest,
forms of this genre.102 After stepping methodically through a
comprehensive tour of blackletter law, Hubbard concludes there is
absolutely no justification to “abandon[] a system that has provided, and
will continue to provide, a fair and efficient balance of innovation and
safety in robotic machines.”103 The term “reasonable” is a deliberately
flexible concept that can readily accommodate any evolutions in
technology to maintain “an efficient balance between the concern for
physical safety and the desire for innovation.”104 In his view, proposals
for “fundamental change” on either side—no-fault schemes to help

98. See Hubbard, supra note 9; see also GLANCY ET AL., supra note 43, at 35–41; Andrew P. Garza,
Note, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 581, 583 (2012) (“[P]roducts liability law is capable of handling autonomous vehicles
in the same way that it handled new safety technologies in the past.”); Alexander Herd, Note,
R2Dford: Autonomous Vehicles and the Legal Implications of Varying Liability Structures, 5
FAULKNER L. REV. 29 (2013); Jeremy Levy, No Need to Reinvent the Wheel: Why Existing Liability
Law Does Not Need to Be Preemptively Altered to Cope with the Debut of the Driverless Car, 9 J.
BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 355 (2015).
99. GLANCY ET AL., supra note 43, at 31–35; Crane et al., supra note 64, at 259–61; Scott, supra
note 6, at 441–50, 467–70.
100. For a detailed discussion of strict products liability as applied to autonomous vehicles, see
Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1632–47.
101. See David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 927, 931 (2009) (noting the
“open secret” that “while purporting to apply ‘strict’ liability doctrine to design cases, courts in fact
were applying principles that look remarkably like negligence”); Twerski & Henderson, Triumph of
Risk-Utility, supra note 61. But cf. Richard C. Ausness, Product Liability’s Parallel Universe: FaultBased Liability Theories and Modern Products Liability Law, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 635, 635 (2009)
(observing that “plaintiffs now commonly supplement or even replace strict liability with claims that
rely on fault-based liability theories”).
102. Hubbard, supra note 9.
103. Id. at 1872.
104. Id. at 1861, 1865.
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plaintiffs, or limitations on liability to help defendants—are solutions in
search of a problem.105
A softer version is offered by Professor Dorothy Glancy and her coauthors in their comprehensive report for the Transportation Research
Board.106 They predict that litigation over autonomous vehicle safety will
progress in three broad phases: (1) a first stage that adheres closely to
claims that are presently successful in conventional automobile litigation;
(2) a second stage that witnesses the evolution of more sophisticated legal
claims to match developing societal expectations for software
performance; and (3) a third stage where claim resolution becomes
routinized as the litigation landscape matures.107 This prediction is
modeled closely on a study of the historical arc of early automotive
litigation,108 with the main implication being that tort law will readily
absorb cyber-physical technologies despite some false starts. While the
report remains carefully agnostic as to the precise content of those future
claims, it concludes that there likely will be some blend of strict liability
theories and negligence principles, along with regulatory rulemaking.109
These critiques are well-taken. Yet, the salient question is not whether
but how these general tort principles can be adapted to work for cyberphysical systems. To answer that question, one must first articulate a
theory of why courts have had great difficulty assessing liability in the
software context. This investigation is the subject of the next Part.
II.

THE UNREASONABLENESS OF CRASHPROOF CODE

The main puzzle of software liability law has been its curious absence.
Two hypotheses have dominated the literature across prior decades. The
first is a definitional claim that software does not fit neatly within the four
corners of tort law. After all, software blurs the traditional line between
intangible information and tangible object,110 and tort law has long
105. Id. at 1865–66 (“Liability law is designed to achieve an efficient balance between the concern
for physical safety and the desire for innovation . . . . [T]he persons proposing change simply assume,
with little or no argument, that there is a problem that needs to be addressed in a particular way.”).
106. GLANCY ET AL., supra note 43, at 30–41.
107. Id. at 37–40.
108. See id. at 35 (citing Graham, supra note 34).
109. Id. at 40–41.
110. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 381, 414 (2005) (critiquing as “barely coherent” the “search for the essential thingness
of the computer program,” which has led the law to conclude that “computer programs, by their
nature, are simultaneously both intangible things and tangible things”). The informational versus
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puzzled over how to administer claims for invisible injuries.111 Other
mechanisms such as contract law, it is argued, are better suited to redress
such claims. The second set of objections emerges from the modern lawand-economics movement as well as from innovation incentive theory.
Here, the argument is less about form than function—namely that
software is a socially beneficial industry that must be shielded from being
snuffed out by excessive legal costs.112
At first glance, both of these traditional explanations appear to fall
away in the cyber-physical context, where the injuries are very much
tangible, and the work is being led by mature, well-funded companies. For
one, an autonomous vehicle or medical implant that kills its user commits
the requisite physical harm that falls squarely within tort’s empire. For the
functional character of software has long attracted academic interest in the free speech domain,
including a recent flurry of renewed attention on so-called “algorithmic speech.” See Kaminski, supra
note 83, at 607–08 (collecting discussion). However, when put to the test, courts have been
circumspect about extending speech protections to functional aspects of code. See, e.g., Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 452 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The functionality of computer code
properly affects the scope of its First Amendment protection.”); cf. Commonwealth v. Carter, No.
SJC-12502 (Mass. Feb. 6, 2019) (“It has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of
speech . . . to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” (citation omitted)).
But see Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument
that “even one drop of ‘direct functionality’ overwhelms any constitutional protections that expression
might otherwise enjoy”).
111. See generally David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 IND. L.J.
593, 594–96 (1985) (“[A] purchaser of a defective product who has suffered economic injury but no
personal injury or property damage may recover only if he can establish fraud, misrepresentation, or
a breach of warranty”); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733 (1995); Daniel
Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002); Betsey J. Grey, The
Future of Emotional Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2605 (2015); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 136 (1992); Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on
Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (2006); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
112. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Liabilities and Software Vulnerabilities, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Oct. 20, 2005, 5:19 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/10/liabilities_and.html
[https://perma.cc/WYQ4-X2SL] (backpedaling after immediate backlash against the slightest
suggestion that software developers and vendors be liable for vulnerabilities in their code); JONATHAN
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 162–63 (2006) (placing legal
blame on each product maker “would serve only to propel PC lockdown, reducing generativity”);
Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Gordon Smith & Christine Hurt eds.,
forthcoming 2019); Eric Goldman, Ten Worst Section 230 Rulings of 2016 (Plus the Five Best), TECH.
& MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/01/ten-worstsection-230-rulings-of-2016-plus-the-five-best.htm [https://perma.cc/FDZ6-HK6A].
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other, market dynamics have shifted dramatically such that software
companies dominate the top spots for market valuation.113 The potential
prize for winning the cyber-physical race is expected to be astronomical.
Yet both narratives point to a more basic obstacle that remains
unchanged: software complexity.114 In computer science terms,
“complexity” refers not to the magnificence of a program’s output, but to
the computational impossibility of verifying and validating the
correctness of the internal logic of the program.115 Software complexity
grows at an exponential rate, meaning that as the program size increases
at a linear rate, the amount of computation needed to prove its correctness
grows asymptotically toward infinity. While testing can locate some
errors on a piecemeal basis, it cannot comb the entire universe of possible
settings (or “machine-states”) that the software might encounter in the
wild. As a result, readily fixable errors—even embarrassingly trivial
ones—regularly pass unnoticed, simply because software testing does not
have the capacity to check every corner.
In short, the challenge of software liability is that it is seemingly
impossible to identify marginal-cost measures that can or should be taken
to improve software safety. The amount of additional effort expended on
software certification does not correlate meaningfully with a reduction in
risk of software error. If all software errors look alike to jurists, then
cracking open the lid to software liability could turn every bug into a

113. See Shira Ovide & Rani Molla, Technology Conquers Stock Market, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-08-02/tech-giants-form-fab-five-todominate-stock-valuation-chart [https://perma.cc/2UPE-83CX] (listing Apple, Google, Microsoft,
Amazon, and Facebook as “the five biggest companies in the world by market value”).
114. See Chong, supra note 6, at 76 (“As Fred Brooks pointed out in his famous 1986 paper
distinguishing between essential and accidental complexity, some complexity can be eliminated by
way of code optimization. But in other respects complexity is an ‘essential property’ of software that
comes with unavoidable technical and management difficulties and leads to product flaws.”); Chong,
supra note 31 (“Gary McGraw, among the best-known authorities in the field, attributes software’s
growing security problems to what he terms the ‘trinity of trouble’: connectivity, extensibility and
complexity. To this list, let’s add a fourth commonly-cited concern, that of software ‘monoculture.’”).
115. See Robert L. Glass, Sorting Out Software Complexity, COMM. ACM, Nov. 2002, at 19; Tom
Mens, On the Complexity of Software Systems, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, Aug. 2012, at 79; Daniel L.
Dvorak, NASA Study on Flight Software Complexity, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS,
2009, at 35 (“The mathematics that so well describe physics and so well support other engineering
disciplines do not apply to the discrete logic that comprises so much of flight software . . . . [P]hysics
deals with terribly complex objects, but the physicist labors on in a firm faith that there are unifying
principles to be found. However, no such faith comforts the software engineer.”). Software
“complexity,” as used as a term of art by computer scientists, also differs from legal complexity, as
used for example by Hubbard, supra note 9, at 1851–53.
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potential multimillion-dollar lawsuit.116 To be sure, intangibility and
innovation are important clues to understanding the absence of software
liability, but they are not its root cause. A successful approach to software
liability must first relinquish the canonical assumption that reasonableness
can be judged on an individual bug-by-bug basis.
A.

Software’s Intangible Form

One prevalent explanation for the absence of software liability is
software’s intangibility. This mistaken belief traces back to the earliest
software liability cases, which were brought primarily as breach-ofwarranty claims, not as pure tort claims.117 There, the predominant
question was whether software was a “good” or a “service.”118 This
dichotomy mattered because Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC)—and its attendant warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose—applied only to sales of goods.119 Software’s
intangibility raised novel and interesting questions about the proper reach
of sales law. The fact that intangibility was summarily rejected as a
distinguishing feature has largely escaped mention within tort law.
116. See Grady, supra note 54, at 901–02, 905–06 (describing a phenomenon in negligence law
where, in cases where “efficient and inefficient lapses are indistinguishable,” “[c]ourts seem to require
perfect compliance from most defendants” and do not allow a defense of innocent mistake, even
though perfect compliance is impossible in the real world).
117. See Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an
Industry that Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 745, 764 (2005)
(citing cases); James J. White, Reverberations from the Collision of Tort and Warranty, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 1067, 1070, 1077 (2002) (“Clearly, Prosser saw the relation between strict tort and warranty.”).
118. See Amelia H. Boss & William J. Woodward Jr., Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code;
Survey of Computer Contracting Cases, 43 BUS. LAW. 1513, 1526 (1987) (“The major issue courts
have faced in cases involving actions for breach of computer software contracts has been whether
such contracts are for sales of goods or services.”); Lawrence B. Levy & Suzanne Y. Bell, Software
Product Liability: Understanding and Minimizing the Risks, 5 HIGH TECH L.J. 1 (1989); Andrew
Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J.
853 (1986); Scott, supra note 6, at 434–41; Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer Software as a
Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 129 (1985); Kerry M.L. Smith, Comment, Suing the Provider of Computer Software: How
Courts Are Applying U.C.C. Article Two, Strict Tort Liability, and Professional Malpractice, 24
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 743 (1988).
119. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); Horovitz, supra note
118, at 141. See generally Peter Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability Theory
in Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 276–79 (1999). Sales of services were
not excluded so much as they were not considered significant enough at the time to be included. See
Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 725, 727 (1993) (citing Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57
YALE L.J. 1341 (1948)).

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

66

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:39

Warranty law was the natural first resort because those early cases
involved bespoke, arms-length transactions between equally sophisticated
business entities.120 In those formative decades, the computer industry was
dominated by IBM and a lesser handful of mainframe manufacturers.121
Hardware was very expensive to manufacture, so sales efforts were
limited to high-end business clients who could afford to pay.122 Personal
computers had not yet been invented; nor was there a mass market for
standalone software.123 Instead, software was custom-built by the
mainframe manufacturers and bundled in at no additional cost, as a way
to entice customers to buy the hardware.124 Computer salesmen promised
to deliver “turnkey systems” that would perform miracles at the
metaphorical turn of a key.125 When expectations were disappointed and
deadlines repeatedly missed, frustrated customers sued for breach of
contract and warranty.126
A “good” was defined by its “movability,” so software presented a
provocative doctrinal test.127 On one hand, early software resembled a
120. See Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts, The Applicability of Tort Law to Commercial
Buyers, 79 NEB. L. REV. 215, 248–49 (2000) (“When two parties are on roughly equal footing, they
are in a position to determine which risks to assume and how costs will be allocated.”); Zollers et al.,
supra note 117, at 764 & n.117.
121. PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 51–53, 67–69, 143–45 (MIT ed.
1998); MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 2–9 (1st ed. 2000),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/chp1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GMM5-LH2R].
122. CERUZZI, supra note 121, at 82 fig.3.1.
123. FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JAMES W. MCKIE & RICHARD B. MANCKE, IBM AND THE U.S. DATA
PROCESSING INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 322 (1983). See generally CERUZZI, supra note 121,
at 207–41 (describing efforts from 1972 to 1977 leading to the development of the personal
computer).
124. CERUZZI, supra note 121, at 143–44 (explaining that “most computer dollars continued to be
spent on large mainframes” until the advent of personal computers in the 1980s, and that “[t]hose who
wished to compete in [the mainframe] business provided everything from bottom to top—hardware,
peripherals, system and applications software, and service”); Rodau, supra note 118, at 871–73;
Horovitz, supra note 118, at 153.
125. See Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v. Groves, 868 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The term
‘turnkey’ is intended to describe a self-sufficient system which the purchaser need only ‘turn the key’
to commence operation.”); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888, 893–94 n.9
(Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (explaining industry usage of the term “turnkey” to mean a system “able to be
turned on and function immediately”).
126. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); IBM Corp. v. Catamore Enters.,
Inc., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976); Clements Auto Co. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.
1971); Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971); see also
Zollers, supra note 117, at 764 n.116 (collecting early cases).
127. U.C.C. § 2-105 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (defining “goods” as “all things
(including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the
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“good” in that it was intimately tied to physical hardware as part of an
integrated turnkey system; if the hardware was physically movable, then
so too was the bundled software.128 On the other hand, early mainframe
software also resembled a “service” in that it was customized for each
customer; arguably, what customers were buying was the labor and
knowhow of expert computer consultants, not a finished piece of
merchandise.129
For all the hype, judicial consensus came quickly and quietly.130 The
near-automatic presumption today is that software is a “good” subject to
the UCC, with or without the entanglement of a physical machine.131 To
the extent that software transactions include service aspects—such as
ongoing maintenance and support—courts have readily ruled that those
hybrid features may be folded in as incidental to the sale of the softwareas-good.132 With the invention of the personal PC and rise of the consumer
software market, physical props such as boxes, disks, and dongles further
cemented the illusion of software as a movable good.133
contract for sale”); see also Alces, supra note 119, at 294 (“To be sure, intellectual property, and
particularly software, is neither completely goods nor completely services. Software is a hybrid,
owing incidents to both the tangible and less tangible.”).
128. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2372 (1994); Scott, supra note 6, at 434–36.
129. See Susan Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 1, 3 (1979) (noting that it was unclear “the extent to which the programmer
must custom-design the program for the customer’s use under the customer’s direction and control
and the extent to which the program comes as part of a package with . . . hardware”).
130. Zollers et al., supra note 117, at 766 (“Commentators have addressed in depth the issue of
whether software is a good and whether a license is a sale, but the courts spend very little time, if any,
debating the concepts.”).
131. Michael C. Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
173, 177 n.18 (1981) (“Most courts which have considered the matter seem willing to classify
computer programs as goods rather than services.” (citation omitted)); David A. Owen, The
Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer Contracts, 14 N. KY. L. REV.
277, 282 (1987); Jeffrey B. Ritter, Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code: Computer Contracting
Cases and Electronic Commercial Practices, 45 BUS. LAW. 2533, 2543 (1990) (“In the context of
article 2, recent decisions have generally classified software as ‘goods’”); Rodau, supra note 118, at
883 (“The weight of authority treats computer software as being within the article 2 definition of a
good without lengthy analysis or discussion.”).
132. See Rodau, supra note 118, at 913–16; Scott, supra note 6, at 434–36. But see Stacy-Ann
Elvy, Hybrid Transactions and the INTERNET of Things: Goods, Services, or Software?, 74 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 77, 109 (2017) (criticizing the “predominant purpose” test as leading to “ambiguous
or conflicting results”); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19, Reporters’
Notes to cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.1998) (“Under the Code, software that is mass-marketed is considered
a good. However, software that was developed specifically for the customer is a service.”).
133. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239,
1244–45 n.23 (1995) (“[A]lmost all courts and commentators that have considered the issue have
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This battle was important for business-to-business dealings, but for
ordinary consumers who lack power to negotiate terms of sale, it was more
sound than fury.134 Boilerplate software licenses rapidly evolved to
include sweeping disclaimers of warranties and limitations of liability,
and those clauses have been upheld consistently in court.135 Today,
software warranty disputes appear mainly in the form of claims sounding
in fraud or misrepresentation, which cannot be disclaimed.136
Given the intimate relationship between tort law and warranty law,
many commentators expected tort law to pick up where warranty law
stopped, as it had done in the past.137 Here, the parallel issue was whether
software is a “product” or a “service.”138 Logic seemed to dictate that if
concluded that a shrinkwrap license transaction is a sale of goods . . . covered by Article 2 of the
current U.C.C.”). But cf. Peter A. Alces & Aaron S. Book, When Y2K Causes “Economic Loss” to
“Other Property”, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (1999) (clinging to the old view: “Software, either
system or application, would not fall within the scope of either the Article 2 or 2A warranty provisions
because software is intangible. The fact that it is captured in a tangible form should not be dispositive.”
(citation omitted)).
134. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 1562–66. Some commentators expressed hope that
implied warranties would lead to needed improvements in software quality. Horovitz, supra note 118,
at 160 (“[T]he UCC will adequately protect software vendees and will not serve as a vehicle for
manufacturers to limit their liability.”); Smith, supra note 118, at 755 (“[B]ecause fairness and
reasonableness are fundamental in the Code, application of the U.C.C. would benefit parties
unfamiliar with its provisions.”); see also Gemignani, supra note 131, at 178 (describing the early
court split on whether to uphold vendor protective clauses in computer contracts). More cynical voices
pointed out that a warranty-based approach was no guarantee of accountability. Nycum, supra note
129, at 7–8; see also Scott, supra note 6, at 436–39.
135. Boss & Woodward, Jr., supra note 118, at 1540 (“Disclaimers [in software contracts] are
generally effective and courts interpret them in the same way as in other contracts.”); Lemley, supra
note 133; Douglas E. Phillips, When Software Fails: Emerging Standards of Vendor Liability Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 BUS. LAW. 151, 169 (1994). But see Zollers et al., supra note 117,
at 765 (collecting cases allowing recovery despite limitation provision).
136. See Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. FTI Cambio, LLC, No. 2:11-cv-036, 2011 WL 2610476 (N.D.
Ind. July 1, 2011); Boss & Woodward, Jr., supra note 118, at 1533–40 (“[B]uyers often ignore the
generally broad disclaimers of express and implied warranties in standard vendor contracts. When
they become disappointed and discover that disclaimers foreclose their contract remedies, they turn
to the law of misrepresentation for relief.”); Zollers et al., supra note 117, at 758 (collecting older
cases in which misrepresentation claims were successfully used to get around contractual limitations
on liability).
137. Alces, supra note 119, at 91 (“[W]e must remain aware that it was warranty law’s limitations
that engendered development of strict products liability.”); see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories,
98 MARQ. L. REV. 555 (2014); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124–34 (1960) (criticizing courts’ contorted reliance on breach
of warranty claims to achieve outcomes that sound more properly in tort principles).
138. See Roy N. Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 270, 275–79
(1977); Daniel B. Garrie, The Legal Status of Software, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
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software were a “good” under warranty law, it should be a “product”
under tort law, too.139 To be sure, the labels are not identical—“products”
are defined by “tangibility” while “goods” are defined by “movability”—
but as long as software is not a “service,” the distinction seems
vanishingly small.140 Besides, commentators were quick to point out that
courts have held other intangibles, such as electricity and aeronautical
chart data, to be “products.”141
Instead, courts have studiously avoided answering whether software is
a “product,”142 and have dismissed most software liability claims by
711, 714–20 (2005); Gemignani, supra note 131, at 197–98; Diane B. Lawrence, Strict Liability
Computer Software and Medicine: Public Policy at the Crossroads, 23 TORT INS. L.J. 1, 12–15
(1987); Levy & Bell, supra note 118, at 2–6; Patrick T. Miyaki, Comment, Computer Software
Defects: Should Computer Software Manufacturers Be Held Strictly Liable for Computer Software
Defects?, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 121, 126–28 (1992); Nycum, supra note
129, at 16–19; Scott, supra note 6, at 461–67; David A. Hall, Note, Strict Products Liability and
Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 373 (1983); Susan Lanoue, Comment,
Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439, 443–55 (1983).
139. David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of “Product” Under the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability, 35 TORT INS. L.J. 845, 857–58 (2000) (outlining three possible scenarios:
(1) “good” is more expansive than “product”; (2) “product” is broader than “good”; or (3) the concepts
are identical).
140. Id. at 875–78. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19(a)
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“A product is tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or
consumption. Other items, such as real property and electricity, are products when the context of their
distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and use of tangible personal
property . . . .”); Lannetti, supra note 139, at 865–68 (discussing the longstanding rule that “service
providers, unlike product manufacturers or suppliers, are not strictly liable for personal injuries
resulting from rendered services”).
141. See, e.g., Lanoue, supra note 138, at 443–47 (noting that “[t]here is no absolute rule that
restricts the definition of products to tangible items” and citing case law finding strict products
liability for damage to homes caused by electric currents); Scott, supra note 6, at 464–67 (discussing
cases treating software as “tangible property” for purposes of insurance law, and treating information
as “products” for purposes of tort law); Smith, supra note 118, at 755–59. But see Alces, supra note
119, at 301–02 (observing that the comments to section 19 of the Third Restatement of Torts
distinguish between intangible information versus intangible forces such as electricity and X-rays).
142. Scott, supra note 6, at 462 (“While a majority of courts have held that software is a good for
the application of the U.C.C. and taxation, that does not mean that software is necessarily a product
for the application of product liability law.”); Zollers et al., supra note 117, at 766 (“To date, there
have been no reported cases holding a software manufacturer strictly liable for defects in the
software.”). Over the years, many commentators have cited Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d
1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991), as the lone case to suggest that malfunctioning software could be called
a defective product—but nothing ever became of this dicta. See, e.g., Calo, supra note 79, at 535–36,
536 n.145 (2015); Scott, supra note 6, at 466; Zollers et al., supra note 117, at 759; Roy W. Arnold,
Note, The Persistence of Caveat Emptor: Publisher Immunity from Liability for Inaccurate Factual
Information, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 777, 798 (1992); David Berke, Note, Products Liability in the
Sharing Economy, 33 YALE J. REG. 603, 614–15 (2016); Michael R. Maule, Comment, Applying
Strict Products Liability to Computer Software, 27 TULSA L.J. 735, 746–51 (1992); Miyaki, supra
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invoking the “pure economic loss” doctrine.143 Under this rule, no tort
recovery may be obtained for losses that are purely financial, and
unaccompanied by bodily injury or property damage.144 The primary
rationale for the economic loss doctrine is to police the conceptual border
between contract law and tort law.145 Various justifications have been
proffered for maintaining this rigid wall, all of which reduce in essence to
skepticisms about intangible injuries, though not necessarily intangible
causes.146 The economic loss doctrine sweeps far beyond software, and its
wisdom has been hotly debated as a general matter, but its application has
had an undeniably profound effect on software litigation.147
Thus, it would be easy to conclude that intangibility is the reason for
software liability’s absence. Yet, there are missing pieces that do not fully
add up. The pure economic loss doctrine does not eviscerate all negligence
liability148; not all software is necessarily a “good” let alone a “product”;
software liability cases rarely succeed even where there is physical
injury149; and those cases that do result in an award—like Singh150—often
turn on additional culpability extrinsic to the code itself. To be sure,

note 138, at 126–27 (1992); Lori A. Weber, Note, Bad Bytes: The Application of Strict Products
Liability to Computer Software, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 469, 470 (1992). Another case offering
tantalizing dicta was Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 673–77 (3d Cir. 1991) (declaring
that computer programs are “tangible, moveable and available in the marketplace”).
143. Boss & Woodward, Jr., supra note 118, at 1535–40 (collecting early software cases that
attempted to navigate the line between contract and tort claims); Scott, supra note 6, at 470–71.
144. Gaebler, supra note 111, at 602–05 (“[A] common statement of the general rule is that there
can be no recovery for economic loss in the absence of some physical injury.”). There is some
variation in how the economic loss doctrine is applied across different states. See Vincent R. Johnson,
The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523 (2009).
145. See Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813,
813 (2006); Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 523, 546 (2009); David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the
Economic Loss Doctrine in the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935 (2016); Catherine M.
Sharkey, The Remains of the Citadel (Economic Loss Rule in Products Cases), 100 MINN. L. REV.
1845 (2016).
146. See Johnson, supra note 145, at 541–43 (“A variety of reasons have been offered to justify the
economic loss rule, although those reasons ‘have not traditionally been clear.’ It is said, for example,
that liability for negligence that causes only economic harm must be uncompensable under tort law
because allowing such recovery would: expose defendants to an unlimited scope of liability; impose
liability for damages that are speculative; result in liability that is disproportionate to fault; or have a
‘chilling effect on non-negligent conduct.’”); see also sources cited supra note 111.
147. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 8.
148. See generally Gaebler, supra note 111.
149. See supra notes 9–10.
150. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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intangibility has been an important factor in many cases, but it has not
been an explanation.
B.

Software’s Innovation Function

Even as the debate over software’s intangibility receded, a different
explanatory movement coalesced around the need to protect software for
its importance to innovation and economic growth.151 This transition to
law-and-economics reasoning ramped up as personal computing took off
in the 1980s, and then reached max velocity with the explosive growth of
the internet in the 1990s.152 Time and time again, software manufacturers
were granted special exemption from liability on the maximalist theory
that more software is always better than less. Yet, if intangibility had been
a reason in search of a conclusion, the economic rationale was a
conclusion in search of a reason. It begged the question: what makes
software liability a uniquely existential threat?
The first signs of this rhetorical shift came in the battle over
“shrinkwrap” or “tear-open” licenses, which purported to bind customers
to contractual obligations as soon as the software was accessed.153
Enforceability of these licenses was hotly debated in the scholarly
literature and loomed over the industry as a question mark.154 These

151. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
To be sure, policy discussions concerning intellectual property protection of software began much,
much earlier. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1160 n.16 (2002) (collecting articles detailing the “curious history of the
patentability of software”); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984)
(describing the history of Congress’s study concerning the issue of software copyrightability).
152. Concerns regarding the negative effects of tort liability on innovation were broad-based across
many sectors of the U.S. economy during this era. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The
Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 77–82 (1995); W. Kip Viscusi &
Michael J. Moore, An Industrial Profile of the Links Between Product Liability and Innovation, in
LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 74, at 81.
153. See Richard H. Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass-Marketed Software: Enforceable
Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51 (1985); David Einhorn,
Note, The Enforceability of “Tear-Me-Open” Software License Agreements, 67 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 509 (1985).
154. See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, AM. BAR ASS’N, SOFTWARE LICENSING CONTRACTS:
PROPOSAL FOR STUDY BY THE A.B.A. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE SCOPE OF THE UCC (1987);
Mary Brandt Jensen, The Preemption of Shrink Wrap Licenses in the Wake of Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 8 COMPUTER/L.J. 157 (1988); Lemley, supra note 133, at 1248 (“Because of the
nature of the shrinkwrap license, and because of its potential to rewrite the rules of tort and
intellectual property law, courts have viewed such licenses with a skeptical eye.”); Ritter, supra
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license terms carried sweeping limitations on liability and disclaimers of
warranty, and this adhesionary abdication of software quality led some
courts to question whether shrinkwrap tactics were fair to consumers.155
Applying a basic UCC analysis, these courts held that customers could
not be bound by terms they could not see.156
Alarmed by this state of uncertainty, the American Bar Association
(ABA) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) launched a joint campaign to modernize UCC Article 2
to offer clearer guidance on shrinkwrap licenses and other software
transactions.157 Professor Raymond Nimmer—who took the lead role in
the drafting efforts—flatly rejected as “wrong” the formalist question
“whether software or other intangibles constitute goods or whether a
contract that licenses use of intangibles constitutes a sale.”158 Instead,
Nimmer embraced the functionalist approach of law-and-economics that
the law should bend to facilitate the commercial needs of a burgeoning
industry offering unique value to the national economy.159 This emphasis
note 131, at 2549 (“These ‘shrink-wrap’ licenses are a common practice, notwithstanding a recent
decision holding such ‘contracts’ to be unenforceable.”).
155. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to enforce
a box-top license because, inter alia, “[w]e are not persuaded that requiring software companies to
stand behind representations concerning their products will inevitably destroy the software industry”);
Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (refusing to
enforce shrinkwrap license in a suit for breach of warranty); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding only three prior cases on the enforceability of shrinkwrap
licenses, including Step-Saver and Ariz. Retail).
156. See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (D. Utah 1997); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and Contract Law, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (asserting that
courts “generally hold that the terms contained in such shrinkwrap licenses are unenforceable because
the consumer never assented to them”).
157. See Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 552–54 (1999); Diane W. Savage, The Impact of Proposed Article 2B of
the Uniform Commercial Code on Consumer Contracts for Information and Computer Software, 9
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 251, 252–53 (1997). For further background on the origins of the UCC
recodification efforts, see Ritter, supra note 131, at 2534–37.
158. Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and Reinvigorating
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337, 1343 (1994).
159. Id. at 1360–62, 1369 (“Software and other intangibles contracts fit a standard of importance
gauged by economic significance under any measure. The information industry accounts for over two
percent of the gross national product of this country and affects a broad spectrum of commercial and
individual interests. Ongoing developments in information technology promise to continue the
exponential growth of that field. Technology (intangibles) contracts underlie virtually all modern
areas of commerce driving our present economy.”); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing on the
Global Information Infrastructure: Disharmony in Cyberspace, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 224, 246–
47 (1995) (“More so here than in any prior commercial/economic context, an enhanced degree of
harmonization and simplification is needed to enable the transactions made possible by the technology
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on economic efficiency favored vendor protections above software
quality.160
Ultimately, the Article 2 revision efforts were rendered moot by the
landmark decision ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,161 which held shrinkwrap
licenses enforceable under the old, unrevised UCC Article 2.162 Yet the
prevailing argument was identical to Nimmer’s, that economic need
superseded doctrinal fit. According to Judge Frank Easterbrook,
shrinkwrap licenses were enforceable simply because they helped
software vendors keep prices low, irrespective of whether the software
came wrapped in a box.163 Low prices benefitted consumers, the court
proclaimed—without exploring the second-order costs of externalizing
software sloppiness onto consumers.
Meanwhile, internet protectionism kicked into full gear with the launch
of Netscape Navigator in 1994.164 Excitement about “global electronic
networks” had already been frothing around the more hidebound

to occur . . . . [A] stabilization of contract . . . law would provide immense advantages to the
commercialization of cyberspace.”).
160. See Alces, supra note 119, at 272–73 (criticizing the Article 2B draft’s treatment of the
warranty of merchantability as “inconsistent with the demands of product quality law”); David
Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 71 (1999)
(criticizing the Article 2B draft for “de facto favor[ing] those with concentrated interests and large
financial resources”); Rustad, supra note 157, at 555–60. But see AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L
CONFERENCE COMM’RS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2B - LICENSES 14, 18 (1998)
(circulated draft) (protesting that the public statements “made about the effect of Article 2B on
consumer protection” are “political efforts to mislead”).
161. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.).
162. Id.; see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). On April 7, 1999, the
American Law Institute withdrew support for Article 2B, and the UCC recodifications efforts were
abandoned. Unwilling to see a decade’s work die in vain, NCCUSL resurrected those efforts as a
freestanding uniform act—the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), also led by
Richard Nimmer—which suffered heavy criticism before being withdrawn finally in August 2003. See
generally William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 131 (2009).
163. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451–52 (“Only a minority of sales take place over the counter, where
there are boxes to peruse . . . . Much software is ordered over the Internet by purchasers who have
never seen a box . . . . On Zeidenberg’s arguments, these unboxed sales are unfettered by terms—so
the seller has made a broad warranty and must pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in
performance, two ‘promises’ that if taken seriously would drive prices through the ceiling or return
transactions to the horse-and-buggy age.”); id. at 1453 (“Competition among vendors, not judicial
revision of a package’s contents, is how consumers are protected in a market economy . . . . As we
stressed above, adjusting terms in buyers’ favor might help Matthew Zeidenberg today . . . but would
lead to a response, such as a higher price, that might make consumers as a whole worse off.”).
164. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745 (1995); Jonathan
Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 257 (2006).
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discussions of boxed software.165 But the arrival of cyberspace and usergenerated content united the computing industry and consumer advocates
together in common cause against efforts to regulate code quality.
The failed efforts to ban online pornography remain the most
emblematic example of internet exceptionalism.166 When Congress
passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),167 it attempted
to impose minimum software standards that would make the internet
“safe” for kids. It did so by criminalizing online distribution of sexually
explicit content, unless appropriate age verification or other measures
were used to screen access by minors.168
While free speech was the nominal headline of the online porn wars,
much of the reasoning was framed in terms of potential economic harm.
In striking down the CDA provisions as unconstitutional, the district court
panel adopted a cost-benefit analysis that emphasized the exceptional
qualities of the internet.169 As one judge highlighted: “Internet
communication is an abundant and growing resource” with “very low
barriers to entry” for “both speakers and listeners,” and the excessive
“economic costs associated with compliance with the [CDA] will drive
from the Internet speakers whose content falls within the zone of possible
prosecution.”170 The panel found that the CDA effectively mandated use
of adult verification services by all internet providers171—not just

165. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic
Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 131–33 (1992) (worrying about the chilling effects of tort
liability and arguing that “[a] network service provider that holds itself out as available to all comers
should face commensurately less exposure to tort liability for the content carried”); I. Trotter Hardy,
The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994).
166. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501, 516 (2013);
Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1975 (2006).
167. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
168. Id. § 507, 110 Stat. 137.
169. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
170. Id. at 877–78 (Dalzell, J.); see also id. at 881 (“My examination of the special characteristics
of Internet communication . . . lead me to conclude that the Internet deserves the broadest possible
protection from government-imposed, content-based regulation.”).
171. Initially, the CDA was ruled overbroad on textual grounds, given the inherent vagueness of
interpreting the statutory terms “indecent” and “patently offensive,” and the harsh, criminal
consequences of guessing wrong. Id. at 854–55 (Sloviter, J.), 859–65 (Buckwalter, J.), 870–72
(Dalzell, J). Yet when Congress corrected the textual flaws, see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 563
(2002), the courts subsequently clarified that it was the mandatory use of adult verification services
that was in and of itself overbroad. Id. at 656. But cf. Digital Economy Act 2017 § 14,
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/30/section/14/enacted [https://perma.cc/DZ5G-AVWX]
(requiring anyone who “makes pornographic material available on the internet to persons in the

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

CRASHWORTHY CODE

75

pornographers—and that this mandate was problematic because such
services were “not technologically or economically feasible for most
providers.”172 The Supreme Court echoed and incorporated these concerns
in its affirmance of the panel’s decision.173
In this climate of internet limerence,174 it was only fitting that the CDA
would come to be associated instead with its safe harbor. Section 230,
originally drafted as a late amendment to shield internet intermediaries
from CDA liability, was the only provision to survive the wreckage.175
This soi disant “Good Samaritan” provision opened with a remarkable
declaration: “It is the policy of the United States . . . to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services . . . [and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”176 With that broad statement of
purpose, courts interpreted section 230 as providing bright-line immunity
to internet entities against tort liability for user-generated content.177 The

United Kingdom on a commercial basis” to use age-verification means to block access by “persons
under the age of 18”).
172. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846–48, 854, 856 (Sloviter, J.); id. at 858 (Buckwalter, J.).
173. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881–82 (1997) (“Under the findings of the District Court,
however, it is not economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such [adult]
verification.”).
174. See, e.g., MICHAEL HAUBEN & RONDA HAUBEN, NETIZENS: ON THE HISTORY AND IMPACT
OF USENET AND THE INTERNET (1997) (documenting the exhilaration, obsession, and devotion of
early internet users); HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (2000).
175. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
373, 409–12 (2010) (discussing legislative history and how it “upended a set of principles enshrined
in common law doctrines that had been developed over decades, if not centuries, in cases involving
offline intermediaries”); Zittrain, supra note 118, at 262. But see Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Internet is no longer a fragile
new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous
enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses.”); Danielle Keats
Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404–11 (2017).
176. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133, 138 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(1), (2) (2018)).
177. This broad-based immunity has endured despite serious pushback over the years. See
Goldman, supra note 113; cf. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). Recent efforts to limit
§ 230 immunity have achieved more traction by focusing on sex trafficking and revenge porn. See
Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016); Allow States and Victims to Fight
Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018); Mary Anne Franks,
“Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251 (2017).
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scope of this immunity is not infinite,178 but it has been reliable enough to
endow the “move fast and break things” attitude of the Silicon Valley
era.179
A final episode, the Y2K bug, set the high-water mark of software
protectionism.180 As the year 2000 approached, the software industry
discovered a basic error in the way calendar dates had been formatted. To
conserve precious disk space and memory usage, dates were commonly
saved in two-digit format. Where necessary, the “century” digits were
hard-coded as “19” such that the year 2000 would be stored as “00” and
read erroneously by the software as 1900.181 These date-keeping errors
were ubiquitous and (like any good doomsday prophecy) the severity of
risk was unknowable ex ante.182 Early signs, however, pointed to the
possibility that software manufacturers might, for the first time, face openended liability for having cut corners in writing code.183
Congress blinked. On July 20, 1999, Congress enacted special
restrictions on Y2K-related litigation, including a three-year moratorium
178. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e); Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions
About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2014, 5:35 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/section-230-the-lawlessinternet_b_4455090.html [https://perma.cc/54TL-92UE].
179. See WITTES & BLUM, supra note 16, at 215–17; Carmine Giardino et al., What Do We Know
About Software Development in Startups?, IEEE SOFTWARE, Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 28; Walter Isaacson,
Resistance Is Futile, N.Y. TIMES: BOOK REVIEW, June 25, 2017, at 1.
180. Alces & Book, supra note 133, at 6–10; Andrew S. Crouch, Comment, When the Millennium
Bug Bites: Business Liability in the Wake of the Y2K Problem, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 797 (1999); see
also Chris Taylor, The History and the Hype, TIME, Jan. 18, 1999, at 72–73.
181. The error was, of course, easily foreseeable. A famous, earlier incident occurred at the 1976
Olympics, when the first perfect 10.0 score in gymnastics was displayed as “1.0” because the
electronic scoreboard lacked enough digits. Pritha Sarkar, Nadia Still Turning Heads 40 Years on
from Perfect 10, REUTERS, July 17, 2016, https://reuters.com/article/us-olympics-gymnasticscomaneci/nadia-still-turning-heads-40-years-on-from-perfect-10-idUSKCN0ZY03X
[https://perma.cc/ND33-S42Y].
182. Robert K. Hur, Note, Passing the Y2K Buck: Examining Foundations of Economic Arguments
for and Against Liability Limitation, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 195 (1999) (noting that
remediation cost estimates varied widely “from $20 billion, to between $300 billion to $600 billion,
to $1.6 trillion”).
183. Alces & Book, supra note 133, at 3 n.7; Crouch, supra note 180, at 804–07 (citing an
individual settlement agreement of $250,000 and class action settlements of $565,000 and
$46 million); Hur, supra note 182, at 195 (“Approximately 70 Y2K lawsuits were filed nationwide
[before the Year 2000], producing a few large settlements, including one for $7.5 million. Many more
legal disputes (as many as 800) proceeded to formal negotiations.”). But cf. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A
Mixed Bag for Chicken Little: Analyzing Year 2000 Claims and Insurance Coverage, 48 EMORY L.J.
169, 173 (1999) (“[T]he number of articles written about the Year 2000 matter dwarfs the handful of
lawsuits actually filed . . . . [T]he Y2K problem would appear to be less catastrophic than many
suggest.”).
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on claims, heightened pleading requirements, and limitations on
recovery.184 The preamble of the Year 2000 Responsibility and Readiness
Act (Y2K Act) proclaimed it to be “in the national interest that producers
and users of technology products concentrate their attention and resources
in the time remaining before January 1, 2000” on fixing Y2K issues rather
than on litigation defense “so as to minimize possible disruptions
associated with computer failures.”185 Congress further admonished such
litigation as causing “a range of undesirable effects” including first and
foremost “waste [of] technical and financial resources that are better
devoted to . . . ensuring that systems remain or become operational.”186 In
sum, Congress sent a strong signal once again that software manufacturers
would not be held to task for even the most trivial of errors, simply
because the software industry was too important.
In the end, the Y2K hype amounted to very little in actual damages;
instead, most of the costs accrued from the remediation efforts that came
before the critical date.187 To recover their remediation costs, some
184. Pub. L. No. 106-37 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601–17 (2018)); see also Alces & Book,
supra note 133, at 17–18; Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 613
(2002) (“Despite the absence of factual proof of a [Y2K] litigation explosion or that it would be fueled
by frivolous cases, Congress proceeded with regulation designed to thwart the impending tidal
wave.”); Martha A. Sabol & Beth Diebold, Readiness and Responsibility in the Year 2000: A Look at
Y2K Legislation, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 217 (1999); cf. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal
Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 953–55 (2001) (noting attacks by opposing
senators that the bill was “an arrogant dismissal of the basic constitutional principle of federalism”
and was “doing away” with the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution). The Y2K Act excluded claims
for personal injury and wrongful death. See 15 U.S.C. § 6603(c); cf. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56 § 814, 115 Stat. 272, 384 (2001) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)) (“No [civil]
action may be brought under [the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act] for the negligent design or
manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or firmware.”).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 6601(a)(2).
186. Id. § 6601(a)(3)(B). Congress also disparaged such litigation as “insubstantial” and
“frivolous,” as well as “unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly.” Id. § 6601(a)(6), (7), (8).
187. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE ECONOMICS OF Y2K AND THE IMPACT ON THE UNITED
STATES 24 (1999) (estimating costs as having run “about $30 billion a year in 1998 and 1999 and a
cumulative cost in the neighborhood of $100 billion for the period 1995 through 2001”); Fairman,
supra note 184, at 616 (“Despite the deluge predictions, Y2K litigation has been a trickle.”); Steve
Lohr, Computers Prevail in First Hours of ‘00, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000; Tony Pyne, The Exclusion
of Y2K Related Losses from Aviation Insurance Policies: Practicalities, Politics, and Legalities, 65
J. AIR L. & COM. 769, 771–77 (2000) (reporting a host of minor glitches from around the world, but
that “[n]o widespread chaos or failure of systems occurred”); David Segal, A Y2K Glitch for Lawyers:
Few Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2000, at A1; cf. Benjamin H. Barton, Tort Reform, Innovation,
and Playground Design, 58 FLA. L. REV. 265, 282–83 (2006) (arguing that, counter to economic
predictions, “[t]he expense of fixing the Y2K problem turned out to be a tremendous benefit for the
economy instead of a detriment,” because “Y2K gave companies an excuse to clean up their software
and hardware underbrush”).
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customers sued software manufacturers claiming that the Y2K bug was a
product defect. Those defect claims were summarily dismissed because
“there is nothing inherently wrong with computer software that assumes
a two-digit year entry means the Twentieth Century.”188 Other business
customers—unable to obtain direct relief from software manufacturers—
looked to insurance companies for recompense.189 Yet in this too they
were frustrated. Insurers resisted payment of Y2K remediation claims,
and won decisively on the legal theory that the Y2K bug was an “inherent
vice” or “latent defect,” a standard exclusion from coverage in most
insurance policies.190 Courts explained that the Y2K bug was a latent
defect because it was present at the time of creation, not introduced by
external factors at a later date. Thus, the Y2K bug was simultaneously a
defect and not a defect, as long as the end result was no financial penalties
for software manufacturers.
While the economic significance of software is undeniable, the glaring
omission from these discussions of cost-benefit balancing is that they
rarely if ever attempt any analysis of the actual code design itself. This
lacuna signals where the root cause for judicial avoidance may be found.
If code designs are unevaluable and therefore indistinguishable at law,
then every software liability claim threatens bet-the-industry litigation. In
short, the argument that tort liability threatens the existence of the
software industry necessarily rests on the tacit assumption that courts are
somehow ill-equipped to define a standard of reasonable software quality.

188. Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977 (N.D. Ill. 1999); accord Against
Gravity Apparel, Inc. v. Quarterdeck Corp., 699 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (slip op.)
(“Also without merit is plaintiff’s claim, based on UCC 1–204, that the software’s Y2K
noncompliance is a latent defect . . . .”).
189. Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity in Property and Liability Insurance, 36 TORT & INS.
L.J. 777, 797 (2001) (observing that “a number of major policyholders” had filed insurance claims
under “sue and labor” clauses); Jeffrey T. Piampiano, Comment, Y2K Remediation: Who Should Bear
the Cost?, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 411 (2000) (describing three complaints filed by Nike,
Port of Seattle, and Kmart against their respective insurers); cf. Stempel, supra note 183, at 174 (“To
date, much of the Year 2000 discussion has simply, and probably incorrectly, assumed that big Y2K
losses for business mean big insurance payments . . . . There has been a disturbing tendency for
discussion of the Y2K problem to seemingly assume that Y2K losses are of a uniform type . . . .”).
190. GTE Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 598, 609 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The problem in this
case was not that a program or system malfunctioned, or some external threat caused damage to GTE’s
systems. Rather, the system performed in exactly the manner it was designed to operate—the problem
is that the system as designed and specified did not permit recognition of dates in the 21st century.”);
State v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 MT 83, 154 P.3d 1233; Port of Seattle v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
111 Wash. App. 901, 48 P.3d 334 (2002). An “inherent vice” is defined as “any existing defects,
diseases, decay or the inherent nature of the commodity which will cause it to deteriorate with the
lapse of time.” Id. at 909–10, 48 P.3d at 338–39.
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Software’s Complexity Anomie

Intangibility and innovation capture the intuition, but do not explain,
why software liability is a hard doctrinal problem. The true culprit is a
very basic property of software—computational complexity—which
defies conventional judicial methods of assessing reasonableness.191
Software strives to conceal or abstract away the “machine layer” as
much as possible.192 That abstraction provides unprecedented plasticity
and reproducibility, but the flip side is that code offers few intrinsic
constraints that govern “normal” behavior, the way physical objects must
obey laws of motion and gravity.193 Utilizing this freedom to its fullest
advantage results in programs having so many possible permutations of
machine-states that it is mathematically impossible to guarantee

191. See Hearing on Deciphering the Debate over Encryption: Industry and Law Enforcement
Perspectives Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Matt Blaze, Professor, University of Pennsylvania)
(“[C]omputer science does not yet know how to build complex, large-scale software that has reliably
correct behavior.”), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
files/Testimony-Blaze-OI-Encryption%20Hrg-2016-04-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD3E-NJ4T].
192. See David Chisnall, C Is Not a Low-Level Language, COMM. ACM, July 2018, at 44
(explaining that even the C language, which is considered “close to the metal,” relies on substantial
abstractions from the physical machine); Edward A. Lee, Cyber Physical Systems: Design
Challenges, 11 IEEE SYMP. ON OBJECT & COMPONENT-ORIENTED REAL-TIME DISTRIBUTED
COMPUTING 363, 364 (2008) (noting that digital circuit designers have “learned to harness
intrinsically stochastic processes (the motions of electrons) to deliver a precision and reliability that
is unprecedented in the history of human innovation”). See generally MAURICE J. BACH, THE DESIGN
OF THE UNIX OPERATING SYSTEM (1986); ZITTRAIN, supra note 112, at 67–70; David D. Clark, The
Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, 18 ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV.
106 (1988); JEFF SHNEIDMAN ET AL., HARV. TECHNICAL REP. NO. TR-21-04, HOURGLASS: AN
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CONNECTING SENSOR NETWORKS AND APPLICATIONS (2004). But cf. Kevin
Driscoll et al., Byzantine Fault Tolerance, from Theory to Reality, in 22 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON
COMPUTER SAFETY, RELIABILITY & SECURITY 235, 239 (2003) (describing how a digital signal can
get “stuck” at “1/2” that is neither a 0 nor a 1).
193. See Lee, supra note 192, at 364 (“The fact is that even the simplest C program is not
predictable and reliable in the context of CPS [cyber-physical systems] because the program does not
express aspects of the behavior that are essential to the system.”); Ragunathan Rajkumar et al., CyberPhysical Systems: The Next Computing Revolution, 47 PROC. DESIGN AUTOMATION CONF. 731, 735
(2010) (explaining one research challenge for CPS is the need for programming abstractions that can
capture “[p]hysical properties such as the laws of physics and chemistry, safety, real-time and power
constraints, . . . robustness, and security characteristics”); Lui Sha et al., Cyber-Physical Systems: A
New Frontier, 2008 PROC. IEEE INT’L CONF. ON SENSOR NETWORKS, UBIQUITOUS & TRUSTWORTHY
COMPUTING 1, 4 (“Existing hardware design and programming abstractions for computing are largely
built on the premise that the principal task of a computer is data transformation. Yet cyber-physical
systems are real-time systems. This requires a critical re-examination of existing hardware and
software architectures that have been built over the last several decades.”).
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correctness through ex post testing.194 Yet, imposing rigid controls ex ante
for the sake of correctness makes it infuriatingly hard to write code that is
actually useful.195 Given this impossible tradeoff, almost all software
manufacturers prioritize functionality and features over safety or validity.
The consensus among the cybersecurity community is that one could
throw infinite resources at development and quality assurance, yet still
emerge with errors so basic a jury would be appalled.196
The platonic ideal would be to require all software be written in
programming languages employing “formal methods,” which rely on
mathematical theory to enforce correctness of code as it is being
written.197 The avionics industry is the most successful example of this
194. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 647–53 (2017)
(describing various shortcomings with static testing and dynamic testing, as well as more fundamental
limitations caused by the non-computability of certain “NP-hard” problems); Yegor Bugayenko,
Discovering Bugs, or Ensuring Success?, COMM. ACM, Sept. 2018, at 12 (collecting commentary
that quality assurance testing cannot guarantee that software is error-free); W. Richards Adrion et al.,
Validation, Verification, and Testing of Computer Software, COMPUTING SURVEYS, June 1982, at
159, 164–66.
195. See Brian Randell, System Structure for Software Fault Tolerance, SE-1 IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON SOFTWARE ENG’G 220, 220 (1975) (“The difference in complexity arises from the fact that the
‘machines’ that hardware designers produce have a relatively small number of distinctive internal
states, whereas the designer of even a small software system has, by comparison, an enormous number
of different states to consider—thus one can usually afford to treat hardware designs as being
‘correct,’ but often cannot do the same with software even after extensive validation efforts.”); Harold
“Bud” Lawson, The March into the Black Hole of Complexity, COMM. ACM, May 2018, at 43; see
also Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 1011, 1020–25 (2014);
Hurwitz, supra note 58, at 1501–04.
196. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 194, at 647 n.34 (describing how the Heartbleed episode
“underscores how difficult it can be to find small and simple mistakes”); Kevin Poulsen, Behind
iPhone’s Critical Security Bug, a Single Bad ‘Goto’, WIRED (Feb. 22, 2014, 11:27 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/02/gotofail/ [https://perma.cc/N3X8-9N4D]; Sunk by Windows NT,
WIRED (July 24, 1998, 4:35 PM), https://www.wired.com/1998/07/sunk-by-windows-nt/
[https://perma.cc/X5RN-VFH6] (divide-by-zero error caused Navy ship to lose control of its
propulsion system for several hours); see also Diomidis Spinellis, Modern Debugging: The Art of
Finding a Needle in a Haystack, COMM. ACM, Nov. 2018, at 124, 134 (describing modern best
practices in debugging techniques, and exhorting that “[n]o bug can elude a programmer who
perseveres”). But see Maggie Hamill & Katerina Goseva-Popstojanova, Common Trends in Software
Fault and Failure Data, 35 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENG’G 484, 484 (2009) (empirical
study finding that “individual failures are often caused by multiple faults spread throughout the
system”).
197. See Kroll et al., supra note 194, at 649, 662–65; Imran Quadri et al., Modeling Methodologies
for Cyber-Physical Systems: Research Field Study on Inherent and Future Challenges, 36 ADA USER
J. 246, 247 (2015); Gerwin Klein et al., Formally Verified Software in the Real World, COMM. ACM,
Oct. 2018, at 68; Nuno P. Lopes et al., Practical Verification of Peephole Optimizations with Alive,
COMM. ACM, Feb. 2018, at 84 (applying formal methods to compilers); Chris Newcombe et al., How
Amazon Web Services Uses Formal Methods, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2015, at 66; cf. Baishakhi Ray et
al., A Large-Scale Study of Programming Languages and Code Quality in Github, COMM. ACM, Oct.
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top-down approach. In the 1970s, in order to streamline the number of
programming languages in use, the Department of Defense (DoD)
developed a new programming language—named Ada after Ada
Lovelace, the first programmer—and in 1987 issued the “Ada mandate,”
a requirement that Ada “shall be the single, common, computer
programming language for Defense computer resources.”198 Due to
national security considerations, Ada was designed from the ground up
using formal methods, and thus it enforces strong typing and other rigid
constraints on code structure that reject programmer sloppiness and error
at the outset. Those limitations also sealed Ada’s unpopularity among the
general software community, which in turn forced the DoD to abandon its
Ada mandate in 1997.199 Nevertheless, some safety-critical applications
such as military aircraft have continued to rely on legacy Ada code, and
the uniquely tight regulation of the U.S. aircraft industry has allowed the
FAA to entrench requirements to use formal methods for avionics
software.200 Even in this high-stakes area, however, training and
compliance remain spotty.201 Cost increases of using a language like Ada
2017, at 91 (empirical comparison of error-proneness across programming languages). But see Peter
Alvaro & Severine Tymon, Abstracting the Geniuses Away from Failure Testing, COMM. ACM, Jan.
2018, at 55 (describing the historical failure of formal methods and model checkers, because
“[m]odern distributed systems are simply too large, too heterogeneous, and too dynamic for these
classic approaches to software quality to take root”).
198. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3405.1 § 4.3.1 (1987); see also Pub. L. No. 101-511,
§ 8092, 104 Stat. 1856, 1896 (1990) (“[A]ll Department of Defense software shall be written in the
programming language Ada.”); Ricky E. Sward, The Rise, Fall and Persistence of Ada, 2010 ACM
ANN. INT’L CONF. ON ADA & RELATED TECH. 71, 71–74 (2010); Benjamin M. Brosgol, Ada in the
21st Century, J. DEF. SOFTWARE ENG’G, Mar. 2001, at 20.
199. COMPUT. SCI. & TELECOMM. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADA AND BEYOND:
SOFTWARE POLICIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 7 (1997) (“Hopes for broad commercial
adoption of Ada have not been realized, however. Its commercial use has been eclipsed by other
languages, such as C, then C++, and, most recently, Java. DOD’s inclusive approach in the
development of the language, as well as its promotional campaigns in support of Ada, do not appear
to have been successful in fostering adoption of the language beyond defense and other missioncritical applications.”); see also Kroll et al., supra note 194, at 649 n.44 (observing that “developers
often choose memory unsafe languages for performance and other reasons”).
200. See RADIO TECHNICAL COMM’N FOR AERONAUTICS, INC., DO-178C: SOFTWARE
CONSIDERATIONS IN AIRBORNE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION (2011). DO-178C
replaced the older standard, DO-178B. See FAA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 20115C: AIRBORNE SOFTWARE ASSURANCE (2013); see also QI D. VAN EIKEMA HOMMES, NHTSA,
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY STANDARDS FOR AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONIC CONTROL SYSTEMS (2016)
(comparing DO-178C to other safety standards for electronic control systems). See generally Martin,
supra note 74, at 488.
201. HUSSEIN YOUSSEF, SAE INT’L, VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS 2
(2011) (“Formal methods however are not considered mainstream for large, complex software
systems found in aerospace, except for developments at the component level.”); Chong, supra note
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are estimated at an additional 75% to 150% of total development costs.202
Low usage rates also cause these languages to suffer from
undercapitalization in upkeep and resources, and to forfeit positive
spillovers that more popular languages receive.
In other safety-critical domains, movements to improve code quality
have been substantially weaker.203 In the automotive industry, the
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) has
repeatedly deferred issuing guidance on software safety standards;
instead, the industry operates largely by self-regulation.204 In the early
1990s, the U.K. government provided limited seed funding for an
initiative named the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association
(MISRA).205 An initial standard was published in 1994, which then

31 (“Yet not all life-critical systems—indeed, not even all aircraft—are required to comply with such
baselines. Software for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) need not meet the DO-178C standard.”);
Jean-Pierre Rosen, Is Ada Education Important?, 29 ADA USER J. 146, 208–09 (2008) (“[M]any
people had few, if any, Ada education before they were assigned to an Ada project . . . . People just
write the C program, ‘translate’ it (badly) into Ada, measure, and make the general conclusion: ‘Ada
is slower.’”); see also Kenneth Magel, Revisiting the Impact of the Ada Programming Language,
COMPUTER, Sept. 2017, at 10 (“Outside of its use in safety-critical applications, Ada has declined in
popularity in recent years. The 2016 IEEE Spectrum ranking of programming languages based on
relative popularity placed Ada 40th among all languages it highlighted.”).
202. Andreas Wölfl et al., Generating Qualifiable Avionics Software: An Experience Report, 30
IEEE/ACM INT’L CONF. ON AUTOMATED SOFTWARE ENG’G 726 (2015). But cf. Kroll et al., supra
note 194, at 665 (predicting “the costs of building fully verified software will likely drop precipitously
in the coming decades, leading to wide adoption in the software industry due to the benefits of reduced
security exposure and the elimination of many types of software bugs”).
203. See, e.g., Manfred Broy, Challenges in Automotive Safety Engineering, 28 ACM PROC. INT’L
CONF. ON SOFTWARE ENG’G 33 (2006); Alexander Pretschner et al., Software Engineering for
Automotive Systems: A Roadmap, 2007 IEEE FUTURE SOFTWARE ENG’G 55 (2007); Corman &
Woods, supra note 38, at 59–60 (analyzing automakers’ failures to make progress on cybersecurity).
204. NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 2.0: A VISION FOR SAFETY
11
(2017),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069aads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLA5-SVXH] (“Entities are encouraged to design
their ADSs following established best practices for cyber vehicle physical systems. Entities are
encouraged to consider and incorporate voluntary guidance, best practices, and design principles
published by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NHTSA, SAE International,
the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of Global Automakers, the Automotive
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Auto-ISAC), and other relevant organizations, as
appropriate.”); David Benjamin, Toyota Underestimated ‘Deadly’ Risks, EE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014),
https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1321734 (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); see also
NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED
VEHICLES
7–9
(2013),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/
Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUV9-CD73].
205. A
Brief
History
of
MISRA,
MISRA,
https://www.misra.org.uk/
MISRAHome/AbriefhistoryofMISRA/tabid/69/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/QBN2-PX5S]; Les
Hatton, Safer Language Subsets: An Overview and a Case History, MISRA C, 46 INFO. & SOFTWARE
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evolved by 1998 into “MISRA C”: a set of advisory guidelines that
programmers using the C language should take into consideration when
writing software for vehicle-embedded systems.206 Since its development
in the early 1970s, C has reigned as the most dominant general-purpose
programming language because of its versatility, simplicity, and ease-ofuse.207 It does not impose rigorous checks on code quality, deferring that
task instead to the programmer.208 MISRA C was an effort to instill better
hygiene practices among automotive programmers,209 akin to a hospital
policy that gently reminds doctors to wash their hands. Adoption of
MISRA C has been voluntary, and low.210 A competing standard initiated
by continental European automotive manufacturers, AUTOSAR C++,
appears to have fared better, but its primary objective is standardization
of software architectures for cross-platform compatibility.211 Safety
improvements are treated as a secondary effect of standardization.212
Other automotive trade groups vying for relevance include SAE
International (blind-spot monitoring systems), Consumer Electronics for

TECH. 465, 469 (2004); Chris Tapp, An Introduction to MISRA C++, 1 SAE INT’L J. PASSENGER CAR
– ELEC. & ELEC. SYS. 265 (2009).
206. See MISRA, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF THE C LANGUAGE IN VEHICLE BASED SOFTWARE
(1998). Two subsequent editions were published in 2004 and 2012.
207. Dennis M. Ritchie, The Development of the C Language, in HISTORY OF PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGES II 671, 685 (Thomas J. Bergin, Jr. et al. eds., 1993) (“C remains a simple and small
language, translatable with simple and small compilers . . . . A parsimonious, pragmatic approach
influenced the things that went into C: it covers the essential needs of many programmers, but does
not try to supply too much.”); Stephen Cass, The 2017 Top Programming Languages, IEEE
SPECTRUM
(July
18,
2017),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/the-2017-topprogramming-languages [https://perma.cc/VMS9-BFK5] (ranking C as the top language for non-Web
applications, and second overall).
208. Ritchie, supra note 207 (noting the “tolerance of C compilers to errors in type” such as arrays
and pointers).
209. Hatton, supra note 205, at 466.
210. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Litig., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1094
n.70 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“Toyota . . . does not use MISRA coding standards used by other two other
[sic] major auto manufacturers . . . . That Toyota has adopted its own coding standards rather than
following the (voluntary) MISRA standards is uncontroverted, although the parties do not agree
whether Toyota’s internal coding standards incorporate MISRA standards or the equivalent.”).
211. History, AUTOSAR, https://www.autosar.org/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/7SWD-DF46]
(describing initial discussions between BMW, Bosch, Continental, DaimlerChrysler, and
Volkswagen). AUTOSAR is short for AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture. See AUTOSAR,
https://www.autosar.org [https://perma.cc/37KJ-2WQH]. In response, MISRA published its own
version for C++ in 2008. MISRA, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF THE C++ LANGUAGE IN CRITICAL
SYSTEMS (2008).
212. HOMMES, supra note 200, at 7–8.
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Automotive (mobile device interfaces), and the Automotive Electronics
Council.213
Because correct code is so difficult to write, standard practice among
software engineering firms is to run extensive testing for quality assurance
(QA) after the fact.214 The main strategy of QA testing is to run the
software through as many different scenarios as feasible, to make sure
nothing obvious is amiss.215 But from a mathematical theory perspective,
this strategy is provably incomplete.216 For any reasonably complex
software, there are more possible permutations of machine-states than can
be tested in finite time.217 This inevitable blind zone explains why all but
the simplest software is susceptible to “zero-day” exploits.218 Nor does it
work to break up the testing into smaller modules. The composition of
two provably correct segments of code does not yield a whole that is
provably correct, because the composition generates new unknown
interactions between the modules.219 In short, after-the-fact testing is
useful but limited, and unable to offer safety guarantees of any kind.
213. Crane et al., supra note 64, at 281.
214. See IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, IEEE 730-2014—IEEE STANDARD FOR SOFTWARE QUALITY
ASSURANCE PROCESSES (2014).
215. See Kroll et al., supra note 194, at 652–53 (explaining that “no testing regime can establish
any property for all possible programs” but that testing can be useful “in specific cases, especially
when those cases have been designed to facilitate testing”); cf. Aarian Marshall, We’ve Been Talking
About Self-Driving Car Safety All Wrong, WIRED (Oct. 29, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-cars-safety-metrics-miles-disengagements/
[https://perma.cc/56EK-B2LT].
216. See Kroll et al., supra note 194, at 650 n.49 (citing H.G. Rice, Classes of Recursively
Enumerable Sets and Their Decision Problems, 74 TRANSACTIONS AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 358
(1953)); cf. Bambauer, supra note 195 (discussing known unknowns and unknown unknowns).
217. See Kroll et al., supra note 194, at 650 nn.48–49 (explaining that “achieving complete
coverage of a program’s behavior by testing alone is considered impossible,” due to the fundamental
problem of “Combinatorial Explosion” that affects “all but the very simplest programs”); id. at 652
(describing Alan Turing’s “Halting Problem” as the canonical example of a noncomputable problem).
218. See Mailyn Fidler, Government Acquisition and Use of Zero-Day Software Vulnerabilities, in
CYBER INSECURITY, supra note 6, at 279–80.
219. Benjamin Beurdouche et al., A Messy State of the Union: Taming the Composite State
Machines of TLS, 36 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 535, 535–36 (2015) (explaining how
even systems that are well-understood in isolation can generate “disastrous misunderstandings” when
combined into a composite state machine); Blaze, supra note 191, at 2 n.2 (“[A]dding new features
to a system that makes it twice as large generally has the effect of making it far more than twice as
vulnerable.”); Jefrey Voas, Composing Software Component “Ilities”, IEEE SOFTWARE, July/Aug.
2001, at 16; see also J.L. Fiadeiro, On the Emergence of Properties in Component-Based Systems, 5
PROC. ALGEBRAIC METHODOLOGY & SOFTWARE TECH. 421 (1996); Khaled Md. Khan & Jun Han,
A Security Characterisation Framework for Trustworthy Component Based Software Systems, 27
PROC. ANN. INT’L COMPUTER SOFTWARE & APPLICATIONS CONF. (2003) (“Repeated experiences
suggest that just relying on the security claims made by the component developer such as ‘secure
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Even when errors are known and fixable, many more obstacles lurk.
Patching a bug can easily introduce new errors.220 This is true not only
because the patch might be poorly written, but also because the
composition problem generates new, unverifiable interactions.221 For
example, that very fear has been cited by medical device manufacturers
who have refused to patch cybersecurity vulnerabilities because they do
not want to lose their FDA clearances.222 When security researchers
reported basic vulnerabilities in infusion pumps that would allow remote
hackers to inject fatal doses into patients, the expected response was that
manufacturers would act immediately to issue security patches.223 Instead,
manufacturers objected that any alterations to the medical device software
might cause it to fall out of compliance and forfeit FDA approval.224 In
component’ may not be very appealing to the software composers. In current practices, software
composers are almost forced to compose systems with components for which they have partial or no
knowledge about their underlying security properties.”).
220. See Robert M. Lee, Protecting Industrial Control Systems in Critical Infrastructure, in CYBER
INSECURITY, supra note 6, at 31, 34–36; Alvaro A. Cárdenas et al., Challenges for Securing CyberPhysical
Systems
(July
18,
2009)
(unpublished
report),
https://ptolemy.berkeley.edu/projects/chess/pubs/601/cps-security-challenges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BZV-HT8J] (asserting that “software patching and frequent updates, are not well
suited for control systems” and citing anecdotally the accidental shutdown of a nuclear power plant
on March 7, 2008, because of a routine reboot of a monitoring device after a security update).
221. See Blaze, supra note 191, at 2 n.2 (“[E]ach new software component or feature operates not
just in isolation, but potentially interacts with everything else in the system, sometimes in unexpected
ways that can be exploited.”).
222. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CYBERSECURITY FOR NETWORKED MEDICAL DEVICES
CONTAINING
OFF-THE-SHELF
(OTS)
SOFTWARE
4
(2005),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/ucm077823.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3DQ-FPG6] (“It is possible, but unlikely, that a software
patch will need a new 510(k) submission.”); see also FDA, DECIDING WHEN TO SUBMIT A 510(K)
FOR
A
SOFTWARE
CHANGE
TO
AN
EXISTING
DEVICE
11
(2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/
ucm514737.pdf [https://perma.cc/H24U-VNVM] (“In many cases, a change made solely to
strengthen cybersecurity is not likely to require submission of a new 510(k).”).
223. Chunxiao Li et al., Hijacking an Insulin Pump: Security Attacks and Defenses for a Diabetes
Therapy System, 13 IEEE INT’L CONF. E-HEALTH NETWORKING, APPLICATIONS & SERVS. 150
(2011); Kevin Fu, Trustworthy Medical Device Software (prepublication draft 2011),
https://spqr.eecs.umich.edu/papers/fu-trustworthy-medical-device-software-IOM11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4KQ-XN8F]; Barry Meier, More Oversight Due for Infusion Pumps, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2010, at B1; see also Daniel Halperin et al., Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical
Devices, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, Jan.–Mar. 2008, at 30.
224. See Laura Hagen, Coding for Health: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, HEALTH LAW., June
2016, at 25 (infusion pump manufacturer was “not interested in verifying that other pumps are
vulnerable”); Daniel B. Kramer & Kevin Fu, Cybersecurity Concerns and Medical Devices, 318 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 2077, 2078 (2017) (describing careful efforts by FDA to allay anxieties of medical
device manufacturers when announcing a required firmware upgrade for pacemakers).
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response, the FDA has issued multiple statements encouraging medical
device manufacturers to provide security updates for known
vulnerabilities.225 Nevertheless, the FDA admits it cannot provide any
guarantees, since changes to software could indeed alter functionality
substantially enough that revocation of approval would be warranted.226
III. CRASHWORTHY CODE: A RULE OF EQUANIMITY
There are two main takeaways from the discussion above. The first is
that code crashes will remain inevitable, even in safety-critical settings
such as cyber-physical systems, because of fundamental attributes of
software technology. Although careful design and testing are necessary
components of software quality, a guarantee of error-free code is not
possible. This axiom is so well-accepted among the software engineering
community that cybersecurity experts have long advocated a strategic
shift from prevention to mitigation.227
The second lesson is that conventional approaches to software liability
law will remain stalled, even in safety-critical settings such as cyberphysical systems, because software errors defy easy legal categorization.
No amount of testing can guarantee the absence of errors, yet more testing
does make code more reliable, so it is not clear how much testing is
225. FDA, POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES 13 (2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/
ucm482022.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGX9-MC9S] (“Manufacturers should respond in a timely fashion
to address identified vulnerabilities.”).
226. See FDA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE VALIDATION: FINAL GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY
AND
FDA
STAFF
8
(2002),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/ucm085371.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZAC-RDX6] (“Seemingly insignificant changes in software
code can create unexpected and very significant problems elsewhere in the software program.”); cf.
Shyamnath Gollakota et al., They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable
Medical
Devices,
2011
PROC.
ACM
SIGCOMM
CONF.
2,
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2018438 [https://perma.cc/CNK7-R7G2] (“Between 1999 and
2005, the number of recalls of software-based medical devices more than doubled; more than 11% of
all medical-device recalls during this time period were attributed to software failures.”).
227. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SYSTEMS SECURITY
ENGINEERING: CYBER RESILIENCY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ENGINEERING OF TRUSTWORTHY
SECURE SYSTEMS (Draft NIST Special Publication 800-160, vol. 2) (Mar. 2018),
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/sp/800-160/vol-2/draft/documents/sp800-160-vol2draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5E9-3ULX]; Azad M. Madni & Scott Jackson, Towards a Conceptual
Framework for Resilience Engineering, 3 IEEE SYS. J. 181 (2009); see also Bambauer, supra note
195, at 1016, 1029 (“Cybersecurity cannot prevent the ghost in the network; instead, it should seek to
cabin its depredations. Mitigation—not prevention—is the key.”); Cárdenas et al., supra note 220, at
4 (“Because we can never rule out successful attacks, security engineering has recognized the
importance of detection and response to attacks.”).
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required to meet the threshold of reasonable code safety. Because even
diligent testing can miss trivial errors, a factfinder cannot rely on intrinsic
attributes of a software error to determine whether it was avoidable with
due care. For the same reason, it is difficult to explain why a manufacturer
should have used an alternative code design, without committing unfair
hindsight bias. Software liability is stuck on crash prevention.
Tort law overcame a similar quandary in the late 1960s with respect to
manual car accidents. For many decades, automakers maintained that they
could not prevent crashes and that safety standards were futile.228 In a line
of cases culminating in Evans v. General Motors Corp.,229 car
manufacturers successfully defended against products liability claims by
arguing that collisions were not an “intended purpose” of driving, and
therefore manufacturers owed no duty to make cars “accident-proof or
fool-proof.”230 At that time, car safety innovations focused only on crash
prevention technologies such as brakes, windshield wipers, and turn
signals.231 The only crash mitigation offered was lap belts, which were
optionally installed and rarely worn.232

228. See NADER, supra note 22, at 3–4; O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 20–21.
229. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
230. Id. at 824–25 (“The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in
collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer’s ability to foresee the possibility that such
collisions may occur. As defendant argues, the defendant also knows that its automobiles may be
driven into bodies of water, but it is not suggested that defendant has a duty to equip them with
pontoons.”); id. at 827 n.3 (Kiley, J., dissenting) (“General Motors has argued here that it owed no
duty to plaintiff . . . . [Because] the automobile is intended for travel, not colliding with other vehicles
or things.”); see also Harvey M. Sklaw, “Second Collision” Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4
SETON HALL L. REV. 499, 508–16 (1973) (explaining the “intended purpose” argument as “attractive
in its simplicity” and showing how cases reiterated it). But see Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page,
Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 645, 655–56 (1967) (attacking the
Evans decision for “set[ting] the development of the common law of auto design back thirty years”);
Recent Cases, Torts—Liability of Maker of Chattel—Manufacturer Is Not Liable for Failure to Design
“Crashworthy” Automobile, 80 HARV. L. REV. 688, 689 (1967) (criticizing the Evans court’s
“excessively narrow assumption that the purpose of an automobile is solely to provide a means of
transportation”); cf. NADER, supra note 22, at 129–31 (detailing manufacturers’ knowledge of
“obvious” structural weaknesses of the X-frame construction).
231. See LEMOV, supra note 23, at 6 (“‘Collision avoidance’ was the predominant safety principle
during the first sixty years of the century.” (citing JOHN D. GRAHAM, AUTO SAFETY: ASSESSING
AMERICA’S PERFORMANCE 17 (1989))); Window-cleaning device, U.S. Patent No. 743,801 (filed
June 18, 1903) (issued Nov. 10, 1903).
232. See LEMOV, supra note 23, at 60–63; MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26; infra notes 281–282.
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The crashworthy doctrine broke the impasse.233 In 1968, the Eighth
Circuit charted a bold new course in the watershed case, Larsen v. General
Motors Corp.,234 involving a head-on collision that caused the steering
column and wheel to be thrust like a spear into the driver’s skull.235
Though it was clear the driver was at fault for causing the accident (the
“first collision”), the court held the automaker responsible for injuries
caused or enhanced by the steering column and wheel during the “second
collision.”236 The Larsen court cited statistical data on the annual rate of
accidents—which in 1966 had risen to 52,500 deaths and 1.9 million
disabling injuries—and also that “[b]etween one-fourth and two-thirds of
all vehicles manufactured are at sometime during their subsequent use
involved in the tragedy of human injury and death.”237 Given the
“statistically inevitable” nature of such crashes, the court held that car
manufacturers owed a duty to minimize the injurious effects of such
eventualities.238 The intended purpose of a car was not merely to provide
transportation, but to provide reasonably safe transportation consonant
with the state of the art.239 Manufacturers were not wholesale insurers, but
neither were they wholly immune.
Change was not immediate,240 but astonishingly quick for common
law.241 A mere decade later, the “intended purpose” reasoning of Evans
233. See generally NADER, supra note 22. Congress responded by enacting the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the Highway Safety Act of 1966. Christopher Jensen, 50
Years Ago, ‘Unsafe at Any Speed’ Shook the Auto World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2015, at B3.
234. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
235. Id. at 497 & n.2.
236. Id. at 502; see also NADER, supra note 22, at 90 (“The most flagrant instrument of
trauma . . . is the steering assembly. It caused approximately twenty per cent of the injuries in the data
sample taken during the past decade. As would be expected, it is the driver who is most often injured
by the steering assembly, either by being thrown forward into it or by being impaled on a ramming
steering column.”).
237. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502 n.4, 505 n.8.
238. Id. at 502.
239. Id. at 503 (“The manufacturers are not insurers but should be held to a standard of reasonable
care in design to provide a reasonably safe vehicle in which to travel.”); accord Volkswagen of Am.
v. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
240. Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 997–98 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“Commentators have
been critical of the reasoning of Evans, but it nonetheless has its judicial adherents . . . . The modern
trend of the case law and increasingly the weight of authority favors Larsen’s extended scope of
liability.”); Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 317 A.2d 494, 534–38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (tallying
nine states and the District of Columbia that had chosen to follow Larsen, and ten states that had
chosen to follow Evans); see also Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973); McClung v. Ford
Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), aff’d, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973).
241. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir. 1977) (overruling Evans).
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was no longer being cited with approval.242 Larsen became the unanimous
rule across the nation.243 The crashworthy doctrine encouraged quicker
adoption of and further innovation in automobile safety technologies.244
To be sure, some academics minimized the significance of the doctrine,
crediting statements from automakers that each case was too one-of-akind and low-impact to affect broader car design trends.245 But the reduced
242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16, Reporters’ Note to cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2016) (“In the early years of tort liability for defective product design, some courts
refused to recognize a duty on the part of an auto manufacturer to design a reasonably crashworthy
vehicle. The overwhelming majority, however, followed the view of Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
which held that collisions are foreseeable and that manufacturers must design cars so that they are
reasonably crashworthy. The Larsen rule appears now to be the unanimous position of American
courts.” (citations omitted)).
243. See Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiff’s Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in
Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DE PAUL L. REV. 55, 61 n.33 (1989)
(collecting early cases showing thirty-five states adopting Larsen). Eleven of the remaining fifteen
states have since adopted the doctrine: Alabama—Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176
(Ala. 1985); Alaska—Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth (Alaska 1998); Arizona—Cota v. Harley
Davidson, Inc., 684 P.2d 888 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Delaware—Gen. Motors Corp. v. Wolhar, 686
A.2d 170 (Del. 1996); Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1997); Hawaii—
Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Haw. 1990); Mississippi—Tolive
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 213 (Miss. 1985); Nevada—Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 796
P.2d 1092 (Nev. 1990); New Hampshire—Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761 A.2d 477 (N.H.
2000); North Carolina—Warren v. Colombo, 377 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Utah—Egbert v.
Nissan North Am., Inc., 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007); West Virginia—Blankenship v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991). Three states have broached the question but remained
noncommittal: Arkansas—Bishop v. Tariq, Inc., 384 S.W.3d 659 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011);
Connecticut—Giannini v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (D. Conn. 2007); Maine—Taylor
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 06-69-BW, 2006 WL 2228973 (D. Me. Aug. 3, 2006). No decisions on point
were found from Vermont.
244. See Johnson, supra note 56, at 685 (“The ‘second collision’ auto cases show the value of
products liability litigation in improving industry customs.”).
245. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 240–41 (“It is difficult to imagine that the products
liability system is a major influence on the safe design of automobiles. The messages from the liability
system to the manufacturers are both weak and full of static.”); John D. Graham, Product Liability
and Motor Vehicle Safety, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 74, 120, 183–84 (concluding that there is
“little evidence that expanded product liability risk was necessary to achieve the safety improvements
that have been made,” because other effects including “consumer demand, regulation, and
professional responsibility would have been sufficient to achieve improved safety,” though
acknowledging that “liability seemed to cause safety improvements to occur more quickly than they
would have occurred in the absence of liability”); Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in
LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 74, at 1, 5 (“[W]hile Eads and Reuter find from their interviews of
corporate managers that product liability exerts a strong ‘pro-safety’ effect on product design, they
also confess that current liability law sends an ‘extremely vague signal,’ since it does not indicate
‘how to be careful, or more important, how careful to be.’”). But see Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and
Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1129, 1176–78 (1994)
(arguing that the development of crashworthiness litigation had a greater impact on automobile safety
than scholars gave it credit).
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rate of repeat cases was a remarkable change from prior practices, when
design flaws persisted lazily across multiple model years, and it suggests
that lessons from crashworthy cases were learned more attentively than
not.246 The certitude of stare decisis helped steer automakers away from
dashboard knobs, flimsy door latches, and rear-mounted engines, and
toward padded interiors, sounder components, and collapsible steering
columns and bumpers.247 The annual rate of traffic deaths plummeted
asymptotically from 5.5 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 1966, to
2.76 in 1982, 1.58 in 1998, and 1.18 in 2016.248
In short, the crashworthy doctrine worked.249 It gave courts a dynamic
framework that ratcheted incentives to reduce injuries and promote
246. See O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 160–61, 173–84 (observing that the automobile
industry has become “panicked over the lawsuits filed against it” and that it has resulted in substantial
reductions in “lead time for a completely changed car” from three years to two years or less); Johnson,
supra note 56, at 677 (“Court decisions in these suits have played an active role in . . . providing
incentives for manufacturers to improve products and thereby avert future litigable injuries.”). There
were exceptions to the rule. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center
of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 77–82 (1995) (narrating the multi-year sagas of the Ford
Pinto and the GM side-saddle fuel tanks, in which automakers apparently determined the costs of
litigation were worth enduring); cf. Graham, supra note 245, at 128–37 (offering a more sympathetic
account that the Ford Pinto’s performance was comparable to that of other subcompact and compact
cars).
247. See, e.g., Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1979) (bumper); Huddell v. Levin,
537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (headrest); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (car
door); Schwartz, supra note 5 (discussing public fallout to Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981) (rear-mounted engine)); see also Federal Standard No. 515—Standard
Safety Devices for Automotive Vehicles, 30 Fed. Reg. 8,319 (June 30, 1965) (complementing judicial
doctrine with regulatory rulemaking).
248. NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES AND FATALITY
RATES 1899–2016 (2018), https://cdan.nhtsa.gov/tsftables/Fatalities%20and%20
Fatality%20Rates.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFQ4-XNRK]; Injury rates fell from 169 per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled in 1988, to 79 in 2015. Traffic Safety Facts Annual Report Tables, NHTSA,
https://cdan.nhtsa.gov/tsftables/tsfar.htm# [https://perma.cc/FBN6-FA9G] (click “Trends,” then click
“Trends: General,” then follow “Table 2” hyperlink). But see EASTMAN, supra note 24, at 155 (noting
that the switch from a fatality ratio based on the number of automobiles registered to one based on
deaths per 100 million miles driven per year was done to present a more pleasing picture); NADER
supra note 22, at 265 (criticizing “any claim of a reduced death rate per vehicle miles traveled” as
“giv[ing] an illusion of progress which is definitely misleading”); NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M.
PADDOCK, RAND, DRIVING TO SAFETY: HOW MANY MILES OF DRIVING WOULD IT TAKE TO
DEMONSTRATE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE RELIABILITY? (2016); supra note 35 (questioning the
credibility of traffic safety statistics).
249. To be sure, Ralph Nader and his allies worried greatly that the pace and scope of automotive
safety improvements failed to meet expectations. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED xxvii–
lxxxvii (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter NADER (2d ed.)]; Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, AutomobileDesign Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415 (1996); see
also Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–104 (1974) (introducing the theory of repeat player advantage in
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innovation, without
demanding perfection or
bankrupting
250
manufacturers. Crashworthiness was less than strict enterprise liability,
because it excused “unreasonable” measures, and offered remedy only
when harms were preventable given the state of the art. Yet it also was
more than pure negligence law, because it offered a legal solution to the
problem of statistically inevitable injuries, not just proximately
foreseeable ones.
Though the crashworthy doctrine remains a potent force, its domain has
been limited to vehicles such as cars, motorcycles, boats, and aircraft, and
equivalent specialized machinery such as farm tractors, grain harvesters,
lawnmowers, and snowmobiles.251 This Article argues crashworthiness
should extend to code.
A.

On the Origin of Crashworthiness

The crashworthy doctrine was invented as a response to judicial
deadlock.252 For decades, the Big Four automakers—General Motors,
Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors—successfully argued that
preventing car accidents was beyond their control. Drivers bore the brunt
of the blame: they were speed demons, drunk drivers, young hot-rodders,

litigation). Nonetheless, what “worked” is that the crashworthy doctrine revealed to courts a new path
forward they were willing to travel. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1093–
94, 1097–1101 (1975) (expounding on the “gravitational force” of common law precedent that
constrains judicial decisions to arguments of principle rather than arguments of policy).
250. Compare Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation Revitalization Act: How
Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1269 (2002), with Nathan
J. Rice, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: A Ten-Year Retrospective, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 945, 951 (2004).
251. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16, Reporters’ Note to cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (collecting cases). But see Scott G. Lindvall, Aircraft Crashworthiness: Should
the Courts Set the Standards?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (1986) (finding courts reluctant to apply
crashworthiness in cases involving aircraft). Some commentators advocated an expanded conception
of “enhanced damages” to include any form of enhancement, but those calls do not appear to have
been heeded. See Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C. L.
REV. 643, 647–50 (1984).
252. See Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform,
72 N.C. L. REV. 1129, 1168–71 (1994) (describing the rise of the crashworthy doctrine and noting
that “as of 1966, no plaintiff had yet prevailed on a claim that an automobile was defectively
designed” (quoting Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 405 (1st Cir. 1988)); Nader & Page,
supra note 230, at 645–46 (“On appeals, plaintiffs are batting zero. The appellate courts have yet to
reverse a judgment for a manufacturer or affirm a judgment for a plaintiff in a case involving a traffic
accident allegedly caused by the unsafe design of an American passenger car.”).
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old codgers, or too inept, undereducated, or otherwise careless.253 Car
manufacturers complained further that it was not their fault if passengers
failed to purchase or use seat belts and other “extra” safety features.254
When drivers were not at fault, road and weather conditions were the
villain.255 Automakers persuaded Congress to appropriate millions of
dollars for the improvement of national highways.256 Expensive proposals
were developed to embed sensors, transmitters, and lights directly into the
millions of miles of roadways, as well as to remove trees and all other
obstacles within close striking distance from the road.257
At the same time, automakers resisted calls to impose any upfront
restrictions on car design. The popular mantra then was that “safety
253. EASTMAN, supra note 24, at chs. 5 & 6; O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 67–87;
LEMOV, supra note 23, at 59 (“Americans accepted the automobile industry and the safety
establishment’s repeated assertion: ‘Cars are safe. Drivers cause accidents.’ One could view it as a
highly effective public brainwashing.”); NADER, supra note 22, at 235–39 (“Today almost every
program is aimed at the driver—at educating him, exhorting him, watching him, judging him,
punishing him, compiling records about his driving violations, and organizing him in citizen support
activities . . . . The reasoning behind this philosophy of safety can be summarized in this way: Most
accidents are in the class of driver fault; driver fault is in the class of violated traffic laws; therefore,
observance of traffic laws by drivers would eliminate most accidents.”); Graham, supra note 34, at
1260 (“[T]here exists a tendency, in early accidents that involve a novel device, to focus on the
behavior of its consumers . . . [and] regard[] early adopters as taking their chances with a
technology.”); Sam Peltzman, The Regulation of Automobile Safety, in AUTO SAFETY REGULATION:
THE CURE OR THE PROBLEM? 1 (Henry L. Manne & Roger L. Miller eds., 1976); see also Schemel v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Schumard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311
(S.D. Ohio 1967). But see Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 317 A.2d 494, 541 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1974) (Lowe, J., dissenting) (“More to the point, we think it is the vestige of an ‘anachronism’ based
upon an era when motor cars were luxuries.”).
254. See infra note 281; LEMOV, supra note 23, at 52; NADER (2d ed.), supra note 249, at xiii
(“Ford officials right up to Henry Ford II perpetuated the myth that motorists would reject safer cars
and that sales strategies and safety don’t mix.”); O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 155, 160.
255. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., SUPPLEMENT TO FED. CARRIERS REP. NO. 456, MOTOR
VEHICLE AND HIGHWAY SAFETY ACTS OF 1966 WITH EXPLANATION 15 (1966) (“Poor roads, it was
felt, imposed upon the driver demands of judgment, decision, and reaction that he could not possibly
meet adequately in the few seconds he usually has in which to meet them.”); EASTMAN, supra note
24, at 147–48; LEMOV, supra note 23, at 6–7; NADER, supra note 22, at 233; O’CONNELL & MYERS,
supra note 24, at 6 (“The real answer, he went on to tell us, is to strip away trees for one hundred feet
on both sides of the highway. That’ll take care of the tree question.”).
256. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374; Post Office
Appropriations Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-244 § 4, 42 Stat. 652, 660; Federal Highway Act of 1921,
Pub. L. No. 67-87, 42 Stat. 212; Federal Aid Road Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-156, 39 Stat. 355.
257. See O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 91–99. This faith in road-improvement efforts
has carried into the present day. See Dean Narciso, Smart Corridor Will Allow Cars to Talk to One
Another,
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(June
16,
2018,
6:07
PM),
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20180616/smart-corridor-will-allow-cars-to-talk-to-one-another
[https://perma.cc/LV7L-2LWJ] (describing test efforts to build out vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) technologies).
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doesn’t sell,” a catchy slogan that united a diverse set of ideologies. One
was a story about what consumers wanted: raw speed and horsepower,
without sissy frills that cost extra.258 The 1956 model year was often
invoked as a cautionary tale, when Ford attempted an ill-fated campaign
that featured safety as a prime selling point.259 Thereafter automakers
pointedly turned their back on safety to prove the point, launching a
concerted push in the late 1950s and early 1960s to sell stripped-down
subcompact cars that promised luxury at a discount.260 Second, car sellers
expressed fears that any mention of “safety” would discourage buyers by
reminding them of the unpleasant hazards of driving. Accordingly,
manufacturers played down the need for safety engineering, and instead
employed stylists to play up the thrill and sex appeal of the road.261 A third
version lamented the exorbitant costs of developing and testing proper
safety mechanisms, with one executive famously declaring that “it is
completely unrealistic even to talk about a foolproof and crashproof
car.”262 Rushing ahead with unproven technologies did nobody any
favors,263 least of all overeager drivers misled into a false sense of
258. See EASTMAN, supra note 24, at ch.4; GRAHAM, supra note 231, at 204–06 (describing “[t]he
showroom reality” of slow sales of optional air bags despite marketing studies and opinion polls
indicating substantial consumer support); cf. Gina M. DeDominicis, No Duty at Any Speed?:
Determining the Responsibility of the Automobile Manufacturer in Speed-Related Accidents, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 403 (1986) (discussing at length Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 261 F. Supp.
134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), aff’d, 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), which rejected a claim that automakers
should not manufacture cars capable of attaining speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour).
259. GRAHAM, supra note 231, at 123. But see LEMOV, supra note 23, at 61; NADER (2d ed.), supra
note 249, at ix.
260. LEMOV, supra note 23, at 179; MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 105 (“As Lee Iacocca
later put it, the American people wanted an economy car, no matter what it cost.”). But see GRAHAM,
supra note 231, at 126–28 (crediting arguments by Iacocca that American automakers needed
subcompacts to combat competition from the Volkswagen Beetle and other imports).
261. NADER, supra note 22, at 210–31; O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 145–57; John
Sibley, State Study Says Safety Car Would Cut Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1966, at 24 (“The [New
York] State Department of Motor Vehicles added its voice today to the chorus of automobile industry
critics who charge that Detroit is more concerned with styling than safety.”).
262. NADER, supra note 22, at 3–4 (quoting John F. Gordon, the president of General Motors); cf.
Larsen v. Gen. Motor Corp., 391 F.2d 493, 497–500 (collecting prior case law finding no
manufacturer duty to design automobiles to be “‘accident-proof’ or ‘fool-proof’” (quoting Evans v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966))).
263. See Larsen, 391 F.2d at 504 n.7 (quoting industry protestations to Congress that “it is always
relatively easy to come up with a new design of an old part, or the design of a new feature or part, but
until we are able to adequately test this part and have a pretty clear picture of what it will do under
the circumstances to which it is subjected, we are exposing ourselves, the users of our products, and
frequently others on the highways to risks”); Jensen, supra note 233, at B3 (describing criticism by
some who “thought that Mr. Nader did not understand the complexity and trade-offs of automotive
engineering and that [his] book encouraged people to sue the auto industry”).
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complacency.264 Yet as accident rates grew steadily worse in the 1960s,
the automakers squandered their enormous reservoir of public trust.265
The theory of “second collision” or “crashworthiness” grew out of
concerted efforts by plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumer advocates to point
the finger back at car manufacturers and force them to make reasonable
design accommodations for safety. Regardless of who or what caused the
first collision, the causes of second collision were by definition within the
aegis of the car designer. The concept of the “first collision” cleverly
enfolded all possible external causes of the crash, including driver fault,
obstacles, and environmental conditions. Defining the “second collision”
as the impact between passengers and the interior of the car then isolated
those factors that lay within automakers’ control.266 Nader and his allies
worked methodically in court and out of court to prove that automakers
had extensive knowledge of the prevalence of second-collision injuries,
possessed readily available safety solutions that could minimize such
injuries, and had conspired to withhold and suppress such safety
measures.267 These efforts culminated in landmark federal legislation
establishing a new regulatory agency with authority to issue national
safety standards.268
264. See Murray Mackay, Liability, Safety and Innovation in the Automotive Industry, in LIABILITY
MAZE, supra note 74, at 191, 214–17 (describing “technological uncertainties” and the “threat of
product liability” as prime reasons contributing to the industry’s opposition to air bags); cf. Peltzman,
supra note 253, at 29 (arguing that any benefits of auto safety regulation were offset by an increase
in driver willingness to take risks); David Shepardson, Fatal Tesla Autopilot Crash Driver Had Hands
Off Wheel: U.S. Agency, REUTERS, June 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-crash/fataltesla-autopilot-crash-driver-had-hands-off-wheel-us-agency-idUSKCN1J31VP
[https://perma.cc/J65E-CBML].
265. See O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 163 (quoting Dan Cordtz, Auto Executives Hurt
Own Cause, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1965, at 14).
266. See LEMOV, supra note 23, at 111–12 (describing efforts by Dr. William Haddon, the first
traffic safety administrator, to “move the emphasis on primary causation away from Box A (the
driver) and towards Box B (the vehicle)” where “the most substantial payoff was”).
267. In particular, they pointed to the 1956 model year when Ford had touted safety measures as a
selling point, and which had been received with great interest by consumers, before being bullied by
General Motors to recant and fall back in line with the mantra that “safety doesn’t sell.” See NADER
(2d ed.), supra note 249, at xi–xvi; EASTMAN, supra note 24, at 228–32.
268. See generally MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26. President Johnson signed the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966), and the Highway
Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966), on September 9, 1966, shortly after Evans and
shortly before Larsen. See Walter Rugaber, Safety Council Sees Auto Law Saving 10,000 Lives, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1966, at 80. Crashworthiness dominated the legislative hearings. See, e.g., 112 Cong.
Rec. 14,221 (1966) (“The committee heard compelling testimony that passenger cars can be designed
and constructed so as to afford substantial protection against the ‘second collision’ for both driver and
passenger; further, that some of these design changes can be achieved at little or no additional
manufacturing cost.”). NHTSA was formed in follow-on legislation enacted in 1970. See Highway
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More significantly, the “second collision” theory broke open a
longstanding logjam in judicial decisionmaking, providing courts a
forceful rebuttal against the claim that safety was too hard to engineer.269
Building a crashproof car was impossible, but installing a collapsible
steering column was not. Reframing the liability problem in this narrower
manner proved remarkably robust against resistance from automakers.
In the decades since Larsen, the body of critical commentary has
remained quite modest, converging on only two main points of contention.
One set of issues addresses apportionment of damages based on the
comparative fault of drivers and other third parties.270 The other set of
issues concerns how to designate the “state of the art” of safety
technologies.
The apportionment discussion has centered primarily on who should
have to bear the burden of proof. Initially, in a line of cases beginning
with Huddell v. Levin,271 courts held that the usual rule in litigation is that
plaintiffs bear the burden to prove their cases, and that this rule should
extend to proving whether one’s injuries are attributable to the second
collision as opposed to other factors.272 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Rosenn criticized this aspect of the decision as doing a “gross injustice to
an innocent plaintiff” particularly where it is “impossible to apportion

Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713; Crane et al., supra note 64, at 302 (outlining
NHTSA’s regulatory authority).
269. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) (questioning the institutional
competence of courts to assess design decisions that are highly “polycentric”); Alden D. Holford,
Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 85, 91–92 (1973);
Comment, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L.
REV. 299, 303 (1969) (“Judicial hesitancy to hold automobile manufacturers liable for negligent
design is attributable in part to misgivings about the jury’s judgment on the issues of damage
apportionment and the expert’s standard of care.”).
270. See James B. Sales, Contribution and Indemnity Between Negligent and Strictly Liable
Tortfeasors, 12 ST. MARY’S L.J. 323 (1980); Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic
Framework, 62 N.C. L. REV. 643 (1984).
271. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
272. Id. at 738 (“[T]he automobile manufacturer is liable only for the enhanced injuries attributable
to the defective product. This being the essence of the liability, we cannot agree that the burden of
proof on that issue can properly be placed on the defendant manufacturer.”); see also Heather Fox
Vickles & Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEX. L.
REV. 417, 429–30, 430 n.75 (1995); Michael Hoenig, Resolution of “Crashworthiness” Design
Claims, 55 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 699–706 (1981); Robert A. McConnell, Survey of Utah Strict
Products Liability Law: From Hahn to the Present and Beyond, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1196–
1207 (1992).
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damages among concurrent tortfeasors.”273 Judge Rosenn invoked the
counter-principle that innocent victims should receive preference over
concurrent wrongdoers.274 The Huddell concurrence has become the
majority rule after adoption by two influential opinions—Fox v. Ford
Motor Co. 275 and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. 276—as well as the
Restatement.277 Only a minority of states continue to follow Huddell.278
The apportionment discussion also seeks to restrict what kinds of
plaintiff fault can be used to offset manufacturer fault for second
collisions.279 Typically, courts will allow evidence of intoxication or other
censured behavior.280 But blaming victims for failure to wear seatbelts has
been viewed differently. Historically, seatbelt use was not common
practice.281 Automakers had stubbornly opposed regulatory efforts to
273. Huddell, 537 F.2d at 746 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
274. Id. (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)). The majority opinion disagreed with the
characterization of defendants as concurrent tortfeasors. Id. at 738–39.
275. Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
276. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
277. Id.; Fox, 575 F.2d 774; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16
Reporters’ Note to cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (tallying twenty-three states favoring the FoxMitchell approach); see also Stanton Phillip Beck, Enhanced Injury: A Direction for Washington, 61
WASH. L. REV. 571 (1986); Karen L. Chadwick, “Causing” Enhanced Injuries in Crashworthiness
Cases, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1223 (1998); Gerald F. Tietz et al., Crashworthiness and Erie:
Determining State Law Regarding the Burden of Proving and Apportioning Damages, 62 TEMPLE L.
REV. 587, 619 n.270 (1989); Aaron D. Twerski, Inside the Restatement, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 839, 848–
49 (1997).
278. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16, Reporters’ Note to
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“Only six states are clearly in the Huddell camp: Michigan, New
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.”), with Levenstam & Lapp, supra
note 243, at 66 n.61 (collecting cases from seven states: Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina), and Vickles & Oldham, supra note 272, at 429
n.74, 442–43 (criticizing the Restatement’s count and collecting cases from eighteen states:
California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and
Washington).
279. See Ryan P. Harkins, Holding Tortfeasors Accountable: Apportionment of Enhanced Injuries
Under Washington’s Comparative Fault Scheme, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1185 (2001).
280. See, e.g., West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D.N.H. 2013) (cell phone
use); Giannini v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2007) (alcohol consumption); Ellen
M. Bublick, The Tort-Proof Plaintiff: The Drunk in the Automobile, Crashworthiness Claims, and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 707, 719–21 (2009); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16, Reporters’ Note to cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(finding courts “sharply split” with a majority “allow[ing] the introduction of plaintiff’s conduct as
comparative fault in a crashworthiness context”); Twerski, supra note 277, at 851–52 (explaining the
Restatement members’ vote to reverse the Reporters on this issue).
281. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 85 (citing government studies finding seatbelt usage
rates at 25% to 30%); Brian T. Bagley, The Seat Belt Defense in Texas, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 707, 716
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require seatbelt installation in vehicles, which they characterized as an
unnecessary expense that consumers did not want.282 But as mandatory
seatbelt laws suddenly swept across the nation in the late-1980s,283
automakers switched tack and began arguing in court that those who failed
to buckle up were lawbreakers who shared fault in enhancing their own
injuries.284 Many states took umbrage at this about-face and immediately
banned use of this “seatbelt defense.”285 Accordingly, not all types of
plaintiff fault are treated as equally culpable.

n.34 (2004); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., New Seat Belt Defense Issues: The Impact of Air Bags and
Mandatory Seat Belt Use Statutes on the Seat Belt Defense, and the Basis of Damage Reduction Under
the Seat Belt Defense, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1387–88 (1989) (below 15%).
282. EASTMAN, supra note 24, at 186 (noting general consensus among sales departments that “the
presence of safety belts would imply that the automobile was dangerous”); id. at 226–28, 231 (“The
demand for seatbelts caught [Ford] by surprise”); NADER, supra note 22, at 112–28; O’CONNELL &
MYERS, supra note 24, at 193–98 (documenting New York state senator Edward Speno’s fight to
have seat belts installed in new cars, which was “bitterly opposed by Detroit”); see also Thomas F.
Powell, II, Products Liability and Optional Safety Equipment—Who Knows More?, 73 NEB. L. REV.
843 (1994).
283. See GRAHAM, supra note 231, at 174–91, 222–24; MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 211
(explaining the background involving NHTSA’s Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 that
led to sudden enactment of mandatory seatbelt use laws across the country); Cochran, supra note 281,
at 1378 & n.31 (“Within the last few years, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
enacted statutes requiring seat belt use.”); State Seat Belt Law Takes Effect Today, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1984, at 26 (reporting New York’s law as “the first in the nation”).
284. See Kelly Carbetta-Scandy, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases: Complex Issues, Empty
Precedents, and Unpredictable Results, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1283–84 (1986) (noting that “Dean
Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts both approve of apportioning damages for a claimant’s
prior negligence in a crashworthiness case” and that “[r]ecent cases illustrate the trend toward
allowing a ‘mitigation rule’ in crashworthiness cases to reduce a claimant’s award proportionately by
that amount attributable to the claimant’s failure to use available safety restraints”); David A.
Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Safety Belt Defense, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 867, 880–
81 (1986) (“Since 1984, seven jurisdictions have adopted the safety belt defense in personal injury
cases through judicial action and an additional four states have enacted the defense through legislative
action, while only one new appellate court has rejected it.”).
285. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16, Reporters’ Note to cmt. f (AM.
LAW INST. 1998) (counting thirty-one states and the District of Columbia as having enacted statutory
bars against the seatbelt defense); id. Reporters’ Note to cmt. d (counting seven states as allowing the
seatbelt defense in full, six states as permitting it with a cap on reduction in damages, and two states
that leave the question to common law); Bagley, supra note 281, at 722–24 (noting that “a majority
of states still reject a general admission of seat belt evidence”); Cochran, supra note 281, at 1387–88,
1401–04; Michael B. Gallub, A Compromise Between Mitigation and Comparative Fault?: A Critical
Assessment of the Seat Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319, 334–
38 (1986); Juli Spector, The Continuing Controversy of the Seatbelt Defense, 27 HOUSTON L. REV.
179, 180–81 (1990); Westenberg, supra note 284, at 904 (finding support in ten states); see also
Bagley, supra note 281, at 719–20 (pointing also to the role of contributory negligence schemes:
“Entirely denying compensation to an auto accident victim because he or she failed to use a seat belt
was simply too harsh.”).

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

98

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:39

The second, more challenging set of issues raised in the
crashworthiness literature goes to the reasonableness of demanding safety
performance that exceeds the state of the art. Manufacturers raise a valid
objection that they cannot be held responsible for the impossible.286 This
concern is especially heightened for safety features, where consumers are
less forgiving of errors.287 For example, the introduction of collapsible
steering columns undoubtedly saved many lives, but also invited many
lawsuits for not being more perfect.288 At the same time, the sordid history
of auto safety regulation strongly suggests that some form of technologyforcing mechanism is needed when the financial incentives to delay and
cheat on safety are too great.289
Here, the judicial response has been equivocal. On one hand, courts
have consistently rejected efforts to rigidly define the “state-of-the-art” in
narrow terms such as industry consensus290 or regulatory compliance.291
286. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) (repurposing Lon Fuller’s concept of
“polycentricity” to critique judicial second-guessing of safety design decisions); Aaron D. Twerski,
Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing
Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 556–61 (1982) (describing the
“state of the art” objection as encompassing three related concerns: (1) practical feasibility, (2) afterarising technology, and (3) shifts in societal norms).
287. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal Aversion: When Agents of
Protection Become Agents of Harm, 90 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 245, 251 (2003);
Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in “No Airbag” Tort Claims: Preemption and Reciprocal Comity,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (1986) (noting “surprising” findings from a 1984 NHTSA study that
“airbags by themselves are effective only in frontal collisions” and will not be activated in rear or side
impact collisions or rollovers).
288. See, e.g., Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 692 P.2d 345 (Idaho 1984) (insufficient collapse);
Durett v. Baxter Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 253 N.W.2d 37 (Neb. 1977) (breach of warranty); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1971) (failure to telescope); see also John D. Morris,
Despite Progress in Auto Safety, Future Effectiveness of Federal Program Is in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1970, at 16 (explaining that the collapsible steering column was the only innovative safety
standard the industry had put into effect, and that it “had been voluntarily incorporated on some
General Motors models before being required under the 1966 [federal] safety standard”).
289. See Nader & Page, supra note 249, at 457–58 (critiquing the regulatory compliance approach
for being (1) primarily reliant on industry-supplied data, (2) subject to political interference, and
(3) vulnerable to lethargic evolution or freezing of existing standards); Comment, Automobile Design
Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 310–11 (1969).
290. Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (Neb. 1979) (“Obviously, the inaction of all the
manufacturers in an area should not be the standard by which the state of the art should be
determined . . . . The question therefore is not whether anyone else was doing more, although that
may be considered, but whether the evidence disclosed that anything more could reasonably and
economically be done.” (citing The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Learned Hand, J.)));
Johnson, supra note 56, at 680–84.
291. Steven L. Holley, The Relationship Between Federal Standards and Litigation in the Control
of Automobile Design, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 804, 818–25 (1982) (canvassing multiple arguments in
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Such evidence can be relevant but never determinative—a sensible
approach given that the “state-of-the-art” inquiry is ultimately one of
technological fact, not of business judgment or legal decree. On the other
hand, the bitter battle over passive airbags offers a cautionary tale where
technological consensus is sharply divided.292 After decades of back-andforth wrangling led to a fragile truce between automakers and federal
regulators, courts refused to disturb the peace.293 Instead they dismissed
“no airbag” lawsuits as preempted by federal law—a ruling ultimately
ratified by the Supreme Court.294 That judicial reticence illustrates the
challenge of evaluating the adequacy and readiness of technology that has
not yet been commercialized.295 Since airbags became mandatory in
1997—more than four decades after their invention in 1953—deployment
has been marred by sweeping recalls of tens of millions of devices,

support of the venerable principle that “compliance with government standards is not a complete
defense, but only some evidence of due care”); Johnson, supra note 56, at 687–89; see also Mark A.
Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2014) (exploring the interplay
between negligence per se, the regulatory compliance defense, and statutory preemption); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 532–45 (2012). But see Dana P.
Babb, Note, The Deployment of Car Manufacturers into a Sea of Product Liability? Recharacterizing
Preemption as a Federal Regulatory Compliance Defense in Airbag Litigation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
1677 (1997). Others have made the point that highly complex technologies such as aviation may be
better suited for the regulatory compliance defense. See Scott G. Lindvall, Aircraft Crashworthiness:
Should the Courts Set the Standards?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (1986); Patrick J. Shea, Solving
America’s General Aviation Crisis: The Advantages of Federal Preemption over Tort Reform, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1995).
292. See LEMOV, supra note 23, at 153 (noting opposition from automakers who called claims of
airbag reliability and safety “preposterous”); MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 208–10, 213
(explaining that “the [U.S. Supreme] Court was baffled by NHTSA’s apparent but unexplained
abandonment of airbags . . . , devices that the agency had maintained for over a decade were
technologically available and cost-beneficial”).
293. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 184–87, 205–23; Nader & Page, supra note 249,
at 434–52 & n.161.
294. Compare Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000) (finding NHTSA’s
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 preempts “no airbag” claim), with Motor
Vehicle Mfgrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983) (finding NHTSA’s
proposed rescission of FMVSS 208 arbitrary and capricious). But cf. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (2011) (finding FMVSS 208 does not preempt “no rear lap-and-shoulder
seatbelt” claim).
295. See JOHN D. GRAHAM, AUTO SAFETY: ASSESSING AMERICA’S PERFORMANCE (1989) (arguing
that market forces are faster and more effective than technology-forcing regulations). Compare Ted
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010) (describing the substantial
challenges that lie between describing an invention and commercializing it), with NADER, supra note
22, at 75–77 (using patent filings to establish knowledge and deliberate disregard of safety risks).
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sparked by just a few scattered reports of eye injuries, burns, and
fatalities.296
All that said, the crashworthy doctrine was an ingenious innovation that
has promoted remarkable progress in an area long mired in inaction.
Breaking down the collision event into smaller sub-components refocused
the cost-optimization function from crash prevention to crash mitigation,
which has made all the difference. For consumer advocates,
crashworthiness provided a long-sought way to push manufacturers off
the perch of inaction. For manufacturers, crashworthiness offered an
alternative to total enterprise liability for all car accidents. Courts’
willingness to draw limits based on apportionment of fault and
technological state-of-the-art showed that the doctrine is a rule of reason,
not one of per se liability. Importantly, crashworthiness does not demand
that every crash must result in no harm.
B.

Software Fault Tolerance: Translation from Cars to Code

The basic lesson of the crashworthy doctrine is simple: “inevitable”
crashes that could not have been prevented in their entirety can
nonetheless be played back in slow-motion and partitioned into smaller
chunks more amenable to legal treatment. In the automotive context, that
process of subdivision has yielded a “first collision” and a “second
collision,” with automakers bearing legal responsibility for one but not
the other. The “first collision” collects all the causes leading up to the
accident and sets those aside; the “second collision” trains judicial
attention instead on the window of opportunity following the moment of
impact, where substandard design decisions enhance (or fail to soften) the
severity of the crash.
As this Article argues, that same process of slow-motion diffraction
can—and should—be extended to cyber-physical systems. Where a
software error leads to physical injury or death, the initial activation of
that software error can be partitioned from the subsequent software
failure—which in turn can be partitioned from the physical crash that
follows after that. To be sure, crashworthiness in the cyber sense is
different from crashworthiness in the physical sense. No literal collisions
are involved in code crashes, so the physics of cause-and-effect are
296. See Myron Levin, Air Bag Lawsuits Blame Nissan for Eye Injuries, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2002, at C4 (reporting 215 deaths since 1990, and 1.2 million vehicles recalled just in 2002, because
of airbag defects); Hiroko Tabuchi, The Quest to Save a Few Dollars Per Airbag Led to a Deadly
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2016, at A1 (reporting fourteen deaths and more than 100 injuries due
to defective ammonium nitrate inflators, leading to recalls of 64 million airbags).

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

CRASHWORTHY CODE

101

determined not by Newtonian momentum and inertia but by code and
data. The provenance and progression of code crashes shares little in
common with the straightforward wham-bam sequence of automotive
crashes. Nonetheless, there are analogous opportunities for cyber-physical
manufacturers to use safer designs that can mitigate the effects of a
software error between the onset and the end of a code crash event.297
Within the computer science literature, there are two basic approaches
to software dependability: fault avoidance and fault tolerance.298 (To be
clear, use of the term “fault” in the computer science sense is not a legal
assignment of liability but merely a factual proposition that an error exists
in the system.) This bifurcation between avoidance and tolerance parallels
the division between first and second collisions: in both contexts, the split
represents the conceptual pivot point between a manufacturer’s duty to
design a system that runs safely before a crash event and its duty to design
a system that runs safely after a crash event has begun.
Fault avoidance seeks to make software “foolproof or crashproof” by
averting errors from the outset, at the design and build stages. Lay
discussions of software liability often begin and end with fault avoidance.
As recited earlier, however, perfect fault avoidance is effectively
unachievable.299 The most rigorous strategies—such as formal methods
and model checking—can validate small, limited modules of code. But
because the extra overhead required for this level of perfection is
impracticable for commercial development, these formal constraints are
often relaxed, used sparingly, or omitted entirely, even in safety-critical

297. See Jean-Claude Laprie, Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance: Concepts and
Terminology, 15 PROC. IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING 2 (1985)
(distinguishing between faults that create latent errors, and system failures resulting from activation
of those latent errors); Ang Chen et al., Dispersing Asymmetric DDoS Attacks with SplitStack, 15
PROC. ACM WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN NETWORKS 197 (2016) (observing that existing responses
to distributed-denial-of-service attacks “primarily focus on stopping the attack traffic as early as
possible,” either at the source, in the network, or at the end hosts).
298. PETER ALAN LEE & THOMAS ANDERSON, FAULT TOLERANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 4–
8 (Springer-Verlag/Wien 1990) (1981) (“What is surprising is that, until recently, tolerance for
software faults has not been advocated and that almost all software research has been applied to
chasing the elusive goal of producing perfect software.”); PULLUM, supra note 30, at 7–13; Laprie,
supra note 297, at 3; see also WILFREDO TORRES-POMALES, SOFTWARE FAULT TOLERANCE: A
TUTORIAL, NASA 6–7 (2000) (describing two methods of dealing with software faults on the front
end (fault prevention and fault tolerance) as well as two methods on the back end (fault removal and
workarounds)).
299. See supra Section III.C.
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systems.300 Compromising on ex ante correctness, of course, implies that
some errors will slip through despite best efforts. To compensate, software
developers lean heavily on ex post error removal strategies: testing the
code as much as is economically feasible, and fixing any errors discovered
thereby. But a well-known truism of software assurance is that testing
cannot prove the absence of errors, only their presence.301 Thus it is
inevitable that all commercial software is shipped with latent errors.
Fault tolerance picks up where fault avoidance leaves off and attempts
to minimize the likelihood that latent errors will lead to system failures.
Within this literature, “faults” and “errors” are defined as distinct from
“failures,” to emphasize the point that faults need not lead immediately or
inevitably to failures.302 Ordinarily, a fault might generate an error which
in turn might lead to failure;303 but that fault is tolerated when the error is
detected in time and failure is thereby averted or minimized.
A vivid illustration, borrowed from the physical world, is the concept
of the “flight envelope.”304 When an airplane loses its engines, it does not
immediately fall out of the sky. Instead, momentum continues to carry the
machine forward without noticeable change for some period of time. This
margin of error (the “flight envelope”) can be computed using the altitude
and speed at which the airplane is traveling. If the engines recover while
the plane remains inside the flight envelope, the flight can continue
undisturbed. Alternatively, if engine recovery is not an option, the pilot

300. See PULLUM, supra note 30, at 8–9 (observing that “formal methods have not been generally
used on large projects” due to difficulty and overhead, but suggesting that formal methods might be
usable on a specific part of a system to handle risk mitigation if that component were “small enough”).
301. See id. at 11 (“Testing has its problems, too, and these should be kept in mind: it is not
currently possible to exhaustively test a large, complex system; testing can show the presence, but not
the absence of faults; it may be impossible to test under realistic conditions; and specification errors
may not be visible until the system is used under operational conditions.”).
302. See id. at 3–4 (“A fault is the identified or hypothesized cause of an error, sometimes called a
‘bug.’ . . . An error is part of the system state that is liable to lead to a failure. It can be unrecognized
as an error (i.e., latent) or detected . . . . A failure occurs when the service delivered by the system
deviates from the specified service, otherwise termed an incorrect result.”).
303. See Laprie, supra note 297, at 4 (“[A] programmer’s mistake is a fault: the consequence is a
(latent) error in the written software (erroneous instruction or piece of data); upon activation . . . the
error becomes effective; when this effective error produces erroneous data (in value or in the timing
of their delivery) which affect the delivered service, a failure occurs.”).
304. Ang Chen et al., Fault Tolerance and the Five-Second Rule, in 15 PROC. USENIX CONF. ON
HOT TOPICS IN OPERATING SYS. 11 (2015) (using the flight envelope concept to argue that “allowing
small mistakes could also be a useful approach to fault tolerance in distributed systems”).
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has some time to plan a more graceful failure mode, such as a water
landing or a cockpit ejection.305
To be clear, this “crashworthy code” doctrine would constitute a new,
additional theory of liability; it would not preempt any existing tort rules.
For example, suppressing knowledge of an available bug fix could result
in separate charges for failure of the duty to warn, even if the code satisfies
the duty of crashworthiness.306 Likewise, an autonomous car would still
be subject to the same safety standards as a manual car, including
negligence, products liability, and conventional crashworthiness—but the
autonomous car would be expected further to meet a standard of code
crashworthiness. That duty could be fulfilled by building in an adequate
level of software fault tolerance.
1.

Redundancy

Software fault tolerance consists of three key elements:
(1) redundancies; (2) adjudication methods; and (3) recovery modes.
Redundancy is the basic building block of any fault-tolerant design.307 In
the physical world, redundant design is ubiquitous and readily
identifiable. Eighteen-wheeler trucks are better equipped to handle a flat
tire than two-wheel motorcycles; twin-engine planes are safer than singleengine planes; server farms are less likely to suffer data loss than personal
home computers. Redundancy need not be identical; devices such as
seatbelts and airbags add redundancy by offering complementary forms
of crash protection. Today, many cyber-physical manufacturers already
tout hardware redundancies—such as diverse arrays of sensors, spare
batteries, and backup engines—as markers of their commitment to safety.

305. See Robert D. McFadden, All 155 Aboard Safe as Crippled Jet Crash-Lands in Hudson, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A1; Christine Negroni, A 1956 Version of Landing an Airplane on Water,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2017, at A18; cf. RICHARD H. GRAHAM, FLYING THE SR-71 BLACKBIRD 43–48
(2008) (narrating the survival of test pilot Bill Weaver); NADER, supra note 22, at 81–86 (narrating
the survival of air cadet Hugh De Haven).
306. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable Expectation of
Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109 (2010).
307. See Brian Randell, System Structure for Software Fault Tolerance, SE-l IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON SOFTWARE ENG’G, at 2 (1975) (“All fault tolerance must be based on the provision of useful
redundancy, both for error detection and error recovery. In software the redundancy required is not
simple replication of programs but redundancy of design.”).

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

104

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:39

Unlike hardware redundancies, software redundancies remain
uncommon.308 The main hurdle is that true redundancy of code is costly
to build, because it requires more than simply duplicating extra instances
of the same code.309 Hardware components can be doubled up because
wear-and-tear occurs at variable rates, but each copy of software is exactly
identical.310 Extra copies of software will replicate the same errors and fail
in precisely the same way given the same inputs.311 This identity is a hardwon feature of software architecture, which strives to conceal or abstract
away the “machine” layer as much as possible in order to ensure that
random quirks across different machines do not corrupt software
execution.312 This abstraction is useful because it allows software
engineers to build highly reproducible systems. It also means that
effective software redundancy depends on injecting artificial diversity
back into the system—in a carefully planned manner.313
Two accepted ways to introduce diversity into a software system are
design diversity and data diversity. The first involves implementing the
same task multiple times in multiple ways—using different algorithms,
different
programming
languages,
or
different
computing
314
environments. Ideally, each implementation is sufficiently independent
308. See Ellis F. Hitt & Dennis Mulcare, Fault-Tolerant Avionics, in AVIONICS DEVELOPMENT
IMPLEMENTATION 8-1, 8-11 (Cary R. Spitzer ed., 2d ed. 2007) (noting in the avionics context that
“[i]n general, much of this redundancy resides in additional hardware components”).
309. See Jie Xu et al., Dynamic Adjustment of Dependability and Efficiency in Fault-Tolerant
Software, in PREDICTABLY DEPENDABLE COMPUTING SYSTEMS 155 (Brian Randell et al. eds., 1995)
(summarizing space and time overheads of software fault tolerance techniques); PULLUM, supra note
30, at 73 (collecting experimental studies finding that “the cost of threefold diversity . . . is not three
times that of a single development (it is less) and the cost of twofold diversity is less than twice that
of a single development”).
310. See LEE & ANDERSON, supra note 298, at 62–63 (observing that physical fault tolerance
assumes that “failures will occur independently in independent replicated components” but that
“software systems do not wear out”).
311. PULLUM, supra note 30, at 18–19 (“If the same software is copied and a failure occurs in one
of the software replicas, that failure will also occur in the other replicas and there will be no way to
detect the problem. (This assumes the same inputs are provided to each copy.)”).
312. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 192, at 2 (noting that digital circuit designers have “learned to
harness intrinsically stochastic processes (the motions of electrons) to deliver a precision and
reliability that is unprecedented in the history of human innovation”); Chisnall, supra note 192, at 44
(explaining that even the C language, which is considered “close to the metal,” relies on substantial
abstractions from the physical machine); see also Clark, supra note 192, at 109; SHNEIDMAN ET AL.,
supra note 192. See generally BACH, supra note 192.
313. PULLUM, supra note 30, at 25; Randell, supra note 307.
314. The two original design-diverse schemes are “recovery blocks” and “N-version
programming.” See J.J. Horning et al., A Program Structure for Error Detection and Recovery, in 16
LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 171 (G. Goos & J. Hartmanis eds., 1974); L. Chen &
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to minimize the likelihood of identical error causes. A prominent example
is the Airbus A320 flight control system, introduced in the late-1980s,
which uses two versions of the same software running simultaneously on
independent computers manufactured by separate companies and having
distinct functional specifications.315 Because each variant is expected to
produce the same behavior, any discrepancy indicates a fault has been
detected.
Data diversity operates on a similar principle, except that the variants
are generated by altering the input data rather than the program code.316
Again, each data variant must be non-identical yet logically equivalent,
such that a discrepancy in result signals the presence of a fault, rather than
a valid difference. Sensor “fusion” offers a real-world application where
data can be collected and combined from multiple sensor devices to
provide useful diversity for fault tolerance purposes.317 Distributed
computing systems offer another important use case for cyber-physical
manufacturers, where each node can be running identical code but
receiving sufficiently proximate input to generate robust data
redundancy.318 In these examples, the method works when the data is
generated independently, yet is expected to be reasonably consistent; it
does not work if the diverse data sources are uncorrelated.

Algirdas Avizienis, N-Version Programming: A Fault-Tolerance Approach to Reliability of Software
Operation, 8 PROC. ANN. IEEE INT’L CONF. ON FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING 3 (1978). Subsequent
variations explored within the literature include distributed recovery blocks, consensus recovery
blocks, N self-checking programming, and acceptance voting. See PULLUM, supra note 30, at 106,
132–72.
315. See Dominique Brière & Pascal Traverse, AIRBUS A320/A330/A340 Electrical Flight
Controls: A Family of Fault-Tolerant Systems, 23 PROC. IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON FAULT-TOLERANT
COMPUTING 616 (1993); Hitt & Mulcare, supra note 308, at 8-8 to 8-9 (describing design diversity
in the flight control software for various aircraft manufactured by Airbus, Boeing, Lockheed, and
McDonnell Douglas).
316. See P.E. Ammann & J.C. Knight, Data Diversity: An Approach to Software Fault Tolerance,
37 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS 418 (1988); P.E. Ammann, Data Redundancy for the
Detection and Tolerance of Software Faults, 22 PROC. SYMP. ON THE INTERFACE 43 (1990). Temporal
diversity, which alters time as the data input, is sometimes treated as its own category of software
diversity. See D.J. Martin, Dissimilar Software in High Integrity Applications in Flight Control, in
SOFTWARE FOR AVIONICS, AGARD CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, NATO (1982).
317. See Radoslav Ivanov et al., Attack-Resilient Sensor Fusion for Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical
Systems, 15 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON EMBEDDED COMPUTING SYS., Feb. 2016, at 21-1, 21-2.
318. See Jiaxing Zhang et al., SIROM3 – A Scalable Intelligent Roaming Multi-Modal Multi-Sensor
Framework, 38 IEEE ANN. COMPUTER SOFTWARE & APPLICATIONS CONF. 446 (2014).
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Adjudication

Once a discrepancy has been detected, the system must decide which
variants are true and which are false. Two general categories of
adjudicatory methods exist: acceptance tests and voting algorithms.
Acceptance tests offer a sanity check on whether an output is within an
appropriate range or is otherwise reasonable. For example, if a flight
control system computes an airspeed value that is impossible given the
structural capabilities of the aircraft, then it is immediately evident that
something must be wrong with the sensor, the computer, or the aircraft.319
Likewise, in a networked environment, if a request does not receive any
response within a preset time period, returning a “time out” error is a very
common use of an acceptance test to avoid an undesirable wait. Thus,
acceptance tests offer a quick way to check and weed out certain kinds of
invalid results. But they are ineffective at adjudicating between equally
plausible results.
When the discrepancy is less easily resolved, a voting mechanism is
needed to move forward. A broad selection of choices among election
protocols offers different advantages and tradeoffs.320 One important
consideration involves how to define the passing threshold. The simplest
scheme is a majority count.321 More nuanced variations have
experimented with plurality voting, weighted average voting, predictive
voting, as well as hybrid voting schemes, in order to optimize the
likelihood of achieving a correct result depending on starting assumptions
about how a system could be attacked or compromised.322

319. See H. Hecht & M. Hecht, Fault-Tolerant Software, in FAULT-TOLERANT COMPUTING:
THEORY AND TECHNIQUES 658 (D.K. Pradhan ed., 1986).
320. See G. Latif-Shabgahi et al., A Taxonomy for Software Voting Algorithms Used in SafetyCritical Systems, 53 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY 319 (2004); Paul R. Lorczak et al., A
Theoretical Investigation of Generalized Voters for Redundant Systems, 19 INT’L SYMP. ON FAULTTOLERANT COMPUTING 444 (1989); Behrooz Parhami, Voting Algorithms, 43 IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON RELIABILITY 617 (1994); Behrooz Parhami, A Taxonomy of Voting Schemes for Data Fusion and
Dependable Computation, 52 RELIABLE ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 139 (1996); cf. Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990) (applying Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem to
argue that there is no perfect voting system).
321. See R. B. Broen, New Voters for Redundant Systems, 97 J. DYNAMIC SYS. MEASUREMENT &
CONTROL 41 (1975).
322. See Latif-Shabgahi, supra note 320, at 322–25; cf. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991) (exploring the use of pooling to overcome
the problem of minority vote dilution in winner-take-all voting systems).
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A second set of issues concerns which voters are eligible to be counted.
Just as vote fraud and vote suppression are persistent fears in political
elections, cyber-physical elections also raise similar concerns. For
example, a common problem for distributed systems is how to
authenticate messages transmitted remotely over the network. When a
system is expecting a response but does not receive one, it could have a
benign explanation such as network latency or temporary glitch, or it
could be due to a malignant cause such as component failure or hostile
attack. Conversely, a response that is properly received could be a spoofed
message that should be distrusted. At one extreme, a perfectly naïve
environment will always allow all possible voters. At the opposite end, a
perfectly paranoid model will be quick to exclude voters, and even
examine voting patterns for evidence of collusion to deceive the system.323
In most real-world systems, regular attacks can be expected so some
method of quarantine is warranted, but finding the right calibration is
tricky because a system that is too quick to disable itself is unusable.
Third, any adjudication scheme in a safety-critical system must grapple
with the element of time.324 Communication is often unreliable in
networked environments, which means responses may not arrive in the
expected sequence (if at all).325 Moreover, cyber-physical systems operate
in real-time, so any crash protection must activate within a useful window
of time.326 Some delay is unavoidable, but taking too long to detect a
software error—like waiting too long to deploy an airbag—could be fatal.

323. See Leslie Lamport et al., The Byzantine Generals Problem, 4 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES & SYS. 382 (1982); Driscoll et al., supra note 192, at 237–38. Current
research has offered algorithms that will tolerate up to one-third of the nodes being compromised. See
Miguel Castro & Barbara Liskov, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance, 3 PROC. SYMP. ON
OPERATING SYS. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION 173 (1999).
324. See Lee, supra note 192, at 365–66 (criticizing the basic design choice to hide timing
properties from higher software layers); Sha et al., supra note 193, at 3–4; Rajkumar et al., supra note
193, at 735.
325. See Lee, supra note 192, at 4 (“Concurrent software often has timing-dependent behavior in
which small changes in timing have big consequences.”); Linh Thi Xuan Phan, Towards a Safe
Compositional Real-Time Scheduling Theory for Cyber-Physical Systems, 4 ANALYTIC VIRTUAL
INTEGRATION CYBER-PHYSICAL SYS. WORKSHOP 21, 22 (2013) (explaining that “even small
discrepancies [in timing] can cause scheduling anomalies and thus ‘snowball’ into large anomalies”);
see also Driscoll, supra note 192, at 241 (stating that the more common problems for Byzantine fault
propagation are in the time domain).
326. See Linh Thi Xuan Phan, supra note 325.
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Recovery

Once the system has detected an error, it must select an appropriate
recovery mode. The solution space consists of backward recovery and
forward recovery.327 Backward recovery techniques attempt to restore or
“roll back” the system to a prior state where the error had not yet occurred.
These methods are especially well-developed in database technologies
where they are critical to guaranteeing the reliability of financial ledgers
and other transactions that demand high fidelity but not real-time
availability.328
For cyber-physical systems, where timing considerations are inherently
vital, forward recovery techniques are the more optimal choice.329 The
essential thrust is to neutralize the detected error by switching to a new
state, rather than by reverting to a prior state. By physical analogy, if
backward recovery is like rewinding a tape, then forward recovery is like
swapping out the tape—or even the entire tape deck.
The gold standard of forward recovery is for the system to self-correct
or mask faults without skipping a beat. That seamlessness is best achieved
by executing redundant software processes in parallel, and cycling out
faulty components upon detection.330 Given the difficulties of fault
detection, cruder models cycle components on a proactive basis even
where no fault has been detected.331 More elegant alternatives to bruteforce redundancy include “roll forward” estimators that attempt to

327. See LEE & ANDERSON, supra note 298, at 144; PULLUM, supra note 30, at 13–17.
328. See Michael Treaster, A Survey of Fault-Tolerance and Fault-Recovery Techniques in Parallel
Systems (Jan. 1, 2005) (pre-print draft), https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0501002.
329. But cf. Maarja Kruusmaa et al., Don’t Do Things You Can’t Undo: Reversibility Models for
Generating Safe Behavior, 2007 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON ROBOTICS & AUTOMATION 1134.
330. See Hitt & Mulcare, supra note 308, at 8-12 to 8-13 (describing fault masking and fault
containment techniques in avionics); Shu-Yi Yu & Edward J. McCluskey, On-line Testing and
Recovery in TMR Systems for Real-Time Applications, 2001 PROC. IEEE INT’L TEST CONF. 240.
331. See Jialei Liu et al., Using Proactive Fault-Tolerance Approach to Enhance Cloud Service
Reliability, 6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CLOUD COMPUTING 1192 (2016); Miguel Castro & Barbara
Liskov, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance and Proactive Recovery, 20 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
COMPUTER SYS. 398, 400 (2002) (describing “a proactive recovery mechanism” that “recovers
replicas periodically even if there is no reason to suspect that they are faulty”); Airworthiness
Directive, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,912 (Dec. 2, 2016) (ordering power to be periodically reset on Boeing 787
aircraft to avoid “simultaneous reset [of all three flight control modules] if continuously powered on
for 22 days”); cf. George Candea & Armando Fox, Crash-Only Software, 9 PROC. WORKSHOP ON
HOT TOPICS IN OPERATING SYS. 67 (2003) (arguing that rebooting from a crash can be faster than and
preferable to performing a clean shutdown and reinitialization).
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forecast what the next actions would have been had the error not
occurred.332
Where fault masking is infeasible or imprudent, the safer choice may
be to transition to graceful degradation or shutdown.333 These types of
reconfiguration or adaptive recovery have long been considered the most
challenging to construct, because they require intimate knowledge of both
the system and the surrounding environment.334 For example, one natural
option for an autonomous vehicle might be to pull over to the breakdown
lane, but where that is and whether the car can get there depends on a host
of variables specific to the vehicle and the road it is on. In the medical
setting, the appropriate response for a heated catheter might be to shut off,
but for a ventilator the safe mode might be to stay on.335 This problem of
heterogeneity has received little concentrated attention from the research
community, but it is arguably the most important because it represents the
catch-all condition when things go wrong. The default workaround is to
trigger a manual override and outsource any improvisational tasks to

332. See Václav Mikolásek & Hermann Kopetz, Roll-Forward Recovery with State Estimation, 14
PROC. IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON OBJECT/COMPONENT/SERV.-ORIENTED REAL-TIME DISTRIBUTED
COMPUTING 179 (2011).
333. See, e.g., Ehsan Dehghan-Azad et al., Sensorless Control of IM for Limp-Home Mode EV
Applications, 32 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER ELECTRONICS 7140 (2017); Oscar González et al.,
Adaptive Fault Tolerance and Graceful Degradation Under Dynamic Hard Real-Time Scheduling, 18
PROC. IEEE REAL-TIME SYS. SYMP. 79 (1997); Linh T.X. Phan & Insup Lee, Towards a Compositional
Multi-Modal Framework for Adaptive Cyber-Physical Systems, 17 PROC. IEEE INT’L CONF. ON
EMBEDDED & REAL-TIME COMPUTING SYS. & APPLICATIONS 67 (2011); see also Algirdas Avizienis,
Toward Systematic Design of Fault-Tolerant Systems, 30 COMPUTER 51, 53 (1997) (describing the
need to define “the acceptability of different modes of service (full, reduced, degraded, emergency, safe
shutdown, and so on) for each phase and establish each mode’s required service level”).
334. See LEE & ANDERSON, supra note 298, at 146–47 (explaining the shortcomings of forward
error recovery as including that it is “designed specifically for a particular system” and “inappropriate
as a means of recovery from unanticipated faults”); PULLUM, supra note 30, at 17 (forward recovery
is “application-specific,” “can only remove predictable errors,” and “requires knowledge of the
error”).
335. Thanks to Jane Chong for suggesting this example.
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human intelligence.336 But any remote backdoor necessarily introduces
new vulnerabilities and failure points to the cyber-physical system.337
C.

The Reasonable Fault-Tolerant System

The crashworthy code framework is a rule of reason. As such, it offers
a nuanced alternative to the bright-line schemes favored by consumer
protectionism and technology protectionism. At the same time, it is a
different measure of reasonableness than orthodox applications of
negligence and products liability law, because it redirects judicial scrutiny
away from the initial code failure and instead toward the subsequent
mitigation response.
To illustrate how this rule might work in practice, consider again the
case described at the opening of this Article, Singh v. Edwards
Lifesciences Corp.338 In the actual case, the software error in the heart
monitor was exacerbated by the manufacturer’s knowledge and callous
disregard of the risk, which greatly simplified the jury’s decision to hold
the manufacturer culpable. But suppose the manufacturer had no
forewarning. A conventional negligence or products liability analysis
might attempt to weigh the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s software
development process by considering whether the manufacturer had
followed industry norms for code review and validation testing. But
absent rare circumstances, this inquiry would be a dead end.

336. See Alex Davies, Self-Driving Cars Have a Secret Weapon: Remote Control, WIRED (Feb. 1,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/human-problem-blocking-path-self-driving-cars/
[https://perma.cc/C97F-7JKJ]; Mary L. Gray & Siddharth Suri, The Humans Working Behind the AI
Curtain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-humans-working-behind-theai-curtain [https://perma.cc/35YK-DJL7]; Gunar Schirner et al., The Future of Human-in-the-Loop
Cyber-Physical Systems, 46 COMPUTER 36 (2013); Olivia Solon, The Rise of ‘Pseudo-AI’: How Tech
Firms Quietly Use Humans to Do Bots’ Work, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/06/artificial-intelligence-ai-humans-bots-techcompanies [https://perma.cc/88MG-3R8X]; Press Release, Ca. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Driverless
Testing and Public Use Rules for Autonomous Vehicles Approved (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/2018/2018_17
[https://perma.cc/GPH9NAJ8] (announcing revisions to California DMV rules approving fully autonomous vehicles on
condition that such vehicles have a “communication link between the vehicle and a remote operator”).
But see Josiah Dykstra & Eugene H. Spafford, The Case for Disappearing Cyber Security, COMM.
ACM, July 2018, at 40.
337. See Abdulmalik Humayed et al., Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey, 4 IEEE
INTERNET THINGS J. 1802, 1809–10 (2017) (explaining that cyber-physical systems have traditionally
relied on an assumption of isolation or “security by obscurity,” and that adding more connectivity
increases the number of attack vectors); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995).
338. See supra text accompanying note 1.

05 - Choi.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:35 PM

CRASHWORTHY CODE

111

By contrast, a court conducting a crashworthy code analysis would be
able to scrutinize directly the code design itself, for the narrow purpose of
inquiring whether it used appropriate software fault tolerance techniques.
A total absence of such techniques within a safety-critical system would
constitute a per se violation. Likewise, if some efforts had been made but
were found cursory or insufficient, then the manufacturer would not
escape liability. But as long as the manufacturer’s efforts were reasonably
adequate, then recovery would be barred under this claim even if
Mr. Singh suffered the same horrific injuries as described in the actual
case.
Two ensuing questions are why the shift to crashworthy code offers a
better reasonableness framework, and how much crashworthiness is
enough to be sufficient.
The first question can be addressed in three parts. From an engineering
perspective, requiring software fault tolerance is less disruptive to the dayto-day practices of software engineering than second-guessing the
correctness of each and every line of code. Adding software redundancy
requires more programmer hours, but not qualitatively different ones. By
relinquishing the assumption of fault-free code, most software engineers
can continue to write and test code as they do today, without an abrupt
overhaul of programming norms or culture.339 Reframing cyber-physical
liability in terms of crashworthiness or risk mitigation also has the virtue
of aligning well with broader trends in cybersecurity practice.340
From the judicial perspective, a crashworthy code doctrine offers an
easier analytical framework because it shifts the locus of tort scrutiny
from whether any arbitrary segment of code is “unreasonable” or
“defective,” to whether a specific, smaller subset of code provides
adequate failsafe functionality. Instead of second-guessing each and every
software design decision, the judicial inquiry is limited to reviewing the
reasonableness of only the fault tolerance aspects. In particular,
adjudication modules need to be handled with heightened care, given how
crucial their role is as the nerve center of fault detection. Luckily, the
limited size and scope of those modules may make it cost-efficient to
require use of formal methods as well as other emerging techniques such

339. Whether programming ethics should change is a normative question reserved for future work.
See also Don Gotterbarn et al., ACM Code of Ethics: A Guide for Positive Action, COMM. ACM, Jan.
2018, at 121.
340. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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as protected memory space on the processor chip.341 More challenging
will be the task of pushing companies to develop robust fault recovery
techniques. In the near term, courts will likely require only modest
improvements such as better emergency warnings and human handoffs.342
More avant-garde techniques will need to be proven in the field before
prevailing at trial.343
For consumers, a crashworthy code doctrine offers a more intuitive way
to describe whether a cyber-physical injury is unreasonable, without
having to understand the technical reasons for the code crash that caused
it. That explainability generates a more effective cause of action at trial,
which in turn engenders more consumer trust that code quality can be
vetted in court. It also has the potential to lower market prices by reducing
development and testing times, cutting down on pass-through costs such
as insurance premiums, and decreasing barriers to entry.344 Hopefully it
can save some lives, too.
The second issue—how much fault tolerance is “good enough”—is the
proverbial devil in the details. Every case involving cyber-physical injury
will necessarily feature an instance where fault tolerance has failed (or is
absent). But crashworthiness does not mean code must prevent all faults,
nor does it mean code must never cause physical harm. In code crashes—
just as in automotive crashes—safety measures will sometimes fail to
prevent death, bodily injury, or property damage. Not all such cases
should trigger liability. How courts choose to meter liability will be the
determinative factor that distinguishes this doctrine from absolute liability
and absolute immunity.
Of the two common-law limitations developed in the automotive
context, fault apportionment and state of the art, the former is likely to
play a diminished role in the cyber-physical setting. That is not to say end
users can never be held at fault. Those with direct physical access to the
341. See Victor Costan & Srinivas Devadas, Intel SGX Explained, in IACR CRYPTOLOGY EPRINT
ARCHIVE 1, 2 (2016), (describing an Intel processor architecture that “protects the integrity and
confidentiality of the computation inside an enclave by isolating the enclave’s code and data from the
outside environment”). But see Johannes Götzfried et al., Cache Attacks on Intel SGX, 10 PROC. EUR.
WORKSHOP ON SYS. SECURITY (2017) (describing side-channel vulnerabilities in the SGX method).
342. But see Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1626–29; Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast and Furious: The
Misregulation of Driverless Cars, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 31–34 (2017) (collecting
skepticism that “a quick handoff from machine to human is feasible”).
343. See supra notes 292–296 and accompanying text.
344. But cf. Martha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and Tort Law, 6
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9 (2000) (describing the focus on efficient pricing in business and
products liability law as being in opposition to the moral values of the consumer law movement in
the United States).
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system will be able to “jailbreak,” “mod,” or otherwise misuse the system
in unauthorized ways.345 Apportionment may be apt as well when a system
is designed to hand off control to the end user in case of emergency, and
the end user is negligent in not taking the helm.346 As for third parties who
obtain remote access to hijack or disable cyber-physical systems from
afar,347 courts should refuse apportionment. Even though these instances
involve a clear intervening actor, anyone designing a software fault
tolerance scheme should be expected to foresee and respond to
cyberattacks.348
As apportionment claims fade in relevance, courts can expect to see a
concomitant rise in disputes over the state of the art, as manufacturers seek
to limit their damages. Courts do not expect manufacturers to achieve the
impossible,349 but even within the realm of possible, there is plenty of
room for minds to differ as to what software engineering is presently
capable of bringing to market. One principal fault line will be to screen
which persons are competent to speak as experts in the field. For complex
technologies such as software engineering, courts defer to technical
experts but play a crucial gatekeeper function in disallowing non-credible
witnesses.350 The American experience with automotive engineering
345. See Trace H. Jackson, Can Jailbreaking Put You in Jail, Broke?, 68 FLA. L. REV. 631 (2016);
Pamela Samuelson, New Exemptions to Anti-Circumvention Rules, COMM. ACM, Mar. 2016, at 24.
346. See, e.g., Neal E. Boudette, Tesla’s Self-Driving Tech Cleared in Crash Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2017, at B1; Tom Krisher & Jacques Billeaud, Police: Backup Driver in Fatal Uber Crash
Was Distracted, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2018; Press Release, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd.,
Preliminary Report Issued for Investigation of Fatal, Mountain View, California, Tesla Crash (June
7,
2018),
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/pages/nr20180607.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VN2X-VBKY]. But cf. John R. Quain, The Autonomous Car vs. Human Nature,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2016, at B4.
347. See Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
348. Compare In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (aircraft manufacturers
owe a duty to install unbreachable cockpit doors that locks out hijackers), and Nash v. Port Auth. of
N.Y. & N.J., 856 N.Y.S.2d 583 (App. Div. 2008), with Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp.,
189 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 1999), and Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2003). For a
longer discussion of the role of foreseeability in duty to guard against acts of terrorism, see JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, OXFORD INTRODUCTION TO TORTS 171–76 (2010).
349. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556 (Cal. 1991) (“[I]f a
manufacturer could not count on limiting its liability to risks that were known or knowable at the time
of manufacture or distribution, it would be discouraged from developing new and improved products
for fear that later significant advances in scientific knowledge would increase its liability.”);
Henderson v. Ford Motor Corp., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974) (“[T]he manufacturer is not charged by
the law nor expected by the purchasing public to design every part to be the best that science can
produce or to guarantee that no harm will befall the user.”).
350. See Eli Siems & Kathy Strandburg, Trade Secrets and Markets for Evidential Forensic
Technology 22–37 (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author) (describing the rise of the
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shows that the establishment of industrial research laboratories, trade
groups, and governmental advisory panels can have a powerful influence
on who gets a seat on the witness stand.351 The software engineering
community is far less cohesive than the Big Four automakers were in their
heyday, and it has long prided itself on its antiestablishment orientation
and hobbyist culture.352 This freedom to code has been an asset in
attracting talent in the early decades, and should continue to be embraced
in most software development settings. For safety-critical applications,
though, formal organization as a professional discipline would help
generate an expert consensus that would have powerful influence over
legal determinations of the state of the art.
Turning to the merits of the state-of-the-art defense, the closest
question will be how to draw lines between research in the lab that is too
speculative to trigger liability, versus commercially ready technology that
is unavailable for reasons other than viability. By analogy, automakers
neglected to install side mirrors, door latches, and other straightforward
safety measures long after they were feasible, because they were viewed
as unnecessary frills.353 Automakers’ deliberate disregard of these simple,
life-saving measures fueled an angry backlash against the industry.
Arguably, within the field of software fault tolerance, redundancy and
adjudication techniques are sufficiently well-developed and generalizable
to make the case that companies should already be availing themselves of
those safety measures. Less persuasive is the readiness and availability of
recovery techniques, because the requirements are so heterogeneous, the
solution set so open-ended, and the legal pressures nonexistent, that
research efforts have been sparse.
Where the current state of the art falls short of the desired mark,
lawmakers may wish to explore interim measures to incentivize
advancement of the art. For instance, cyber-physical manufacturers could
Daubert standard, which positions judges as gatekeepers, over the Frye standard, which defers entirely
to the scientific community); Sarah Jeong, The Judge’s Code, VERGE (Oct. 19, 2017, 10:57 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/19/16503076/oracle-vs-google-judge-william-alsup-interviewwaymo-uber [https://perma.cc/MYE5-CN29] (profile on Judge William H. Alsup, who received
media attention for being the rare judge claiming to possess some knowledge of software
programming).
351. See NADER, supra note 22, at ch.7.
352. A compelling analogy can be drawn to the early days of auto manufacturing, when the field
was littered with hundreds of independent inventors and small entrepreneurs scattered across the
country, before the industry consolidated in the 1920s. See generally BEVERLY RAE KIMES,
PIONEERS, ENGINEERS AND SCOUNDRELS: THE DAWN OF THE AUTOMOBILE IN AMERICA (2004).
353. Cf. O’CONNELL & MYERS, supra note 24, at 20 (quoting a tire official: “Detroit is probably
the only place in the world where a ten-cent saving per car looks like $3.5 million.”).
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be required to generate and update an auditable Crashworthy Code Plan
that justifies how their system detects and recovers from code crash
events. Other cybersecurity regulations require broadly termed Privacy
and Security Plans,354 which have been criticized as lacking substantive
remedies and being too deferential to weak industry practices.355
Specifying a narrow, defined goal such as software fault tolerance may
prove more effective at raising the bar. Tying the documentation
requirement to the liability standard is important; early iterations of the
plan may be weak, but the repeated exercise of having to defend how
one’s software fault tolerance compares to the state of the art would drive
manufacturers to inspect and adopt new techniques at a faster clip. In turn,
adoption by some manufacturers would influence and advance peer
perceptions of the state of the art, which in turn elevates the standard of
reasonable fault tolerance.
Extending the concept of crashworthiness beyond its original motor
vehicle context will likely raise new complications. Heterogeneous
cyber-physical systems may demand new affirmative defenses. What is
excusable for a self-driving school bus may be different from what is
excusable for an insulin pump.356 The precise contours will need to be
sorted out as such systems are developed and deployed. While much of
that future discussion will invariably focus on establishing an upper bound
on the doctrine, it is worth closing with a reminder that the crashworthy
code doctrine is foremost a mechanism for raising the minimum floor of
software safety.
CONCLUSION: MEMENTO MORI
Code is not perfect, but it can be safer. By accepting that code crashes
are statistically inevitable, courts can skip ahead to how those crashes
could be mitigated, rather than getting mired in the fool’s gold of crash
354. See, e.g., Federal Information Security Management Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549 (2018);
HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2013); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Safeguards Rule, 16
C.F.R. § 314 (2018).
355. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 1594–98; Paul N. Otto, Note, Reasonableness Meets
Requirements: Regulating Security and Privacy in Software, 59 DUKE L.J. 309, 325–29 (2009).
Contra Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 655–56 (2014) (praising the HIPAA Security Rule as “one of the most specific
data security laws” and arguing that industry customs are still better than no standards).
356. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 141–46; David Shepardson, U.S. Regulator Orders
Halt to Self-Driving School Bus Test in Florida, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-selfdriving/u-s-regulator-orders-halt-to-self-driving-schoolbus-test-in-florida-idUSKCN1MW2SG [https://perma.cc/G3VQ-ZPAV].
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prevention. Like the crashworthy doctrine for automotive vehicles, a
crashworthy doctrine for code requires engineers to design for safer
crashes, not just for safer intended uses. In particular, the computer
science literature on software fault tolerance provides a mature toolkit that
could be mandated for all safety-critical cyber-physical systems.
The crashworthy doctrine is a common law judicial doctrine, but its
lessons could be embraced and amplified by other regulatory bodies.357
For example, federal regulators at NHTSA and the FDA have hesitated to
issue firm guidance on cyber-physical safety, reflecting collective, shared
apprehension about how best to regulate software.358 Working in mutual
conversation with the judiciary to establish and expound a crashworthy
code standard may be more robust than each attempting to venture forth
alone.359
Another area for future work is extension to artificial intelligence
techniques such as deep learning where scholarly concern has focused
more on data errors than on code errors. As these learning algorithms have
won acclaim for startlingly impressive demonstrations, they have also
come under heavy criticism for their inability to explain those results.360
Researchers have questioned the trustworthiness of those algorithms,
showing that bias in the data leads to bias in the results,361 leading to calls
357. Cf. Mark A. Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet Spot for Autonomous Vehicles, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 337 (2018). See generally Shavell, supra note 91 (exploring the economic tradeoffs
of controlling risk through regulation versus through liability).
358. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 26, at 224–54 (expressing the challenges of “technologyforcing” regulation); GRAHAM, supra note 231, at 37, 55–56 (same).
359. The U.S. Supreme Court’s pending argument in Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2017), cert. granted sub nom., Kisor v. Wilkie, 202 L. Ed. 2d 491 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15),
appears poised to transfer power from federal agencies to courts, which could revitalize common law
over regulatory rulemaking. See also Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon
Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955 (2016) (criticizing the legitimacy of legal jurisprudence developed
through the administrative process).
360. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful
Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (2017); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal
of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018). But cf. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing
with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
653 (2017); Natalie Wolchover, New Theory Cracks Open the Black Box of Deep Learning, QUANTA
MAG. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.quantamagazine.org/new-theory-cracks-open-the-black-box-ofdeep-learning-20170921/ [https://perma.cc/WQ88-3CJC] (describing “information bottleneck”
theory of deep neural networks); see also Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH.
REV., May/June 2017, at 54, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-theheart-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/2DHF-NV65].
361. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/HA2H-CB7H]; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
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for fairness, transparency, and due process in how those results are applied
to citizens.362 If a misclassification could be reframed instead as a kind of
algorithmic “crash,” then a logical follow-up would be to ask whether a
crashworthy design could achieve better performance than one that is
blind to its own fallibility.363
Adopting a crashworthy code doctrine would not be an overnight fix.
Manufacturers would need to adjust budget allocations and alter code
design practices. Courts would need to address important questions such
as how much redundancy is reasonable; what recovery modes should be
legally required; and whether code written for fault tolerance modules can
be held to a heightened standard of reliability. Litigating these questions
could take years if not decades. But by comparison, courts allowed half a
century to go by before applying a crashworthy standard to the automotive
industry. Crashworthy code is the looked-for lynchpin of the coming
cyber-physical era.

104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 330 (1996).
362. See Sam Corbett-Davies, Algorithmic Decision-Making and the Cost of Fairness, 23 ACM
PROC. INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 797 (2017) (quantifying the tension
between improving public safety and satisfying prevailing notions of algorithmic fairness);
Muhammad Bilal Zafar, Fairness Constraints: Mechanisms for Fair Classification, 54 PROC.
MACHINE LEARNING RES. 962 (2017); Shira Mitchell et al., Prediction-Based Decisions and Fairness:
A Catalogue of Choices, Assumptions, and Definitions (Nov. 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.07867.pdf; Kroll et al., supra note 194; Wexler, supra note 10.
363. The layering of multiple AI techniques is well-established in the art, but typically is not used
for redundancy. See David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and
Tree Search, 529 NATURE 484 (2016) (describing AlphaGo’s combined use of two neural networks
performing separate functions).

